Vietnam - a counterintelligence mission
The following document is made available from a person who has since passed. In my opinion it is relevant today considering the onset of the current war with Iran. Direct all concerns to this blogger.
"The defeat of the Infrastructure is a major counterintelligence mission, that must have laws to assure its success. Presently, an attack on the Infrastructure brings major demonstrations by the Liberation Front charging effectively that the government is attacking its political opposition. This is particularly frustrating for the USA when working with third world governments where there is generally corruption and claims that all of its opposition is communist. The free world must come to grips with this dilemma or be frustrated to the end - Communist domination."
M E K O N G D E L T A
T H E
V A L L E Y O F T E A R S
by
NORMAN HURD RICKER, JR.
The views expressed in this book are
the author's and are not necessarily
those of the Department of Defense,
or the Department of the Army.
Cleared for open publication by Directorate For Security
Review (OASD-PA), Department of Defense, 12 March 1968. 000433
Chapter 1 February 1964 5
Chapter 2 March 1964 8
Chapter 3 Impressions April 1964 13
Chapter 4 April 1964 20
Chapter 5 Communist Control 24
Chapter 6 May 1964 27
Chapter 7 June 1964 34
Chapter 8 July 1964 41
Chapter 9 August 1964 46
Chapter 10 George Lahey 51
Chapter 11 Muy Incident 56
Chapter 12 September 1964 58
Chapter 13 October 1964 68
Chapter 14 November 1964 72
Chapter 15 December 1964 74
Chapter 16 James Vincent 79
Chapter 17 January 1965 82
Chapter 18 February 1965 86
Chapter 19 1965 - 1970 90
Chapter 20 1970 - 1971 Second Tour 94
Epilogue 98
Appendix Insurgency 101
I L L U S T R A T I O N S E L E C T I O N
I N D E X
Author
Infant's laundry drying in the sun 9a
Corporal Nugyen-Van-Van 13a
Lieutenant Truc's wife, An 35a
Water well at Binh Thuy Ammunition Depot 47a
Work on the Binh Thuy family quarters 49a
Eakin (American) Compound at Can Tho 56a
Eakin Compound after heavy rain 56b
Building platforms for family quarters 56c
Transport of mud to construction site 56d
Madam Nho 56e
Installation of telephone line 58a
American PFCs cross water installing telephone line 58b
High suspension towers 58c
Truc and An at ancient villa 64a
"Brick Factory" at Binh Thuy Depot 65a
Framework of family quarters 65b
Laborers working on family quarters 65c
Corporal No 65d
Barracks building that was turned into family quarters 66a
Depot Latrine & Barracks 66b
Madam Chu 71a
Depot map - Muy Incident 79a
Binh Thuy kids & candy 84a
Binh Thuy jungle 84b
PFC Back & CWO Sandstrom 84c
Family Quarters Latrine 88a
Nine month old, orphanage 89a
Orphanage, Can Tho 89b
Mother Glossiantte 89c
MAJ Garvais & MSGT Johnson 92a
Kindergarten 103a
Kindergarten 103b
Dalat Plaza Hotel view 105a
St. Pius X Seminary 106a
Dalat Plaza Hotel 106b
Dalat Market area 106c
Dalat Market area 106d
Dalat Market area 106e
Carl's Baptism 107a
Carl's Baptism 107b
Father Nosser & MSG Johnson 107c
LT Dien & SGT Rang, EOD Squad 114a
Lieutenants Duc and Thanh 117a
Lieutenant Vincent, USN, Advisor to Junk Force 119a
Wives of Junkmen receiving gifts 121a
Lieutenant Vincent and small Vietnamese girl 122a
Front view of Duc Me Fatima Nha Tho 128a
Size of Church 128b
Altar of Church 128c
Vietnamese Honor Medal presentation 129a
Trong & Lilas 136a
Truc and An, typical Vietnamese couple 152a
Note: Photos and slides in the above selection list are stored in a box
in the garage; after 30 years they probably are deteriorated.
In 1956, while attending the Armor Company Officer Course at the Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, I first became acquainted with the Republic of Vietnam. One of my classmates was Lieutenant Bui-Long-Hai. Hai (the first name is written last in Vietnamese) and I became fast friends. It is customary at Army Schools that the U.S. officers more or less look after the foreign officers in their class. Hai and I ate lunch and spent much of our free time together talking about Vietnam. So when I was attending the Advance Ordnance Officer Course at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, during the summer of 1963, it was quite natural that I should become closely associated with Nguyen-Trong-Tung and Nguyen-Van-Tam, both Captains. As with Hai, Tung, Tam and I spent our free time together talking about Vietnam. They inspired me to read several books, so by the time of the tragic November coup over throwing Ngo-Dinh-Diem, I had already become quite knowledgeable about the country, it's people, customs, and what the Vietnamese were trying to accomplish in Vietnam. So it was not surprising that I was delighted when I received orders for my first tour of duty as an Advisor in the Republic of Vietnam.
By February 1964, I had settled my wife, Nancy, and our sons, John and Chris, at El Paso, Texas. We had been assigned there at Fort Bliss from June 1960 to July 1963, and we loved it so much that Nancy wanted to stay there while I was in Vietnam. At about 6:00 PM, on February 21, 1964, I bid farewell to my family at the El Paso Airport and flew to Los Angeles, and then on to San Francisco. I took a bus from there to Travis Air Force Base, arriving about 2:00 AM. After reporting at the manifest desk, I was given quarters and told to report to the Dispensary for processing the next morning: I was to be given a booster for my Cholera vaccination that had expired. The passengers for our flight to Saigon had formed in a long line before the door leading to the loading gate for our aircraft.
At 9:30 AM, on February 22, 1964, we boarded a propeller-driven aircraft of the Flying Tiger Line, and were on our way via Alaska and Tokyo. I had received a surprise upon arrival at Travis Air Force Base; we were not to pass through Hawaii as I had expected. Harry and Anne Eastwood, old friends from El Paso, were stationed there, and we had planned to meet for the few minutes we would be landed there. It was too late even to get word to them that I was not coming that way. We landed at Anchorage, Alaska, at lunch time and most of the passengers went into the terminal building to pass the time. After about an hour, we again boarded our aircraft and headed for Tachikawa Air Force Base in Tokyo. We got there at about 11:00 PM, and didn't leave until about 2:00 AM -- that was a long and tiresome wait. We could not leave the terminal and no one provided us with any departure information whatever. Finally we departed and arrived at Tan Son Nhut Airport in Saigon at 6:45 AM, February 24, 1964. As we landed, all the false notions of the situation in Vietnam derived from television and printed articles flood-flooded my mind -- I wondered if we would be fired upon as we landed!
It is true that the newspapers, magazines and television gave the American people a false image of the situation over there. This is largely because almost every incident that took place at that time in Vietnam was reported in about three minutes during a fifteen minute news broadcast or TV program. In reality the number of incidents during my tour with respect to the land area of Vietnam were very greatly distorted by the capsuling or telescoping necessary to report the news in a few minutes. The Republic of Vietnam was about 560 miles long. It was about 40 miles wide at it's narrowest point and about 210 miles wide at it's widest point. The total area of the Republic of Vietnam was about 66,000 square miles. Now a lot can happen in an area that size in just one day; a lot did happen. I do not mean to distract one iota from the seriousness of the situation or the suffering that had been endured by both Vietnamese and Americans in those incidents. However, when five or six serious incidents in Vietnam were reported in a news program in about three minutes, it gave the impression that these incidents were happening in the entire 66,000 square miles of the Republic, which was a very false impression. I hope to indicate the falsity of that impression with a day-by-day account of my activities in Vietnam during my first tour, February 1964 to February 1965. I assumed that we would be fired upon as we touched down at Tan Son Nhut. We were not. We were processed through an administrative section located at the Airport, and briefed on the terror tactics presently being executed by the V.C. in Saigon (the Capitol Kinh Do theater had been bombed on the day I departed Travis Air Force Base for Vietnam). After processing and being given directions as to reporting for Orientation Lectures the next day, we were each dropped off at our assigned temporary quarters in Saigon hotels. These hotels were leased by the U.S. Government and used as Bachelor Officer and Enlisted Quarters. When I got to my room high in the Capitol Hotel, I met Lieutenant James M. Vincent, U.S. Navy; "Vince" became one of my closest friends in Vietnam. We processed during the next two days, during which we were informed of the current political and tactical situation. It terminated with a briefing by Major General Charles J. Timmes, Commanding General of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, explaining why we were in Vietnam, and what we were trying to accomplish. General Timmes' talk was very inspiring. He was a familiar personality to the Advisors in the field, as he often dropped in on them by helicopter to give them an up to the minute status briefing. On one occasion I had just landed at Vi Thanh when everyone was told to report to the Mess Hall immediately. General Timmes had arrived unannounced and gave us one of his famous briefings.
While I was in Saigon, I attempted to locate my old friend Hai (from the Armor School days). Hai had written several letters to me from 230/1 Pasteur Street, and I had hoped to locate him. The entire year I was in Vietnam, I inquired about him, but we never got together. I did locate Tam, and I was lucky for he was later transferred to Nha Trang, and I did not see him again. Tung had resided in Saigon, but I found that he had been transferred up north before my arrival. I spent the evenings shopping in Saigon for gifts for friends and for my family. I found a nice shop owned by To-Giang at 41 Tu Do Street. To-giang had a factory and made beautiful lacquered, brass, and silver items. He was very nice and during my tour I wrote him periodically asking him to select and send gifts to friends back in the United States for me. I went to see Father Robert Crawford, C.M., the Chaplain of the American Catholic Church in Saigon. Father Crawford was a Council Member of the Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation (a Catholic anti-Communist group), had been a missionary in China, a prisoner of the Chinese Communists for 2 1/2 years, and had spent 15 years in the Orient for the Church. I attended his Mass every afternoon when I was in Saigon.
Finally, after touring all of the Ordnance Base Depots in Saigon for ordnance support orientation, I boarded a Caribou (U.S. Army Aircraft) for Can Tho. Can Tho is located on the south bank of the Bossac River in the center of the Mekong Delta area of South Vietnam. It's population at that time was about 50,000 people, and it was the location of the IV Corps Area Logistic Command (CALC). I was assigned as the IV CALC Ordnance Ammunition Supply Advisor. My primary counterpart (Vietnamese officer for whom I was the principal advisor) was Lieutenant No-Van-Hien, the IV Corps Ammunition Depot Commander. I was also the Ammunition Advisor to the 840th Ordnance Battalion Commander, Major Nguyen-Van-Dang. Major Dang had fought with the Viet Minh against the French, and many of the tactics and techniques described in this book are a contribution from him. We talked often of his experiences when we were on road trips throughout 1964.
The week before I got to Can Tho (I arrived on March 4th), two of the Non-Commissioned Officers of the 541st Ordnance Ammunition Company (that operated the IV Corps Ammunition Depot) were ambushed by the V.C. when they were on an inspection road trip. The V.C. actually attacked a gasoline truck that then came across the highway and crashed head-on into the truck in which Sergeant Nho and another Sergeant were riding. Nho was not killed by the accident, but the V.C. killed him. The Sergeant with him was splashed with burning gasoline as he jumped from the vehicle just prior to impact and the V.C. left him for dead. He lived to continue the fight and was later decorated for action against the V.C.. He was horribly disfigured. His face and hands were a mass of scars, and one ear was completely burned away. I mention this incident because Nho's wife was to become my house-keeper later when I moved to Binh Thuy.
The Eakin (American) compound in Can Tho was about 50 yards square and located in the center of town. There were about 14 buildings providing about 145 rooms for living quarters, a Detachment Headquarters building, Officer and Enlisted Mess Halls, an NCO and Officer's Club, Chapel, Dispensary, Post Office, Barber Shop, Post Engineer Office, and a Library. When I arrived there were about 200 people living in this little compound. When I left a year later there were over 300.
On the 5th of March, I came out of my room and met an old friend, Captain Norbert A. Kanzler. Norb and I had attended the Advance Ordnance Officer Course together and he had joined Vince and me to share our room at the Capitol Hotel in Saigon. Now Norb was assigned as the Ordnance Advisor to the 841st Ordnance Direct Support Company.
On the evening of the 6th, we saw a huge red glow over Can Tho, a raging fire. It turned out to be a city block of grass houses. The entire area was completely destroyed in a couple of hours. Hundreds of the people of Can Tho contributed generously and in a week the area was rebuilt.
On the 7th of March our ARVN (Army Republic of Vietnam) Ordnance Battalion loaded a Caribou aircraft with the weapons and a basic load of ammunition for a Hoa Hao Company at Vi Thanh. This was my first of many visits to Vi Thanh. We later established an Ammunition Supply Point there. We returned to Can Tho airfield and loaded and flew a like shipment on a C-123 (U.S. Air Force aircraft) for another Hoa Hao Company at Long Xuyen. The Hoa Hao sect was one of the many separate groups maintaining their own army that President Diem was forced to defeat in order to build a single nation and a single army for the Republic. The Hoa Hao became a guerrilla force---fiercely anti-Communist, but also anti-government. From time to time Hoa Hao military units rallied to the support of the government and we provided them with weapons and ammunition.
March 8th, the V.C. destroyed three large gasoline storage tanks at the ESSO gasoline farm a few blocks from our Can Tho Ammunition Depot. A few days later, the village chief from a village on an island in the Can Tho Canal, just across from our depot, was kidnapped by the V.C.. When he was released, he sent word that the V.C. had said that our ammunition depot was next on their list for attack. We were told by ARVN Counterintelligence that there was at least one V.C. agent, employed as a civilian or soldier, in our depot. ARVN Informants in the V.C. camp had reported that inside information was coming from our depot. All of the Vietnamese had at least one close relative residing in an area that the V.C. controlled at night. They kidnapped these relatives and forced the loyal Vietnamese to become informants or their relatives would die a horrible death. We strengthened our security force, but the V.C. never attacked the Depot in Can Tho.
The ammunition depot in Can Tho was not more than 50 yards square and stored over 500 tons of ammunition. Not only was this an ammunition man's nightmare, but the depot was located in the city of Can Tho itself, with families living all around it. Had the V.C. been successful in destroying this depot the lives lost would have been in the hundreds.
An Advisor cannot "advise" all day long. He must let his counterpart do his job. Each day, I inspected the depot and reported deficiencies to Hien along with advice on how I would correct the situation. After that I could do no more, but leave him alone to carry out his duties and I hoped he would take corrective action on the deficiencies I had found during my inspection. I made studies of the manner in which the Company performed its ammunition support and tried to make good recommendations for improvement. I found Hien to be very receptive and cooperative and we got along very well. I was told that a new depot was being constructed for us at Binh Thuy, ten to twelve kilometers out of Can Tho on the road to Long Xuyen. We drove out to Binh Thuy to inspect the depot and on the way Hien pointed out things of interest. He was proud of his country and enjoyed explaining about it. As we passed through Can Tho, Hien pointed out each of the government buildings, the high school, etc. He explained what had happened to the bridge over the Can Tho Canal, which was destroyed in an accident and was at this time being replaced. About half way between Can Tho and Binh Thuy we stopped at a rice paddy and Hien explained how during the dry season the farmer trapped the canal water at high tide when it came into his paddy, so that it would remain the next day to water the rice. He explained how during the wet season he used the same traps to hold out the water, and to drain his field when the canal tide was low. We walked down the road a hundred meters and observed cashew nuts growing on a tree. At Binh Thuy, I found that no provisions had been made for the families of our Vietnamese soldiers---there was no place for them to live. I suggested and Hien agreed to request that the government purchase the land across from the depot on the Bossac River for our families. Hien also agreed to prepare and submit a storage and stock level plan for the new depot. These were two of the very few instances where statements made by Vietnamese I later found to be false. I can speak only for the Vietnamese I knew, but generally I was impressed with their basic honesty.
On March llth, Chaplain John T. Calter took me to visit the Can Tho Orphanage, operated by the Sisters of Providence, A French congregation. There were over 200 infants up to 2 1/2 years of age in that orphanage, cared for by only six sisters and twelve novices. The mother Superior, Mother Mary Glossiantte, took us through the orphanage and told us, through an interpreter about the orphanage and their problems. The children were usually left at the convent gate by anonymous mothers. Most of them were wives of the many men killed every month in combat with the V.C.. The government gave the orphanage 50 Piasters (then about 75 cents) per child per year, recognizing the help that the Sisters were giving victims of the war. The orphanage was not eligible for any of the U.S. aid programs because it was a religious institution. The only orphanages in the Mekong Delta that I found were church run institutions. The children, of course, are the only ones to suffer from such injustice. The Sisters needed financial and other help: Father Calter was one of their primary supporters. The orphanage was to become a civic action project of mine. At age 2 1/2, the children were moved to another orphanage, run by the same Order of Sisters, for children in the next age bracket. The Sisters operated a day school for another 200 children living in the Can Tho area. Father Calter took on a project of procuring and installing overhead fans to try to cool the sweating infants. I agreed to try to get two washing machines. The Sisters, in their spare time, were washing the infants dirty laundry by hand---the washing machines would free them of many hours of work that kept them from being with the children.
The next morning at 9:00 AM, my assistant (a Master Sergeant) and I joined six other U.S. Advisors and their counterparts for a road trip to Sadec, about 70 km from Can Tho. When we arrived at Sadec, we went directly to the residence of the Ordnance Advisor of the 842d Ordnance Company, Captain Donald Garvais. Don and I had first met when we were fellow students in the Ordnance Ammunition Supply Officer Course at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, in September 1953. The old saying that the paths of Army friends cross many times during a career is very true. It was a good reunion, and we talked of the whereabouts of old classmates we had since seen. Lieutenant The', the Ammunition Staff Officer at Battalion Headquarters, and I visited the site selected for a new ammunition supply point. We finally got that ASP in operation months later. The trip over and back was uneventful---it was the first of many weekly trips over that road.
Regulations required a minimum of two jeeps on a road trip to Sadec. Road travel to other areas required as much as a company of troops as an escort security force. Some roads were not passable at all. We worked our two jeeps as Knights complement each other on a chess board. The V.C. generally used electrically detonated mines on these roads. The mine was placed under or along side the road. The V.C. had a battery and two wires going to the mine. When the vehicle passed in front of him and over the mine, the V.C. touched the two wires to the battery and detonated the mine. We assumed there to be no defense against the attack by the people in that jeep. So the people in the front jeep covered both flanks of the rear jeep and the rear jeep covered the flanks of the front jeep. Of course, we each also observed an assigned sector from the jeep; but had a jeep been mined, the other jeep would have placed fire on both flanks about 50 meters out. The V.C. had to be there some place. Everyone in Vietnam had their own ideas about road tactics, this was mine. We stayed very alert, with weapons ready. We were never attacked. It is very easy to become careless after several of these uneventful trips and as a result there were enough vehicles with relaxed personnel (I reasoned) that the V.C. would avoid an alert convoy and wait for a better prey sure to come by in a few minutes. Of course, if the target was me as an individual---.
On the evening of March 13th, the U.S. Advisors entertained their counterparts at Eakin Compound Officer's Club, then we were the dinner guests of the Vietnamese at the Phong Dinh Lau (Phong Dinh was the name of the Province and Lau means restaurant) in downtown Can Tho. For dinner we had shark fin and crab soup, fried crab claws, fried shrimp, broiled bird, fish, and fried rice (with bits of beef, pork, fried egg, and onion greens mixed in). Along with this we had a sauce called Nuoc Mam. Nuoc Mam is heavy salted fish aged to fermentation and then distilled. There is no more repugnant smell than that coming from a Nuoc Mam factory! But the end-product is odorless and quite good. The Vietnamese usually have salt on the table, but Nuoc Mam is the main source of salt in their diet.
Construction at the new Binh Thuy depot was well underway at this point. The work there did not progress without incident. There were several incidents, all about the same in nature. On the 15th of March, a V.C. platoon rounded up the laborers in the depot. One of the laborers ran and the V.C. killed him. They left immediately, knowing that the Binh Thuy Strong Point would dispatch a security force to pursue them.
Our after duty hour life at the Eakin Compound was pretty well stereotyped. The same people could be found at the officers club every night, as could the show watchers be found at the theater (chapel). I spent most of my free time in my room reading, or visiting with Norb. The next most enjoyable remembrance was the time spent playing Ping-Pong with Chaplain Frank Deese, our Protestant Chaplain. He was one of the top players in the compound, and it was my greatest challenge to try to beat him. I finally found a technique to do so; I encouraged people to challenge the winner (always Chaplain Deese) until he was tired and wanted to quit--then I would challenge the winner myself! Chaplain Deese was the most liked and respected person in the compound, certainly as an outstanding Christian. On weekends, Norb and I often took long walks from the compound all around Can Tho, to spend our time sight seeing and shopping.
On Holy Thursday, March 26th, the American Catholics went to Mass at the IV Corps Vietnamese Army Chapel. Chaplain Calter celebrated Mass for both ARVN and US personnel, and his servers were Vietnamese. The unity of the Catholic Church was never so evident to me as that day. The Vietnamese soldiers and their families couldn't speak or understand English, but all of us were on common ground at our Latin Mass.
By now I was getting my feet on the ground in my job as an Advisor and each day was filled with activity. Hien and I got along very well and ammunition supply throughout the Delta was running smoothly. Hien told me that he would soon be transferred to 50th Base Depot at Thanh Thuy Ha. He would not be here for the move to the new depot at Binh Thuy.
On Good Friday, March 27th, Hien and the Company officers took me to dinner at a little restaurant in Can Tho. Hien jokingly enjoyed trying to shock me with peculiar foods. This night we had snake, turtle and frog. I dreaded this meal and it was just as bad as I had expected. I was certain I would be deathly ill the next day -- but I wasn't. I had resolved that I would not decline to eat anything offered to me the first time, but after having tried something once, I would feel free to decline to eat it again. I declined to eat snake the next time it was offered to me! One thing that I did like that night was what they translated as "Shrimp Sheets" or "Shrimp Cake." They pulverized the shrimp with tapioca or rice starch and made it into a paste paddy which was then deep fat fried. It was delicious.
I hated to think of Hien leaving for 50th Base Depot. We had gotten off to such a good start, but in a few days he was gone. First Lieutenant Le-Truc, Hien's replacement, arrived and we got off to a bad start. He wanted to trade his driver for mine. His intentions were good, but I had spent that past month training Nguyen-Van-Van to perform as I wanted him to and his maintenance of the jeep was excellent. Van was now disciplined not to drive over 70 km per hour on road trips (a real accomplishment), and most important, Van and I were beginning to be able to make our thoughts known to the other. Of course, Van was a soldier under Truc's command and Truc could do as he pleased. I told Truc in no uncertain terms that I didn't like it and he let me keep Van. I had confidence in Van. I often facetiously proposed a dangerous road trip and Van would say, "where you go Dai Uy (Captain), I go; if you die, I die with you." I was certain he meant it too. Van and I grew quite close, that unusual closeness of people who share real danger together.
Easter Sunday, March 29th, we celebrated Mass at Eakin Compound.
From my Vietnamese associates, and the accumulated knowledge of Vietnam and it's people, these were my impressions in April 1964 of the big problems in the Republic. Though Vietnam as an area had extensive history, the Republic of Vietnam only dated back to 1954. Her history was the record of achievement made in 10 years by the father of the little Republic, Ngo-Dinh-Diem. Diem, with American aid help, actually performed miracles. In 1954-55, there were 363,160 children enrolled in elementary education. In 1960-61, the total had risen to 1,325,000 of a country with a population of only 14,000,000. In 1954-55, there were 19 secondary schools in the Republic---in 1960-61, there were 62. In 1954, there were three million illiterates. Between 1954 and 1958, some two and a half million people above the age of 13 years attended literacy classes; of these, 1,126,792 passed the final examinations. By the end of 1958, only an estimated 1,200,000 remained illiterate. Between 1955 and 1960, the number of rural brick homes owned increased by more than 800%, while the number that lived in grass houses decreased by almost 25%. Before the Republic was established, there were only 242 health facilities and 11,289 hospital beds throughout the country. From 1954 to 1960, the total number of health facilities increased to 747---an increase in beds of 17,952. Under President Diem, the many armies of the various religious and ethnic groups had to be consolidated into a single army. This meant the war lords would have to give up their power or at a minimum become a part of the national government. Diem's administration had achieved an enviable record. With the support of the United States, his administration had assimilated into the population of the Republic about a million refugees from the Communist government of North Vietnam. Diem established the Strategic Hamlet program that was so effective against the Communists.
Each Strategic Hamlet was a school for adults, where they first learned about democratic processes. They elected their leaders and delegated the various responsibilities essential to the operation of any town. The men were organized into fighting forces for their own self defense. They received lectures on sanitation, health, trades and crafts, modern agriculture techniques, and were taught to read and write. All of this was a part of Chanh-Sach-Nhan Vi (Philosophy of the dignity of man).
The Nhan Vi philosophy of Vietnam was not base upon Capitalism, Communism, Socialism, or any other economic concept. Nhan Vi established that man was just as much a spiritual being as he was a materialistic being. He could neither be happy without the basic material necessities of life, nor could he be happy without the basic spiritual necessities of life. Therefore the Nhan Vi philosophy was concerned about man's soul, his mind and his spirit.
According to Nhan Vi, if we did not recognize man's spiritual being, he was no different from any other animal; he would have no human dignity. The soul of man, therefore, was at the center of all of his objectives, all of his efforts, and all the sacrifices he made. The spiritual development of the individual was essential to his dignity and to his recognition of the dignity of others. Spiritual development, according to Nhan Vi, brought a voluntary willingness of a person to sacrifice his own opportunities for the welfare of his neighbors. This voluntary sacrifice gave greater dignity to the man and raised him to his full value. But forced sacrifice, which detracted from man's dignity, was wrong.
Nhan Vi Society was based on the family unit (which was essential to man's dignity). Everything necessary was to be done to make the family unit healthy, happy and prosperous. The family of families formed the village or hamlet. If the families could be made healthy, happy and prosperous, then so would be the village or hamlet, the family of hamlets (the Province); the family of Provinces (the Republic).
Politically, Nhan Vi guaranteed the individual freedoms required by the unalienable rights of man we have documented in our Declaration of Independence.
The community of families, according to Nhan Vi, must join together to accomplish those objectives which they could not realize themselves. Nhan Vi philosophy held that the work of the individual must result in a direct value to that individual and his family. Therefore, he could not be transported from place to place to perform labor from which he and his family would not immediately benefit as a family unit. The effort must develop the individual's basic property and guarantee to add to his dignity as an individual and not detract from it. His labors had to be directed toward providing the individual with an adequate home and land for him and for his family so that he could live without being obligated and bound to another person. This truly established his spiritual freedom and permitted his own personality to be expressed. A soul that is bound because of an obligation is not free to express his own personality, but must to some extent reflect the personality of the person to whom he is obligated. In such community work (work accomplished by the family of families), the State must furnish the materials and the community must do the work. Such projects might be a school, dispensary, community water well, market place, etc..
The military concept, based upon Nhan Vi, had to derive it's benefits for and establish its goal as the protection of the family unit. At the center of the military concept was the Strategic Hamlet. Here the soldier-civilian was to train and fight to preserve his own Strategic Hamlet, and therefore to preserve his own family. He was therefore deriving direct benefit from his labor and sacrifice. This then, contributed to his dignity. The Civil Guard troops were full time professional soldiers. Each soldier's family derived direct benefit from his total salary as a soldier, as well as the family's preservation. The Civil Guardsman was recruited from the hamlets of his own Province, thus assuring his direct benefit from his labors. The Civil Guard was a local mobile force with the mission to rush to the aid of any hamlet in the Province that was attacked. The Regular Army filled its ranks from the families, hamlets and provinces of the entire Republic. The Nhan Vi theory of benefit of labor was the same for the Regular Army as it was for the Civil Guard. The Regular soldier was better trained and compensated in material reward for the less direct (but still direct) benefit of his labors to his family. Of course, the Army was not only responsible to act as a mobile force to rush to the aid of a Province under attack, it was also to seek out and destroy the enemy (now supposedly separated from the people, secure in their Strategic Hamlets) and destroy him. The Regular soldier therefore fought and made his supreme sacrifice, when called upon to do so, in defense of the family of Provinces, the Republic.
The Vietnamese claimed that the Strategic Hamlet was a Vietnamese concept; others said it was in Malaya that the Strategic Hamlet concept originated; still others say the forts of the American pioneers were it's origin. All are correct as far as the statement goes. But the Vietnamese concept of the Strategic Hamlet was much more than a fortification or safe area; even more than the excellent environmental improvement and population and resource control programs of Malaya.
The Vietnamese concept of the Strategic Hamlet was, in addition to the Malayan and American idea, required to fulfill all the programs and guarantees of the Nhan Vi philosophy. This was the Vietnamese claim to originality. It was here that most of the community work programs were to be accomplished, from which they were guaranteed to receive direct benefit. Bringing together the families of an area into a hamlet was to make it possible to take full advantage of teaching aids for both adult and child education. Credit programs could be instituted under such conditions and could develop local natural resources. The first concepts of true democratic processes of self government were taught (first through class lectures, then through local application). As soon as possible the people selected their own local representative leaders in the hamlet and those to represent them at the Provincial government. Self defense as a community effort was possible in the Strategic Hamlet. Before, as individual farmers living throughout the rural area, it was impossible for them to defend themselves, and it was impossible for the Republic to defend them. In the Strategic Hamlet, all persons were known and identifiable; therefore, Communist infiltration and subversion could be controlled. The identification and control of visitors to the hamlet made it very difficult for the Communists to extort the intelligence, recruits and logistical support essential to their conquest of the Republic. The Strategic Hamlet concept was not only military, it's emphasis was just as much educational, political and social. All of these blended together and focused on the family as a unit; and directed toward the spiritual and material development of the individual; these became the primary building block for the development of man's dignity and respect guaranteed by the Nhan Vi philosophy.
All I have said so far about Nhan Vi, I maintain to have been the Vietnamese concept. Some of Nhan Vi was achieved and some was not. For a period of time, over-zealousness in the development of hamlets extended beyond the capability of the Province and Republic to develop the forces to defend them, thus causing some reversals. Forcing the people into the Strategic Hamlet and to reside off their land was not fully understood and caused resentment of many of the people. But this does not refute the excellent basis of the concept.
Certain clichés here in the United States became accepted ideas for the conduct of the Vietnamese war. Let's see how Nhan Vi philosophy coped with some of these American ideas: "For there to be a victory over the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, the government must have the support of the people." This is obviously true - as far as it goes - but it does not go far enough. Before people can support a government they must have enough security for them to be able to express that support without fear of terror. Security of the people from V.C. terror pressure should have been a first priority. In the Strategic Hamlet Nhan Vi concept, the military forces are the people themselves, the government (the only government they knew and understood) were the leaders of their hamlets and representatives at the Provincial government. These forces and people had the "support of the people" - they were one and the same. If a Hamlet came under attack and they called for Civil Guard support, the Civil Guard certainly had the support of the Hamlet. The Civil guard was fighting to preserve one of it's own hamlets - from which some of the Guardsmen themselves were recruited.
In reality, the paramilitary self defense forces bore the brunt of the war. They had to take the initial attack and defend the hamlet until the Civil Guard and Regular Army forces arrived. It is this group, the paramilitary, that needed to be well trained, equipped, and provided with military Advisors at the lowest levels.
In reality, the development of the concept of democratic processes had to take place at the hamlet. Most of the people couldn't care less what happened in Saigon. The basis for loyalty to the national government was pretty thin in 1964. It was this group, the uneducated rural population, that needed to be taught democratic processes and provided civilian Advisors. In time, when the people were educated to understand the meaning of representative government, it was to be from the Strategic Hamlet Nhan-Vi school that the Provincial government leaders were to be elected.
Of course, Chanh-Sach Nhan Vi was the contribution of President Diem's government; as such it suffered from the smearing of his good name after the coup that over threw him. Everything was done to separate any credit for the good of Nhan Vi from Diem. The Strategic Hamlets were redesignated "New Life Hamlets", but by whatever name you may want to call them the same philosophy prevailed in the hamlets of Vietnam. It is my guess that President Diem and his brother Nhu, merely defined the great bulk of common ideas of the various sections of the Vietnamese people and called it Nhan Vi (it was Natural Law philosophy). They gave it order and a defined meaning. In 1964 I wrote, "If we find it difficult to understand Nhan Vi, then I believe we will also find the people of Vietnam difficult to understand." Today, I doubt that many Americans ever understood the Vietnamese culture or philosophy, and consequently never understood the people. This has been my observation working with Southeast Asian refugees in this Country.
The primary author of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson, left us with his final word which is etched on his memorial in Washington, DC: "The God who gave us life gave us liberty. Can the liberties of a nation be secure when we have removed a conviction that these liberties are the gift of God?"
It seems to me that the conception of our founding fathers for the ideals of our own Country were not based on Capitalism, Communism, or any other economic or materialistic concept; but rather on spiritual concepts of the inherent dignity of man as a gift of God. Perhaps that is why I liked the Nhan Vi philosophy.
While President Diem was accomplishing the astonishing social service development of the Republic, his government was composed of people absolutely loyal to him. There was no loyalty to the government - it had no history - there was nothing to which to be loyal. The people didn't have the slightest conception of the intentions and goals of the government. Largely they did not have the knowledge necessary to understand where the government was going. So President Diem picked people that were loyal to him. He formed a government founded on a constitution. Very much like our own. Though there has been much criticism about the way elections were carried out, the fact remains that there were elections and political parties competing for the vote. No doubt there were illegal actions, just as there are illegal actions in the USA. But Vietnam's politics were no worse than politics in some other countries much closer to us.
Here was ten years of beautiful history (founding fathers, constitution, social service achievements, etc.) upon which loyalty could and indeed was being built. The coup overthrowing President Diem destroyed every bit of this. The new leaders felt compelled to smear the good name of the Country's founding father and consequently smeared all of the good things that had been achieved. The experienced administrators and policy makers that had worked for President Diem were pushed out of the government. The new government then started all over, appointing people who would be loyal to the new leader. No one was loyal to the government, for that would have been "Diem". Now, at this point in my 1964 tour in Vietnam, there was no constitution, people were jailed without trial, all of the things Diem was accused of doing were openly done by the new leaders. When historians criticize the lack of loyalty to the government by the Vietnamese people, they should also recognize these factors.
Consider for a moment what effect one single post-coup government action had on the military and its support of the government: On May 8, 1963 (during the alleged "Buddhist Persecution" which never existed according to the Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission to South Vietnam, published by the U.S. Government printing office, dated February 19, 1964) Major Dang Sy, as commander of the security force, was ordered to disperse a crowd of demonstrators at the radio station in the city of Hue. Two explosions that killed eight people occurred in the crowd. Sy was accused, tried and convicted after the overthrow of Diem of murdering them. The people were alleged to have been killed by MK3 U.S. concussion grenades. Anyone familiar with this grenade knows it is not likely to have caused the extensive mutilation of the victim's bodies left after the Hue demonstrations. Certainly the Vietnamese military, who had experience with this grenade knew its capabilities. Now imagine the effect on ARVN officers assigned in similar security force positions under the later regimes. How would you expect them to act against any future demonstrations? Indeed how did they act under later regimes until the military took over the government? They shied away from taking any action at all. After all, if the next coup should be successful, might they not also be tried by the "Revolutionary Court" as was Dang Sy? Major Dang Sy was sentenced to prison for life.
I wonder how it would all have ended had a way been found to reinstate President Diem's good name and reclaim the history he built for the Republic. Could a more intense sense of loyalty to the government, with an additional 10 years of building history, made the difference in April 1975?
On April 2d, 1964, Truc and I escorted Major Thong, Assistant to The ARVN Chief of Ordnance, and Capt Xuyen from Ammunition Branch, Office of The Chief of Ordnance, to Sadec to see the selected site for the new Ammunition Supply Point (ASP). That night we had our informal farewell party for Hien and the welcome party for Truc at the Phong Dinh Lau restaurant. We had a nine course dinner. First, duck stew with grass (literally translated Fairy Hair) which was boiled with the duck; second, fried chicken; third, fried bird and salad; fourth, fried shrimp with tomato sauce and Nuoc Mam; fifth, chicken and mushroom sauce; sixth, "Mixed Meal," which was a stew cooked in an angel food cake pan and served that way with a fire burning in the conical center of the pan to keep the stew boiling hot. This was at other times called "Island Cooking." Seventh, fried rice with bits of fried egg, beef, pork, mixed with greens; eighth, ice cream with vanilla wafers; ninth, tea with fragrance. It was a wonderful dinner, and I enjoyed it very much. On the morning of April 4th (Saturday), we had a change of command ceremony followed by the official farewell party for Hien. It was a rather stiff affair, the sort of social function that everyone is pleased when it is over. Hien left and Truc was officially in command.
At about this time, I noticed a change in our environment. During the dry season (there are only two seasons in the Mekong Delta - hot and dry, hot and wet) lizards are every where. We liked having them around, as they helped control the numerous bugs. They made a sound like saying "chuck" four or five times quickly. In April, there were fewer of them. The rainy season was a couple of months away and the lizards were dust lovers, now crickets began to take up the natural sounds of life, especially at night. Soon there were millions of crickets, and ten times as many little green bugs.
On Monday, April 6th, I went to Soc Trang, which is on the way to Bac Lieu. We went by helicopter, Captain Edward E. Snider, Norb and myself. There I met Captain Patrick O'Meara, the Artillery Advisor and Captain George A. Lahey,, the 21st Division Ordnance Company Advisor. George Lahey was later wounded in an ambush. Pat showed me through the Artillery unit to which he was assigned as the Advisor, and I made routine inquiries into the adequacy of Ordnance ammunition support. Meanwhile, Norb and Ed were visiting the other Division Ordnance activities with George. When we met for lunch at the "MAAG House" Norb told about having seen an elaborate funeral and Pat told us that the District Chief had been ambushed a few days earlier and explained how the V.C. had killed him. They strapped an electrically detonated mine to a tree along side the road on which the District Chief was expected to travel. He always rode in a civilian European car that was easy to recognize. The V.C. placed a wicker basket just to the left of the center of the road. When the District Chief's car came to the basket, the driver moved as far to the right of the road as possible, and close to the tree. When the car passed by the mine, it was detonated killing the District Chief and crippling two others for life. At 3:00 PM, we were back at the Soc Trang Airfield, where we boarded a Caribou aircraft back to Can Tho.
On April 9th, my NCO assistant and I went alone by jeep to Sadec. I had made these trips so often by now that I discounted the danger. Having to have two jeeps to make the trip often made it difficult for me to get to Sadec every week. So Van, my driver, and I would cross the Bossac River on the Can Tho ferry and then sit in a restaurant (I use the term very loosely) drinking coconut milk until a troop truck passed, and we'd jump into the jeep and tag along behind them. Often our friends would only be going to Vinh Long, and we would have to wait for another escort for the trip on to Sadec. I had become convinced that these small ambushes (more often only the detonation of one mine by one V.C.) on the roads were not under taken without purpose and specific target. I concluded this from observation that attacks seemed to have the same target for a period (like trucks carrying troops) and then the target would change and it seemed that jeeps carrying officers would be the target. Also I believed that many of the targets were specific individuals who were expected to pass by at a known time. I also believed, and still do, that the V.C. could have assassinated me any time they wanted to do so. There were so many opportunities for them to do so, particularly during the last half of my tour when I was living at Binh Thuy. So I concluded that if they decided my time had come, I would die, if not I probably would not die. Once accepting this concept, I no longer worried about the V.C.. I do not intend to represent this reasoning as fact. All of us had various ideas about this sort of thing, and we seldom agreed on them. For instance you will later read about the ambush of George Lahey, and his belief that he was not specifically the target: In my way of reasoning he was the specific target. The V.C. were being hurt in their propaganda campaign by George's civic action projects and they chose to eliminate him as an obstacle to progress toward their goals. But I believe that all of us did rationalize these sort of things out so that we went about our work in a routine manner. We rationalized psychological security blankets, and did what we had to do anyway. That evening, I had dinner with the Vietnamese Ordnance officers of our Battalion and a visiting Office of the Chief of Ordnance inspection team. We had fried shrimp, chicken with mushrooms, roasted pigeon, stewed duck, baked fish and crab meat with Nuoc Mam sauce, fried rice, and finally "Island Cooking."
On the night of April 10th, the V.C. hit the airfield at Soc Trang with mortars and a heavy small arms attack. The U.S. Army aviators (the helicopter pilots) evacuated their aircraft to Can Tho during the attack. If there was one single group of Americans who had the utmost admiration of all of us serving in Vietnam, it was the helicopter pilots and their crewmen, especially the boys on the UH1Bs. Norb and I were concerned about our friends Pat O'Meara and George Lahey, but fortunately the "MAAG House" was not attacked. The next day we were told to be very careful on the road to Vinh Long, as the V.C. were going to step up activity there.
On April 20th, Lieutenant The', the Ordnance Battalion Ammunition Staff Officer, and I went to Sadec to check on the construction progress at the ASP. Slowly but surely it was taking form. We came back to Can Tho at about 3:30 PM. At about 5:00 PM, the V.C. blew up a bridge over a canal about 5 km down the road from the Can Tho ferry, just past the Ba Cang District Headquarters toward Vinh Long. Again we were very fortunate, having crossed that bridge two hours earlier.
On April 21st, Captain Spruill and his NCO Assistant, Sergeant Adams, and three ARVN soldiers were killed when their jeep was mined between Vinh Long (where they were assigned) and Can Tho. Captain Spruill and Sergeant Adams were not in our Advisory Team, I did not know them personally, but many of the people in Eakin Compound knew them and their loss really hit all of us. I re-examined some of my previous ideas about my road travel tactics, but they did not change. From that time on however, no one knew when I was going to make my weekly trip to Sadec. When I was ready to go, Van would see me with my Carbine, run get his, and tell his wife he would not be home for lunch. Ten minutes later we were on the road to the Bossac River ferry. If my beliefs were right (that the V.C. planned these attacks in detail), then I did not intend to give them any information until I had to do so.
On the night of April 22d, seven V.C. kidnapped the Village Chief on the island across from our ammunition depot. The wife of the Village Chief slipped out and warned our depot that the V.C. were asking questions about us. We thought they were preparing to carry out their threat made after the attack on the ESSO Oil Tanks on March 8th. Again we tightened our security program, but nothing happened. Major Dang told me that these civil administrators were kidnapped for the purpose of coercing them into giving assistance to the V.C., or forcing them to become a part of the Communist covert infrastructure (government) that paralleled the government of the Republic.
On one of our road trips together, I asked Major Dang why it was that we never saw or heard of the V.C. when there were supposed to be many of them in the area. He said, "Oh yes, they are here. Right now, here today in these villages they stand and look at us." I asked if the villagers knew who were the V.C. and he said, "yes, they know but they will not tell." Dang went on to explain that when he was fighting the French with the Vietminh, he too stood in the villages and looked at the French. He told how they moved from place to place, planned their attacks, collected tax and many other techniques of the Vietminh. I asked the question so many people have ask me, "Why don't the people tell us who are the V.C. so that we can clear them from the area." Dang said, "You don't know how the V.C. get and maintain control of the people." Then he proceeded to explain this procedure by use of an over-simplified example:
In 1954, a small force of communist Cadre personnel, with their families, moved into the little villages along the canals of the Mekong Delta. They became a part of the community going out of their way to help local people who needed help. This was not necessarily done for love of the people, but in order to gain their confidence, respect, and a degree of influence by obligation over them. There was no overly anxious haste involved, and history indicates that about an eight year period evolved before very strong militant anti-government action was phased into their program. The first goal was to obtain the respect and confidence of the people. Communist ideology was never mentioned. Then there began a period when the actions of the newly formed Diem government were questioned; not openly criticized, but expressions of doubt about the correctness of the government. After sufficient time had passed, and this questioning of the government's actions had become acceptable to a heavy majority of the people, they began to criticize and point out the "wrongness" of governmental actions. Those people who were not among the Cadre cell members, who joined into the criticism, were pointed out by the Cadre as "expressing a good point: showing good thinking, etc..." Cadre members who had gained high positions of respectability, such as a Village Chief or District Chief, showed honor to those people with public recognition. Time passed on, and open criticism became acceptable conduct, though many, even a majority, did not consider the criticism to be generally valid.
Then, one night, the Cadre as a group, dug a ditch across the highway located across the canal from the Village. Now those of you from a small town know that nothing happens in a small rural town that every one does not know about. After digging the ditch across the road, the Cadre came back to the Village laughing about the neat "joke" they were pulling on the Army trucks to come by the next morning. Many of the people didn't like this action, didn't want these believed to be "good men" of their Village to cut the road, but when their objections were laughed off, they let it pass. When the Army convoy was forced to stop at the cut road the next morning, the Cadre laughed at them, and joked with the other people of the Village about it. As a routine procedure, when being stopped at a road block, the convoy security force deployed. When the security force passed through the Village and tried to get in-formation, the Cadre men asked each other facetiously, in front of the loyal soldiers, if they knew anything about the road cutting and each denied knowing anything. The people of the Village considering the incident as harmless, though lacking in prudence, declined to expose the Cadre, because they were considered "good men of the Village."
Not realizing what they were doing because they did not (or did not want to) accept in their minds the conspiratorial nature of the Cadre, the people of the Village had put themselves officially in opposition to the government. A few days later, the Cadre cut the road again, this time snipers were placed to fire on the Convoy until the Security Force deployed. When the security force entered the Village, no one would acknowledge that he knew anything about the incident, not just because they knew and liked the people involved, but also because they had involved themselves by not reporting the Cadre the first time the road was cut. In addition, recall the problems facing loyalty to the Vietnamese National Government as a new Republic, already discussed. The village was committed.
On occasion, but not often, a villager at this point told the security force who had cut the road and had fired on them. The "good men" of the village had just gone too far for the conscience of someone. On these occasions the Cadre were rounded up by the security force and taken away. But there were unexposed Cadre, an underground cell still among the villagers, as well as the families of the captured Cadre. These "sleepers" reported what had happened to their superiors. The Cadre of nearby villages then formed into an armed guerrilla squad. The guerrillas came into the village and took captive the man who "talked" and his family. A "People's Court" was held, and the families of the captured Cadre were witnesses against the man who was loyal to his country. After the "guilty" verdict was reached, and the man convicted of "treason against the people," the villagers witnessed first the disemboweling of the man's wife, then the burning to death with gasoline of the man himself. Finally, chop sticks were jammed into the ears of his children. Those who had betrayed "the people" had been punished. A new "open Cadre" was brought into the village - they had nothing to fear, no one would tell on them now, the "sleepers" were still hidden and each suspected the other.
After the rural people of many villages were brought under control by the open Cadre and underground cells, a regular village guerrilla force was moved into the area. The people soon learned who they were and why they were there, but no one told the loyal soldiers about them. The people were effectively neutralized.
Platoon - My Lai
I have read the facts about the atrocities at My Lai, and I saw the movie Platoon. My experiences during both tours were quite different. I never experienced infantry combat. As a Regular Army Officer I knew many who had that experience, and have the benefit of their conversations. I can honestly say that never have I heard a personal account of troop behavior as detailed in either of these accounts. I am not saying they did not happen as the public has been told; I just have never heard personally such stories. I personally believe they were isolated instances, and far fewer than might have been expected given the lack of training on the part of the officers and men concerning Communist philosophy, insurgency tactics, political infrastructure and its dynamic with the paramilitary and National Liberation Front. We lost that war, and I attribute that loss to a failure to learn and teach the military and American general public what we were fighting.
During WWII, we were continually indoctrinated to "Know the Enemy." Remember in the movie Patton, when the General was overlooking his tanks engaging Rommel's forces? As the battle turned in Patton's favor, he was depicted as saying "Rommel, you magnificent bastard, I read your book!" Oh how I wish more of us had read the Communist books; it's just as important today. They continue to win using the same War of Liberation tactics and organization; the opportunity to change the course of history is still there if our leaders will study the enemy and make a major effort of teaching the subject. Oh how helpful if the news media people would make that study and understand what we are fighting throughout the world. As long as the Communists continue to win the organization and tactics will not change. During my career, I knew only two men I believe really made a serious study of
Communist War of Liberation organization and tactics: General John Cushman, US Army and Mr. John Vann, (US Army Ret), US Operations Mission.
Lacking that knowledge, the troops were absolutely frustrated for a solid year. Psychology teaches us that frustration manifests itself in anger and, if sufficiently frustrated over time, in violence. That worked to the advantage of the enemy, and his propaganda played on the cruelty the people could expect from the Vietnamese government and the American military. When troops entered a Communist controlled area, they had not been trained to understand that the people in that area are the bowl in which the Communist fish swim. They have no capability to resist them. The government and American forces entered those areas, completed a search and destroy mission and left. The people had to account for their actions to the Communists who faded out temporarily and returned to debrief the people and be briefed by their sleeper agents. Then they held people's court and punished most cruelly anyone who cooperated with Government or American forces. This was not something that might happen, it always happened and the people knew what to expect.
Unfortunately, I have not seen any broad effort to train the people or military in depth since the fall of Vietnam. Some of the Military Intelligence personnel have the knowledge, but extensive training of personnel across the board has not happened.
Though I support the people every where fighting Communist totalitarianism, I do not support the use of American troops, other than Advisors or Special Forces personnel. We must accept that if a people can not do the fighting to save their own country, we can not achieve that goal for them. I believe we can and should provide all the where with all for them to be successful, but that is where it should end. President Ngo-Dinh-Diem was opposed to American combat troops entering Vietnam; I wonder how it would have ended if our support had been adequate and no American combat troops had entered the war.
For those who are interested, a brief explanation of Communist War of Liberation organization is included as an Appendix.
On May 2d, my NCO assistant got into trouble with military authorities. He had been a disciplinary problem for me from the day I arrived in Can Tho. I recommended that he be shipped out of the country, so during May, June and about half of July I was without an assistant. The military was very selective in the assignment of personnel to Advisory positions at that time. They were highly qualified and responsible people. Some people make good Advisors and others just don't make good Advisors. The best were those who really liked the people and wanted to help them. Those were Advisors like Vince and George, who will get extra attention in this book. The worst were those who did not like or respect the people, or tried to tell them what to do. Then, in the middle were the majority, those who did a quite satisfactory job passing along their valuable experience and Military knowledge. My NCO assistant was one of the few bad Advisors, and my superiors wasted no time getting him out of Vietnam.
On May 8th, my Navy Lieutenant friend, James Vincent, came down from Vung Tau to Can Tho to determine the repair status of one of his counterparts junks. We had a wonderful visit. I had been trying to learn the Vietnamese language, but not making much progress. Vince had progressed very well and practiced speaking the language at every opportunity. We went to the market in Can Tho and shopped. The Vietnamese were delighted to hear Vince trying to speak their language. Everywhere we went people gathered around to hear Vince trying to bargain with the merchants. They laughed at him and he laughed at himself. We enjoyed ourselves and I was impressed with Vince. I decided several things that weekend: 1) I had to learn the language. It wouldn't be necessary to become fluent but I must be able to communicate basic ideas. 2) I had to move out of the U.S. Compound and into the Ammunition Depot when we moved the Company to Binh Thuy. 3) I must become personally involved, learn the customs of the Vietnamese, eat their food, become one of them. And so I set about to realize these objectives.
The Army sends as many future Advisors as possible to the Language School for at least a spoken language capability for the country in which they are to serve as Advisors. I was not sent to the language school before my tour in Vietnam and during my entire tour I envied these fortunate people and their headstart on their language capability. The Army also has made a determined effort to provide Advisors with the opportunities of background information on the history, customs and traditions of the people as well as counterinsurgency training by sending them to special schools at the Military Assistance Institute, Washington, D.C., and the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The need and benefits of this training cannot be over emphasized.
On the night of May 10th, Don Garvais (now the Senior Ordnance Officer in the IV Corps), Norb and I went to a dinner party at the home of my new counterpart, Lieutenant Le-Truc. The dinner had been prepared before we arrived and was a variety of meats, fruits, cakes, all prepared in many ways. The company officers joined us for a quiet, slightly formal evening of general conversation and continual munching of food. About 8:30 PM, when it was dark, Truc showed color slides of his wedding (he had been married for just over a year and this was his anniversary party), slides of France (Truc had been trained by the military in France), Algeria, and the United States. Truc had been to the United States twice for military training and spoke English fluently. Truc and his wife An had a little girl, born on the 1st of March, just before Truc moved to Can Tho. Truc was born in Hue and grew up in Dalat. He was educated in the French school system. An was from Saigon and like Truc had the equivalent of our high school education. I was impressed with An who was pretty, quiet, shy and afraid to try to speak English. She had studied English for two years in school, but never practiced speaking the language. She spoke slowly and with considerable accent. Truc asked that I teach her English and I agreed---I now had some one to teach me Vietnamese! From then until we moved to Binh Thuy, An and I had tea and talked together for an hour each afternoon that duty permitted us to do so. They were very pleasant hours, perhaps a bit strained at first for both of us. At first, Truc sat with us, but An would not Try to speak English in Truc's presence - it was too easy to get Truc to translate for her. When we were alone, she had to try to speak, and I kept the conversation mostly about Lilas (her little girl), child care, my wife Nancy, and our two sons, John and Chris. We talked about how American wives kept house, shopped for food, clothing, cooking, and about how the Vietnamese and American wives did the same things only differently. After a few days we both relaxed and enjoyed the visits. Months later, at Binh Thuy, I told her father about our beginning sessions and how An did not want to talk - but by that time she talked all the time, like American women!
On Friday, May 15th, Dang narrowly escaped death when the V.C. tried to mine his jeep. He was going from Can Tho to Vinh Long and had just passed the District Chief's house at Ba Cang. The mine went off just after his jeep passed over it. He was very fortunate not to have been killed. This incident took place between Ba Cang and the bridge the V.C. destroyed about an hour after we had passed over it coming back from Sadec.
The next afternoon, Dang came to see me at the compound. What we later found to be a 260 pound general purpose bomb had somehow fallen from an ARVN aircraft and landed in a village. It had not detonated and Dang had accepted the job of removing it from the village. I advised him to call the Office of the Chief of Ordnance and request Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Specialists be sent to do the job. Dang said no, that he felt that he must do the job, and had already accepted the mission. He was leaving immediately and wanted me to go with him. I was not EOD trained and had never worked in Explosive Ordnance Disposal. In 1953, I had a few hours of orientation in training on explosive Ordnance disposal procedures and that would have to do. The village was east of the Can Tho-Vinh Long highway. I suspected that Dang wanted to make a personal appearance in that area performing civic action. Dang, Lieutenant Dien (the Ammunition Destruction Officer at our depot), Sergeant Rang and two other Ammunition enlisted men and I departed at about 2:00 PM. Van and I followed Dang's jeep, and we were followed by Dien and the Ammunition Destruction Team. We crossed the Bossac River by ferry at Can Tho and went to the District Headquarters at Ba Cang. Dang was granted a company of self defense troops for a security force from the District Chief, and we were off again heading toward Vinh Long. We passed over the now filled hole just outside of Ba Cang created by the mine intended for Dang the day before. About six km from Ba Cang, we turned east into a small village of about 200 families. About 100 meters farther toward Vinh Long (from where we turned off the highway) was the now repaired bridge the V.C. had blown up that afternoon after Lieutenant The' and I had passed over it on our way back from Sadec. After we turned off the highway, we stopped in the village, posted guards with the vehicles, and started off on foot for our destination two km farther east.
About 3:30 PM, we arrived at the bomb entry site, located about 35 meters from a grass house in a very small village. I stuck a bamboo pole into the bomb entry hole and probed for the bomb. I found that the bomb, about 1 meter after entering the muddy delta soil, had changed its trajectory. I estimated the angle and distance to the turned trajectory and we started digging directly down to the turn. At about 5:00 PM, we located the entry hole again and once more started probing. The bomb had proceeded about another meter and once again changed trajectory. After another calculation we started digging another hole to locate the bomb trajectory after the second turn. At 7:00 PM, we decided to quit for the day. We were in a bad area (in which to be after dark) and we had already heard some small arms fire in the vicinity, so we started our foot journey back to the vehicles. After Mass on Sunday, we went back to work. Norb decided to go along and hopped into the jeep with Van and me. We met Dang, Dien and the men at the approach to the ferry and were once again on our way. The Self Defense security force had completed their morning job of clearing the V.C. road blocks (on the Can Tho - Vinh Long highway within their district) by the time we got to Ba Cang. Soon we were back at the excavation site digging. I was very relieved to find, after checking our hole, that the V.C. had not booby trapped the area. I was convinced that they would do so, as they knew we had not finished the job and would have to come back. We were expecting trouble all day as we continued to work. We had another complication in our work - the children. Children are everywhere in Vietnam, and they were drawn to Americans like a fly is drawn to candy. These children had never seen "the men with hair on their arms," and swarmed in to pull at the hairs to see if they were real, to squeeze our arm or hand (I suppose to see if it was like theirs). No matter what Dang told them they would not stay out of the danger area. We were quite concerned for their safety. Actually we were pretty much concerned for our own safety. We had been unsuccessful in determining from the Air Force what type of bomb had been dropped. It could be white phosphorous (a chemical that produces intense burning, heat and smoke when it comes in contact with oxygen). If our bomb was white phosphorous, it could have broken up after entry into the ground. In that case, when we uncovered it, the white phosphorous would ignite spontaneously. We did not know how the bomb was fuzzed; was it mechanical time or delay. All dud ammunition is very dangerous, but when you do not even know (as we didn't at this point) the size of the bomb, much less its filler or fuze, the situation is worsened. I had tried with Dang's help, to maintain a secure area around the excavation site but as time wore on, were not able to keep the curiosity seekers out, much less the children. The more of them that came around, the greater was the security problem too. Finally I asked Dang to call me as soon as the bomb trajectory hole was again located. Van borrowed a fishing pole in the village and brought it to me. We walked down the canal a short distance (really not far enough, but as far as I felt we should go and be able to get back quickly to the site). Norb, Van and I sat on the edge of the canal and began to fish. The kids followed the Americans and soon they were all sitting with us. We fished and talked with the children using Van for an interpreter. If the bomb blew, at least the kids would survive. About an hour later, Dang yelled to us that the bomb itself was located. Immediately our curiosity seekers fled and mothers removed their children as fast as they could. They never realized there had been any danger until that time. From the markings I detected the bomb was a 260 pound general purpose bomb (high explosive filler). There began a conversation among the Vietnamese as to what they should do now. I had already decided that we should blow the bomb in-place, and not worry about the house. No grass house is worth the life of an individual. This was my advice to Dang, and he agreed. Dien set up the charge utilizing three minute time fuze to two separate charges. This is a short delay, but we did not want to give the V.C. time to get to the bomb and disrupt the detonation sequence. There were several possibilities open to them if time permitted. If one of the time fuze setups failed, the second was sure to fulfill the requirement. We recalled our security force and they were sent back to the vehicles. Just the ammunition people were permitted to stay, and these only because they had a need to gain the benefit of the experience. We packed mud on top of our explosive set-up to direct the force of the explosion down on the bomb. After pulling the fuze lighters, we moved quickly back about 800 meters toward the vehicles and waited for the detonation. Then we returned to see what had happened. The house was caved in. A huge chunk of mud, as big as a wash tub had come down on top of it, breaking the main cross support for the roof. There was now a nice ten foot in diameter "fish pond" for the village (the bomb crater)! Because the villagers did not have ice boxes or refrigerators, they would find it convenient to store their fish alive in the pond. I gave the farmer 400 Piasters ($5.30 - all the money I had with me) to help buy the materials to repair his house and Dang promised to send two men the next day to help do the work. At about 4:00 PM, we were on our way back to Can Tho.
On May 21, Truc and I went to Bac Lieu to visit the 21st Division Ammunition Section. We went down by helicopter. We inspected ammunition, supply and storage procedures, and came back on the afternoon Caribou aircraft. We made a stop at Soc Trang in route back to Can Tho, and there the pilot and copilot inspected every inch of the plane's skin. We were informed that we had been fired upon during our take-off from Bac Lieu. The aircraft was not hit.
When I got back to my room, I had a surprise waiting for me. Van had left a gift in my room: A three dimensional picture of Our Lady of Perpetual Help was hanging on the wall and Van was beside me grinning from ear to ear. While Truc and I were in Bac Lieu, Van had brought in the picture and prepared the surprise. I know it cost him a month's pay and I felt very bad about that. Van got $1,200 Piasters (about $15.00) per month and had a wife and four children to support on that income. Soon after my arrival in Can Tho, Van (as well as other Vietnamese) asked me to buy things for them in the PX, which is prohibited by Army regulations. But Van and I were so close that I decided to GIVE him two packages of cigarettes every Monday morning. I had given him a new set of fatigue uniforms to improve his soldierly appearance, paid some doctor bills when his children were ill, and he was now showing his appreciation with this gift. I guess he got the idea on one of the trips to the Sister's orphanage. Van is Buddhist, and the selection of this gift was characteristic of him.
During this month, our clothes had been coming back from the laundry issuing such odors that we had to lay them out to air for days before we could put them on our backs. Many complaints were directed to Mrs. Hien, the operator of the laundry furnishing support for our American compound. The clothes smelled like shrimp to me, but Don Garvais said they smelled more like lobster. Anyway, Mrs. Hien sent us a mimeographed letter on May 21st, doing the best she could to explain the situation. The letter was so humorous to us that I am including it verbatim here:
Dear Sir:
We have the honor of respectfully writing you this letter to expose you of the following:
First, on behalf of all Employees of the Mrs. Hien Laundry, we wish to declare our admiration and gratitude for all our respectable American Customers (yes, very respectable) who have given us, 20 men and also 20 females, a living.
Dear Sir: By the agreement of the Senior Advisor of 21st Division, our Laundry has been established since April 1, 1962, and it is reserved for U.S. Personnel only. During the past 2 years of serving our American Customers, we have received some letters of appreciation. With the letters of complaint which are very useful to us, we will try to correct our mistakes and to learn from experience. With the letters of appreciation, we respectfully thank for and will try more and more to be deserving with. Although we are not perfect but we promise to serve you with all our effort. Every mistake caused by our Employees has been strictly warned and will be more strictly than ever. We hope you will understand that we always try to do our best to give good service although we got a lot of troubles and pains at this time due to rain and we only wait for your good wishes that is your understanding and satisfaction.
You are Guest of our Country that we respect very much and we are very happy to serve you with all our enthusiasm but unluckily if sometimes we commit a mistake, that was not our intention, that was "Professional Accident" we never wanted. We sincerely beg your pardon, please don't be angry with us, but please let us know so we can correct it. We will be very grateful for your generosity, generosity which will certainly encourage all Employees of a Laundry which has been loyally serving the U.S. Military Personnel for approximately 2 years.
Following are some problems on laundry service we would like to explain to you:
1. Sometimes smell not too good: That was something that grieved us not a little. As you know, it is rainy season at the present time in Vietnam and all fatigue suits as well as white shirts must be starched while there is no sun, sometimes one week, two weeks or more, so it is very difficult to get away from a smell not too good.
2. Incompleteness of delivering laundry: Because it rains, laundry cannot be dried in time, due to that we send back to you first only the items which have been dried, then the rest will be delivered in next time (but if in a week you don't receive back, please send us a note).
3. Lateness: (Sometimes 4 days instead of 3) Due to rain.
4. Loss: Please advise then wait for a week, if we can not find them back we will pay you.
5. If unluckily you receive any laundry item which is still dirty, please send back to Laundry, we won't charge you for that item.
Dear Sir: Those are the problems which can be fallen into your laundry, and we only know to trust in your forgiveness. Once again, on behalf of 20 employees and also 20 families as well as of myself, I wish to express here all our gratitude to you and thank you very much for your business and continuity with our Laundry, business and continuity which will help 20 families out of hunger.
May God bless and keep you during the time you are Guest of our Country.
Yours most Respectfully,
Mrs. Hien
On May 22d, Truc and I went to Rach Gia (on the Gulf of Siam) but our UH1B helicopter could not land because of a severe rain storm, so we returned to Can Tho.
On the night of May 23d, I was Duty Officer (a job that came up about every 10 days. At about 10:15 PM, there was a great explosion. We thought that the V.C. had probably bombed a downtown cafe, but it turned out that they had tried to damage the Cai Rang bridge. All they damaged was one telephone pole on the bridge; a very amateurish job or a training mission. Cai Rang was a little town 10 -12 km from Can Tho beyond the Can Tho Ammunition Depot and ESSO Gasoline Tank farm. The rainy season was in full swing then and the frogs were croaking loudly all that night. They were everywhere, thousands of them.
From May 23d to 26th was Buddha's birthday celebration period; "Tet". There was a great parade and the Army battalions each made a float to represent them. On Buddha's birthday, the 26th, there were many festivities downtown before a great monument that had been erected in the middle of a main thoroughfare.
On May 28th, Norb, Captain Minh (Battalion Executive Officer), Truc and I went to Soc Trang to remove an M79 grenade from a grenade launcher. There apparently hadn't been any propellant in the cartridge or the propellant had been removed, and I assumed that the detonator produced enough pressure to push the grenade up the tube a few inches and there it remained. We had prepared a device to hold the launcher and a hydraulic jack to push the grenade out the muzzle of the tube (the launcher was like a shot gun that would pass a 40mm grenade. This particular fuze does not arm until it passed several yards beyond the end of the tube during a normal firing, but when something is wrong with ammunition, special care must be taken for safety reasons. We set up our operation behind a barricade and finished our work in short order. I tried to find George Lahey and Pat O'Meara, but George was in Saigon and Pat was with his Artillery troops. We ate lunch at a Vietnamese restaurant in downtown Soc Trang and returned to Can Tho on the afternoon Caribou.
On the night of May 30th, the V.C. attempted to destroy the bridge in the little village of Binh Thuy. Like the job at Cai Rang, it was an amateurish job, but the damage was more extensive.
Vince spent the weekend of May 30/31 with us at Can Tho. His language capability had increased considerably and Truc was very much impressed by this. We had a wonderful time together. Norb and I promised to go to Vung Tau to visit Vince on the weekend of June 12th if at all possible.
On the first of June (Monday), Truc and I were planning to go to Hai Yen, but our aircraft was canceled and we didn't get to go. We rescheduled the trip time and time again, but each time we were canceled. Norb and Don made the trip several times and told me what they found. Norb took lots of color photographs of Hai Yen, and this, along with the description he provided, was as close to Father Hoa as I ever got. Father Hoa was the legendary "Fighting Priest" of Vietnam. Father Hoa had been a career soldier of Chiang Kai-shek's Army in China. He had attained the rank of Lieutenant Colonel when he decided to go to the seminary and become a Priest. In 1951, Father Hoa and his parish fled Communist China and established themselves in North Vietnam. As the Communists took over North Vietnam, the parish gradually migrated into Cambodia and finally settled in South Vietnam. They established a strongly defended area in the Hai Yen sector of the Ca Mau Peninsula, where Chinese and Vietnamese alike rallied for self support and defense against the common enemy - the Communists. When I was in Vietnam in 1964, the population that looked to him for protection numbered 18,000. He had 1,200 trained men to defend the area. Above Hai Yen flew the community's own flag, a black swallow soaring on a white field. The legends of Father Hoa's actions against the V.C., the rehabilitation of the Viet Cong prisoners into worth while Hai Yen citizens, the hatred of him by the V.C., all were known every where. After the over throw of President Diem, the Post Coup administration was obviously trying to appease the "Buddhist" leaders, and one of these attempts was to replace Father Hoa at Hai Yen with a Vietnamese Army Major. As the story goes, the Major arrived at Hai Yen and was very coldly received. The people and soldiers would not have anything to do with him. On the day he was to have taken command, he supposedly took sick and departed. Father Hoa was really only one of many such "Fighting Priests". Truc and I learned of another one at Tra Vinh, when we visited there on the 27th of May, and another, Father Foc, led an out post in the Soc Trang area.
On the night of June 1st, the V.C. set off another charge on the Cai Rang bridge; it was no more effective than the first attempt. I am convinced these were training exercises - their placement had only an insignificant impact.
On June 2d, Truc and I inspected the progress on the new ammunition depot under construction at Binh Thuy. It was very close to completion, just some electrical wiring and the digging of a water well was all that was left to be done. I found out that day that no provisions had yet been made for housing the families of our troops. Lieutenant Hien had not requested the housing; time was short before we were to move, and the families had to come with us.
This is one area, families, in which there was very little understanding between Americans and Vietnamese. The American's attitude was that since he left his family at home, why couldn't the Vietnamese? The answer is simple enough, but few took the time to learn the reason; some didn't want to know the reason. First, Americans left their families in the USA where they were safe from attack by the enemy. Families of Vietnamese soldiers were prime targets of the V.C. (attacks on families of Vietnamese soldiers destroyed the soldiers' morale and will to fight - moving families around with the Army reduced the Army's flexibility and mobility); second, the Vietnamese soldier could not support his family when they were separated. A Vietnamese private earned about $12.00 (in US equivalent) each month. Vietnamese married young and had large families. In order to make ends meet, the soldier spent his free time fishing, hunting, or doing odd jobs to get the food to feed his family. If the family was separated from the soldier, the family could not survive. For these people, the move from Can Tho to Binh Thuy (10-12 km) might as well have been a hundred km, for the soldier neither had nor could afford transportation back and forth from Can Tho every day.
A side point that seemed to me to be a terrible injustice was the elimination of Vietnamese military communities from the U.S. aid programs. These programs were intended to "win the hearts and minds of the people," (which these programs could not accomplish themselves. The mandatory requirement to gain the support of the people was to provide them security from V.C. terror). Yet the very people who were expected to provide the security from the V.C. were the soldiers who (because they were in the military) were not entitled to the aid programs. The government surely needed the support of its fighting men and the fighting men needed some support for their families. Instead, his family was not eligible for US Operations Mission (Agency for International Development) aid programs. The government of the Republic had only so much money to pay the military. The individual salary was cut to the bone in order to have as many men under arms as possible; there was no money for pay raises. Thank God for the flexible and understanding Americans who helped anyway. But back to our family quarters problem - no provisions had been made for them.
We selected a 200 by 400 meter section of land across from the depot and Truc requested that the Army procure it for family quarters. Knowing how slow governments work, I suggested to Truc that we lease the land from the owner, start housing construction and hope that the government would purchase the land. We had considerable trouble locating the owner.
After many conferences, he accepted our proposal. He would give us a years lease, and if the government did not buy the land before the years end, I would pay the agreed amount. I don't recall the amount, but it wasn't much in American standards. Now we had land. We needed the houses; 120 units. Truc and I went to see Lieutenant Colonel Le Van Hien, the IV CALC Commander, and he agreed to give us enough metal sheets and wood for 30 units of prefabricated houses. Next we went to work building a 30 cm high earth platform upon which to build the first ten units. The platform was necessary to keep the houses out of the water during the rainy season. All of our men, except those required to issue ammunition to the using units, were taken to Binh Thuy every duty day at 3:00 PM to work on their family quarters area. We worked until 7:00 PM when it became dark. On Saturday and Sunday we worked the whole day out there, rain or shine - and the rainy season had started. A major problem at this point was getting from the road to our land - there was a canal between them. I located the senior representative of Raymond, Morrison and Knudsen (R.M.K.) Contractors, who had built the new ammunition depot, and were then building a new airfield about 4 km down the road toward Omon from our new depot. Paul Teeters turned out to be one of my closest friends. From that first meeting, Paul, Truc and I worked closely together - each helping the other when he could. I told Paul about our problem of getting across the canal. He said that the next time I saw his crane in the depot not being utilized, to let him know. I did this and Paul had the crane operator pick up mud from the canal bottom and pile it up until we had a road across the canal. Construction of the family quarters became a big project needless to say - it remained a project when I left Vietnam. This was not the only time that Paul helped us; there were many other times. We helped him too. He needed a generator (small one), a wrecker, and many other things from time to time, and we were always ready to give him a hand.
On Thursday night June 4th, we went to a IV CALC dinner party in honor of Lieutenant Colonel Parson's departure for the United States and Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. Rickman's arrival as the new Advisor to the IV CALC Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Le Van Hien. For dinner we had cold chicken, asparagus with crab, abalone with oyster sauce, stewed chicken in soup, fried rice, and bananas for dessert.
During the month of May 1964, Can Tho received almost twice the normal rain fall. We had measurable rain on 21 days with a total of 12 1/2 inches. The climatology report (by Captain F. D. Lang, our IV Corps Weather Officer) for June was: Average minimum temperature 75oF, average rainfall 7.4", average relative humidity 85%. Record maximum temperature 97oF, record minimum temperature 68oF, record rainfall in a 24 hour period 3.8".
On June 5th, Truc, Lieutenants Duc and Thanh and I went to Kien Phong Province. Our mission was to destroy captured V.C. ammunition, one of our routine tasks, and to inspect ammunition at Cao Lanh Training Center. While at the Training Center, we had lunch with the Vietnamese Training Center Commander at his home. We had rice, fish, dried beef and some kind of meat balls. After lunch, we went back to Kien Phong village and visited with a Hoa Hao company which was there awaiting the arrival of General Duc, IV Corps Commander. The company had just rallied to the government forces and General Duc was to welcome them. We inspected their ammunition and I suffered through the hair pulling and arm squeezing routine. We all shook hands, customary in Vietnam (much more so than here in the United States), and we departed for Can Tho on our UH1B helicopter. Van met us at the airport. He had been in Saigon on leave for a week. Van had a purse made of reeds and a decorated conical hat as gifts for my wife, Nancy, and a little wooden house for my two sons, John and Chris. Van had purchased them in Saigon and brought them all the way back on the bus for me. He really had a way of touching my heart. The value of these things did not total more than two dollars, but I knew he could not afford such gifts. I asked Truc to tell Van in Vietnamese (so that there would be no doubt he understood) that I was deeply appreciative of the gifts, but that he was not to give me any more of them. He should spend his money on his family. Van understood what I had said to Truc before it could be translated to him in Vietnamese. He was crushed, and I was sorry about that, but it had to be done.
We spent the next week planning the movement of the depot from Can Tho to Binh Thuy and working on the family quarters.
Norb and I left Can Tho on Friday, June 12th, on the afternoon Caribou for Saigon. It was our first trip out of the Delta since we arrived in country in February. When we got to Saigon, we were bumped off the Caribou because they needed the weight capacity to carry food rations on to Vung Tau. It just was not God's will that we take that plane to Vung Tau. We were lucky enough to catch another about 30 minutes later, and when we got to Vung Tau, Vince was waiting for us. It seemed the Caribou with food arrived at Vung Tau during a rain down pour, and due to a fuel shortage could not orbit until visibility improved, so had to return to Saigon - if we had been on that flight, we would not have gotten to Vung Tau that night.
Vince took us to Cyrnos Hotel and we registered and ate a lobster dinner at the hotel restaurant. The hotel and restaurant were Vietnamese, but the food was prepared French style. After dinner we walked along "Front Beach" and around town. We went to bed early and got up early Saturday morning to eat with Vince in the Mess Hall. Vince lived at the Pacific Hotel which was just across the street from Cyrnos. After breakfast, we went out to Cat Lo, where Vince's Junk Force Division was headquartered. We went through the division on an orientation tour and then on some of the junks. One of the junks was preparing to get under way and Vince found that they were just going on a short run and returning, so we went along. It turned out that they were picking up a platoon of troops and transporting them to another location on an island. After returning to base, we went back to Vung Tau and ate lunch at Pizzeria. The Pizzeria was the only place we ate in Vietnam, where we could order a hamburger, French fries and a coke - cooked as you would expect to find here in the USA. The Pizzeria looked out toward Front Beach and the ships at anchor far out in the South China Sea. It was very pleasant at Vung Tau, the war seemed far away. Norb and I were impressed. Vince did every thing he could to impress us too, he was a number one member of the Vung Tau Chamber of Commerce!
After lunch, we went out to "Back Beach" for a swim in the South China Sea. Vung Tau is a beautiful place, as fine a resort vacation spot as you would expect to find anywhere in the world, at least that is the way it impressed Norb and me. Personnel who were stationed there may have had different views - though Vince didn't. The beach was wide with clean white sand. There were people playing with beach balls, pretty Vietnamese girls in bathing suits, snackbars, all the trimmings of Miami Beach. It was hard for us to believe that we were in that Valley of Tears, sorrow torn Vietnam. We spent the afternoon on the beach and returned for dinner at Cyrnos that evening. After dinner, we went to the home of Vince's counterpart to deliver some gifts Vince had for him. Vince and I had been trying to converse with each other in Vietnamese ever since Norb and I had gotten off the plane, but failed completely. I could not understand Vince, and he could not understand me. Vince communicated easily with his counterpart and so could I! Then we realized that both of us had learned different words to say the same thing. We just could not understand each others vocabulary!
Sunday morning, Norb and I got up early and went to Mass at St. Dominic's Church on "Front Beach." After lunch the day before, we had gone for a walk down the beach and found St. Dominic's Church. We went up to the bulletin board to find the Sunday Mass schedule and met Bishop Joseph Ðai, O.P., the Superior of the Dominican Order of Religious in Vietnam. After learning that I was a Third Order Dominican Novice, and had been trying to make my Profession (promise to live in accordance with the Rule of St. Dominic), he agreed to make arrangements for my Profession in Can Tho. God works in strange ways. After Sunday Mass, Norb and I hurried back to meet Vince for breakfast at the Mess Hall in the Pacific Hotel. Then we went to the Vung Tau Market and looked at the displays. There were fruit stands, meat stands, fish stands, dishes, pots, pans; just about anything you could think of naming was there. In mid-morning we went to Thich-Ca-Dai Buddhist Monument area. The entire area was impressive. All of the buildings, even the huge Buddha high on the mountain, were of a very clean white stone. The monument of Buddha must have been at least twenty feet high and he was sitting on a platform that must have been about as high itself - about forty feet high altogether. The platform was a large round pillar about twenty-five feet in diameter. At the base of the pillar was what appeared to be an altar, upon which were flowers and a decorative container of sand. The people stuck prayer sticks into the sand. The Pagoda was named Thien Lam Tu. It was a bright white, as were the other buildings, and on the front in addition to the name was a black twelve spoke wheel symbol of Buddhism. The altar in the Pagoda was of brown marble. High on a platform above the altar was a Buddha clothed in yellow. Flowers and prayer sticks were on the altar. On the front of the altar was a white eight-spoke wheel symbol of Buddhism, flanked by an inverted heart shaped green leaf on both sides of the wheel.
Looking down from on high, the monument area (which was on a steep hill) was impressive. The garden was green and well kept. It looked out over the bay where junks and sampans moved slowly. It was a beautiful sun shiny day and all was very peaceful there.
We had an excellent dinner at the home of another of Vince's counterparts. It was a wonderful meal of well prepared meats, vegetables, and tasty fruits. Then after lunch, we went to "Back Beach" for a swim. I met a group of Saigon University students there and they were delighted with the opportunity to practice their English with me. They all knew the song "On the streets of El Paso," and upon learning that I was from El Paso sang it for me.
That evening, we went to Au Favori Restaurant for dinner. Like Cyrnos, it was a Vietnamese restaurant with food prepared French style. It was largely patronized by U.S. personnel and the atmosphere was typically American. The next morning, we were up early to catch the Caribou that made the IV Corps trip that day. Vung Tau was the home base of the III and IV Corps Caribou services. At 10:00 AM, we were back home in Can Tho and Van was there to meet us. The gossip had it that when you landed at Can Tho airfield, and felt "it was good to be home," that you had adjusted to Vietnam. It had been our first weekend off in three months; a wonderful weekend. But it was good to be home. I had adjusted!
After 6:00 AM Mass on June 16th, I walked to the Mess Hall for breakfast with Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. Rickman, our IV CALC Senior Advisor. I told him that the next month the Ammunition Company planned to move to Binh Thuy, and that unless he had objections, I intended to move out there with them. Well, he did have objections - and voiced them in terms that were not to be misunderstood, but the reasons had no real substance - I let the matter drop. Colonel Rickman was a daily communicant and a wonderful person. We attended Mass together and without close association were in fact spiritually close. Yet all we had to do was come within eye sight of one another and we fought like cats and dogs (as much as Captains are permitted to argue with Lieutenant Colonels). We had a relationship that only daily communicants know and can understand, yet seemed to take issue with each other on all subjects. It was a common joke among the CALC Advisors. It was my boss and good friend Don Garvais who compared us with two bantam roosters, after a go-around over some insignificant matter while waiting at the airport for a flight out of Can Tho.
Time went by, and I continued to make my plans to move to Binh Thuy. Don kidded me for having asked Colonel Rickman for permission, saying that had I left the subject to him, he would have approved and let Colonel Rickman know about it after the fact. I was glad that I told him. Colonel Rickman was concerned for my safety. He had many reasons, but none of them would stand against serious argument. I continued to answer each argument and then let the subject drop.
On June 20th, I estimated we had 10 inches of rain. It was terrible - water in my room reached three inches in depth. Outside in the compound, the Advisors were cutting up as only American servicemen can, swimming in the 10 inches of water, stepping into a ditch full and overflowing with water. Commander Dodd, the Navy Advisor, was a riot that afternoon!
Meanwhile, work continued on the family quarters at Binh Thuy. I made my inspections of the depot in the morning and became a construction engineer in the afternoon. We worked nine hours a day (excluding siesta), seven days a week. I had to be back at the compound by 7:00 PM, or I'd miss supper. It was just as well, when we left Binh Thuy the evening small arms fire exchanges with the V.C. were already underway. It was time to go home.
I had a definite plan for the family quarters - twice normal floor space (which was three by six meters for a family of seven), and a cement floor to keep the children out of the dirt. That does not seem too much to expect, does it? The people considered the floor space excessive and the concrete floor a waste of cement! We worked hard and long. I worked as a laborer with the men, and though we had many language difficulties, we grew to really understand and respect each other.
At about this time, I selected a woman to become my house keeper when we moved to Binh Thuy - Madam Nho. Earlier I mentioned her husband having been killed by the V.C. during an attack on a gasoline truck, while Nho was on a road trip. At this time, Madam Nho was working as a laborer, passing chunks of mud in the work line preparing the platforms for the family quarters. I thought of her five children taking care of themselves; no father and their mother working all day at very hard work. I arranged for her to work for me, and for the cook of my good friend, Bob Adams, who worked for United States Operations Mission (AID), to train her in his kitchen to cook American food. After a few days of training, Bob's cook, a Vietnamese, confided that Madam Nho was not very bright and was not learning much, but that she was trying hard and wanted to learn. She never did learn and was a lousy cook. In a short while, there was no attempt to cook anything American style, we were 100% Vietnamese - it was just as well. Madam Nho could not even cook Vietnamese food well, and when I left seven months later, she still had not improved. But she was a good soul, tried hard, and needed the job for her family's sake. I kept her to the end, primarily because we had absolute confidence in her loyalty to us. Truc was certain that he could have found us a better house keeper!
June 27th was Truc's birthday and I went to his home for "a family dinner." I had expressed regret that I had been unable to experience the routine home life of the Vietnamese - Truc responded with an invitation to dinner. We had a wonderful evening.
The last part of June and all of July was most hectic. Each day I got up as tired as I was when I went to bed the night before. We prepared our written plan for the movement of the Can Tho Depot to Binh Thuy. We prepared our Security and Defense Plan for the Binh Thuy Depot and presented our plan as a briefing before IV CALC and Corps staffs, who recommended that we be given the forces and materials for which we had asked. Our planning and documenting of our requirements really paid off, for in August, when we finally moved, it was as smooth as glass.
I had requested a U.S. telephone line to the Binh Thuy Depot. Chief Warrant Officer Richard Sandstrom arranged for two of his signal Detachment enlisted men to lay the line, provided I furnish the security force to defend them. On July 10th, Private First Class Rhol and Back started at the Can Tho Airport, stringing our telephone line. Four ARVN soldiers plus my driver, Van, and I provided flank security as Rhol and Back climbed pole after pole stringing the line. The poles had been abandoned after V.C. had repeatedly cut the lines they had carried.
In the afternoon we were about half way from the airport to Binh Thuy. I was about 300 meters out from the telephone line when I saw a Vietnamese boy, about six years old, walking toward me carrying a basket. He reminded me of my son John. I recalled how so often I had seen John walking home from the desert in El Paso, carrying a bucket in which he would have lizards, stones or some other child treasure. When the boy arrived, he greeted me in Vietnamese, sat on his ankles, and began to talk. When I did not understand him, he took from my pocket a ball point pen and wrote out the words in Vietnamese. Then we played charades, acting out the words - pointing to this or that, until I understood the word. As Back and Rhol worked, they moved on from pole to pole, and so did we providing flank protection. My little friend followed along for a couple of kilometers and then briskly announced that he could go no farther, and must go home. For a six year old, he was ingenious. He could read and write and with gestures define his thoughts.
About dinner time, we reached the Binh Thuy river. We spanned the river from high suspension towers and tied off our line on the Binh Thuy side. On the morning of July 11th, I checked-in with the Binh Thuy Strong Point, and notified Captain Huu (the Strong Point Commander) that we would be passing through the jungle between Binh Thuy and our new ammunition depot. it was about one km through dense jungle of banana, coconut and fruit trees. It took us from 8:30 to 11:30 to get through the jungle. The V.C. were often in this area, but we had no trouble. Just as we entered the area, the V.C. initiated a small attack about 5 km southwest of us, so there was some anxiety. We found three houses in the jungle. The people were very friendly and helpful. One woman told us that the V.C. would cut down our telephone line before the week was out.
Early in June I had written a letter to the Editor of the El Paso Times newspaper. My letter was published and read as follows:
ASKS AID FOR ORPHANAGE
Here in the center of the Mekong Delta the Sisters of Providence are running an orphanage for 200 infants. This is the only orphanage in Can Tho and receives large support from military personnel.
The infants are fed, clothed and sheltered by a community of Nuns who give them all the love and affection time permits. We in the military provide as much material support as possible but there are some items that are just beyond reach for us.
You who are parents can imagine how much baby powder 200 infants require every month. Needless to say, it is a large quantity and is a continual problem. Think of hand washing clothing for 200 infants; which keeps a whole platoon of Sisters busy full time!
If anyone would like to join our support for these wonderful Sisters in this land of martyrdom, we will welcome you with open arms.
As a personal project of my own, I am trying to build and start a kindergarten for a small community of dependents of Vietnamese Army soldiers assigned to the Company to which I am assigned as the U.S. Advisor.
Any materials which can be used in a kindergarten will be appreciated. Please mail or ship any items to me at the address below.
Capt. Norman H. Ricker, Jr.
Ad. Tm. No. 96, APO 15
San Francisco, California
In response to this letter, some very fine women in El Paso formed an organization which they named Texan's Person To Persons Aid Committee (TEPPAC). In the months to follow, TEPPAC kept a steady flow of clothing and many other items to me in Vietnam. These were people working without any possibility of recognition or publicity. They worked without any organizational support. The entire organization was the officers of TEPPAC:
Mrs. T. W. Shaughnessy, President
Mrs. Daniel M. Higdon, Vice Pres.-Treasurer
Mrs. G. B. McCleskey, Secretary
Miss Helen Ratterman, Executive in Charge of Liaison
Mrs. Frank W. Gorman, Sr., furnished two washing machines
Mrs. Frances Traylor of Las Cruces, New Mexico, though not affiliated with TEPPAC, furnished much help in the form of vitamins for the children. As time passed, TEPPAC entered other projects. One of the projects was our kindergarten. We planned to open the kindergarten when we moved to Binh Thuy; and as soon as possible, build a six room school house. TEPPAC completely supported the kindergarten. TEPPAC furnished the materials to get it started and maintained it all the time that I was in Vietnam. An (Madam Le Truc) tried to answer the gifts with letters of thanks. She wrote a couple of them, but it was just too much of a job for her. There are hundreds of people whom we never thanked, the people whose names are recorded only by God, who gave money, clothing and other items to TEPPAC to send to us. They will receive their reward ten-fold in the life hereafter.
On the afternoon of July 12th, we received three aircraft loads of ammunition from 50th Base Depot to boost our stock level. July was a very active month for V.C. combat activity. Ammunition is very heavy, and transport by air is rare.
On the morning of July 17th, while assisting at Mass, we heard automatic weapons fire, explosions, and finally artillery fire nearby. It turned out that the Sector Chief, Colonel Di, Assistant Sector Chief, Advisor to the Sector Chief (Captain John Nicholson), a representative of the Medical Civilian Aid Program, and other accompanying personnel had been the target of an ambush by the V.C. While the military Sector Chief and his people carried out military duties, the Med CAP Team gave medical attention to the people in the village. They were outstanding men performing a wonderful service, both to mankind and to the battle against the Viet Cong. The convoy came upon a road block and received small arms fire from a wooded area about 300 meters to the flank. As everyone jumped from the vehicles for a ditch, the aidman was hit and killed by small arms fire. Two Vietnamese were wounded in these first minutes. An Artillery Battery close by saw what was happening and fired direct line of sight fire into the V.C. ending the ambush. This ambush was in the Binh Thuy District, and I was afraid that Colonel Rickman''s decision concerning my move out there would be affected by the ambush.
Vicious V.C. attacks were conducted throughout the Delta during July; notably at Vi Thanh. At Cai Be, the V.C. committed mass atrocities on the civilian dependents of Regional Forces soldiers. They killed forty civilians, mostly children and their mothers. This attack was effective in encouraging soldiers to stay with their families or keep their families with them. We were moving to Binh Thuy soon, and we felt the effects of the Cai Be atrocities.
On July 23d, the Vietnamese Chief of Ordnance came to see us. We took him to Binh Thuy to see our new depot. The Binh Thuy bridge was out while a new bridge was under construction that would take the heavy loads of ammunition that would soon be coming over it. So we had a time getting Colonel Tran-Van-Trong across the river in a boat and then into transportation on the other side. Lieutenant Colonel Wingfield Scott, U.S. Ordnance Branch Chief in Saigon, came too and they had an interesting day. When we got to the other side of the Binh Thuy River, Colonel Trong, Truc, Dang, Colonel Scott and I all got into my jeep (wouldn't that have made a nice target for a V.C. ambush!) and toured the Depot. While at the depot, Colonel Rickman was talking with Colonel Trong, and told him that I was going to live at the Binh Thuy Depot. That was good news! And I assumed that to be the end of that problem. Colonel Trong was pleased with the new depot and expected us to make good use of it.
On the 24th, I went along with the group accompanying Colonel Trong to see the ASP at Sadec. We went by helicopter. Colonel Trong made a reconnaissance of a location close to Vinh Long suggested by the 9th ARVN Division for relocation of the 842d Ordnance Direct Support Company. We went back to Can Tho from Vinh Long by helicopter.
The Viet Cong opened a propaganda campaign in Can Tho on the 25th of July. Sixty men, women, and children appeared in the Can Tho market displaying banners expressing a desire for the neutralization of Vietnam. They denied being V.C., they were "pacifists." A soldier who was in the area quickly notified the security police and it was all over in a matter of minutes. Only 15 demonstrators were caught. Truc felt the people caught probably were not V.C. or pacifists, just terror stricken conformists to V.C. pressure. Of course the friends of the V.C. and the pacifists in the USA picked up the tune and the orchestra played on American streets up to the April 1975 fall of Saigon.
Our depot was accepted from the R.M.K. Contractors by the U.S. Government on July 26th. Soon the U.S. Government would turn it over to the Vietnamese Government, then to the ARVN and finally to Truc. Meanwhile, activity was flying like a buzz saw. Work on the family quarters had expanded to thirty units fully taking form, TEPPAC was sending materials for the opening of the kindergarten in late September. Bob Adams at USOM agreed to help us with the construction of the school and we were now making plans for its construction. We did not get the school built before Bob Adams and I left, but Edward Phillips, Bob's replacement, had prepared the written request for construction, which was approved and the school was completed shortly after my return to the United States. It was built in the family quarters behind the Pagoda. The original plan called for six rooms and was subsequently expanded to eight rooms. We had completed our security and defense plan and it was now approved by the Joint General Staff in Saigon. One of the two Civil Guard Companies required by this plan was already on duty at the depot. Our plan for the phase-out of Can Tho Depot and phase-in of the Binh Thuy Depot was finalized.
In all this activity a sad note drifted by - Colonel Rickman kept making comments adverse to my moving out to Binh Thuy. My confidence that this issue had been settled was shaken. I asked God and Our Lady to solve this problem for me, and just went ahead assuming the conclusion to be favorable. Now I was privately making plans to build a small Chapel at Binh Thuy. Not much of a Chapel, just the bare essentials for keeping the Blessed Sacrament there. About thirty of the men in the Ammunition Company and their families were Catholic, and a somewhat smaller percentage of the Civil Guard Company. Also at Binh Thuy Strong Point there were many Catholic families. The Artillery Battalion headquarters and Psychological Warfare Company at Binh Thuy had many Catholics, too. But there was no Catholic Church there.
An and I continued our English/Vietnamese classes. Truc and I continued our visits to the using units. I continued my weekly trips to Sadec to check on the ASP construction.
On July 31st, Truc, his wife An and I visited an ancient villa at Binh Thuy. The house was over 200 years old and the same family had lived there for generations. The owner had trees from all over the world on his farm. It was the first time that I had seen chocolate growing on a tree. Our host took some of the chocolate that was in his mill and ground it for us. The oil in the bean was bitter chocolate. He added cream and sugar, and we had tasty chocolate. The fruit, as it grew on the tree, was about the size of avocado, its skin was brown, crinkly and rough. The beans in the fruit are about 3/4 inches long and 1/2 inch in diameter. Also on this farm grew limes, oranges, lemons, and grapefruit (though of a different variety from ours in the United States). The furniture in the house was very ancient and of course oriental. The walls of the living room were of wood, all hand carved with figurines, each in great detail. The outside of the house was very decorative sculpture.
On August 2d, the V.C. started firing at our guard force at Binh Thuy Depot; nothing serious, just harassing fire. They set up a public address system and told our guards that they (the V.C.) were going to kill them. They made the mistake of setting up their system in the same place one time to often; Captain Huu set up an ambush for them. The V.C. were permitted to set up the public address system, and had just started to address the guard force when the ambush opened fire. We never had another P.A. propaganda unit visit our depot.
Earlier I mentioned that the Vietnamese Army had issued the wood and metal sheets for thirty units of family quarters. We decided to make concrete cinder-type blocks with river sand and cement, and make the sides of the building with them I had acquired the cement and sand, and our company carpenter, Corporal No, had made wooden boxes (forms) into which we would put the sand and cement to make the bricks. But time was too short to complete all this work before our move - something had to be constructed temporarily and quickly. We did not want to use the 1/4" X 12" planking issued for siding; it cracked badly when exposed to the weather and besides we had other plans for that material. Truc utilized the fiber containers in which 105mm Artillery ammunition is packed and unusable ammunition boxes for the temporary siding. We used the issued wood to construct partitions in the two forty man barracks. We partitioned one of the barracks in half for the 18 single men in the company. The other half of the building was partitioned to make three apartments for officer families. The other barracks was partitioned into five apartments for officer families and two U.S. Army Advisors. Our long range plan was to construct officer quarters around a lake inside the depot and then turn the apartments in the barracks over to the key noncommissioned officer families. The end result was to be concrete block family quarters across the road from the depot with the key NCO's and officers inside the depot. This arrangement was also part of our security plan, for it was essential that the officers and NCOs be immediately available in the depot in the event of attack. None of the officers originally intended to live at Binh Thuy - they intended to keep their residences in Can Tho and commute to Binh Thuy. They could afford to travel, and the wives would have the advantage of the Can Tho market. Binh Thuy was a remote little village at that time, and there was nothing that would attract anyone to reside there (it was also insecure at night). We needed the officers at the depot and Truc ordered that they move (having provided the temporary quarters in the depot for them).
The plans seemed simple enough, but we were astonished with the opposition and problems they created. First the U.S. Army Engineers had a fit because we were altering the buildings. Actually, I had anticipated this problem and had insisted that the partitions be constructed so that not one single nail attached the partitions to the walls of the building. Carpenter No designed them well. No precut them to fit together in grooves under tension - not a single nail went into the walls of the building. U.S. Army policy is that you cannot alter a building such that it cannot be returned to its original state and used for its originally intended purpose. The Engineers descended upon us with wrath! When my good friend Joe, the Engineer Advisor, heard of our construction, he came to me while I was working at Binh Thuy and really blew up - he was furious. He was going to send a report to Saigon; he was really going to blow the whistle on us. I was with Truc at the time. Truc was quite taken back by Joe's display of anger. Frankly, I was too, but it didn't bother me as it did Truc. Rather than make an issue worse in front of Truc, I simply stated our position to give confidence to Truc. It was senseless to try to reason with Joe at that time; he just was beyond reason. But I knew Joe, and knew he'd settle down after he blew off steam, and I'd reason with him then. But Joe went back to Can Tho and expressed his position to the rest of our Advisory Team and created a lot of opposition. It was especially detrimental to my plans to move to Binh Thuy, for Colonel Rickman agreed with Joe. It was quite a blow out! Meanwhile, Truc went through Vietnamese channels and had ARVN backing, up and down the chain of command for his plans. In the end I had to explain our position to about every one in our Logistical Advisory Team.
The problem really was that the Americans just had not put themselves in the position of the Vietnamese. They just had not thought the problem out from the Vietnamese side.
First, Americans, as I said earlier, just did not understand why the Vietnamese insisted on having their families with them. I will not repeat what has already been written, but it is important for the reader to recall this continual misunderstanding. The reasons why the two 40 man barracks should have been partitioned: There were only 18 single men to utilize the 80 man capacity. One half of one 40 man barracks was adequate space for the 18 single men. Joe argued that if we were not going to use the barracks for troop quarters, then we should use the space for offices, and not for the personal use of the military. I argued that the buildings were constructed for the purpose of providing living quarters; besides adequate office space was provided in the depot construction. After we returned to the United States, I visited Joe in his home in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and ate dinner with his wonderful family. I knew him to be strongly the family man and I pulled a psychological dirty trick on him. I accused him of being anti-family, with the intent of putting him on the defensive. Poor Joe spent the rest of the tour trying to convince me that he was not anti-family! Joe was as wonderful a guy as I have ever known. We finally won out and the whole matter died down.
Then one of the troops wrote an anonymous letter to Colonel Trong, Chief of Ordnance, alleging that Truc was misappropriating the wood siding issued for the family quarters and putting it to personal use. Truc had already explained to ARVN channels what we were doing and had their backing when Joe first raised the issue of partitioning the barracks - now they all back tracked, and didn't know anything. They were afraid of being criticized. In the end, I flew up to Saigon and told Colonel Trong what we were doing and the matter was dropped. You can not know how detrimental all of this was to Truc's and my morale. Here we were working very hard, seven days a week, and the people we felt should be helping us were doing everything possible to impede our progress. We were very depressed during that period. Frankly it was my opinion that the finger should have been pointed toward those who planned the depot for not doing their homework, and knowing more about Vietnamese cultural and social conditions.
On August 8th, we were told immediately to move the depot to Binh Thuy. Our approved plan for relocating the depot was for a transition period of thirty days. We planned to issue ammunition to the using units from Can Tho Depot and receive incoming shipments of ammunition, from 50th Base Depot in Saigon, at the Binh Thuy Depot. Then toward the end of the 30 day period, move the left over stock at Can Tho at the optimum time to best utilize personnel and transportation. Now we had to complete our move in 10 days. All of our prior planning (thank goodness it was detailed) had to be telescoped. Issues to the using units had to continue unaffected. We contacted using units and requested they make advanced draws to reduce the stock at Can Tho. During this period we had to continue to receive our sea shipments of ammunition from 50th Base Depot. We did it, and as efficiently as I would have expected one of our U.S. Army Ordnance Ammunition Companies to do the same job. This move and its planning was in large part the citation for which the Army of the Republic of Vietnam awarded me their Honor Medal just prior to my departure for the United States.
On the night of August 9th, our perimeter lights failed at Binh Thuy Depot. These lights flooded the entire area around the depot and were essential for security. They provided light along the entire 4,000 meters of perimeter fence so that the guards could detect infiltration attempts by the V.C.. When the lights went off, the V.C. opened fire on our guards. When the lights came back on, ten minutes later, the V.C. stopped firing. We guessed that the V.C. thought we were sending out a patrol against them when the lights were out and they were laying down a harassing fire to oppose the patrol threat. A more
likely explanation was that the guards, after having their eyes adjusted to the light, and then suddenly being thrown into pitch darkness, panicked and did the firing themselves. It was necessary to locate the trouble with the lights. Mr. Alvin C. Neff, a Philco Technical Representative, came to our assistance immediately, but could not find the problem. (Later, Al was one of the biggest helpers we had for Engineer support). I contacted Paul Teeters at Raymond, Morrison and Knudson Contractors, and Paul sent "Dinky" and his electrical crew to help us.
Don Garvais was promoted to Major on August 10th and Colonel Rickman pinned the gold leaf on his collar later that week.
On Sunday, August 16th, after Mass at Can Tho Cathedral, I made my Profession (Promises) to live in accordance with the Rule of the Third Order of St. Dominic. Bishop Ðai, Dominican Provincial I had met at Vung Tau, had made the necessary arrangements with Father Dang-Duy-Ton, the Spiritual Director for the Third Order in the Can Tho Diocese. Norb and I attended Mass together and he was the only personal friend to witness my Profession. There were many Vietnamese people there of course, but Father Ton did not want to make any prior announcements or have a collection of Americans in the Cathedral that would make a likely target for a V.C. terror attack.
We started to build a fortification on the perimeter of the depot on August 17th. Mud and water were every where. We filled 105mm Artillery ammunition boxes with mud and then laid them like bricks. At about 10:30 AM, a jeep drove up and Don Garvais and a Master Sergeant got out of the jeep. I was knee deep in mud and a filthy mess when first introduced to Master Sergeant Carl E. Johnson, who was assigned to the Advisory Team as the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squad Advisor.
I moved into the Binh Thuy Depot on the 18th and Carl moved in with us on the 19th. Carl and I became fast and close friends from the very start. We ate breakfast together the next morning and had our first introduction to the cooking of Madam Nho. She had completed her training period with Bob Adam's Cook. Madam Nho did her best, but there were trying days ahead. Now I must admit Carl is some what finicky about the way he wants his eggs cooked for breakfast. The other meals could be terrible, he would never complain, but those eggs had to be correct. He decided eventually to have three minute eggs - that should be simple enough - how can you louse up a three minute egg! Madam Nho could! She put the eggs into water that was cold and then started counting three minutes from that time. They were raw! Then the next time Carl peeled the eggs and bounced them on the table! After I got back to the United States, I sent Carl a sand-timer for three minute eggs as a joke. By return mail Carl replied that Nho had failed to master this complicated device - nothing had changed. Truc made no comment, but we noticed that his house keeper (Madam Chu) started cooking the breakfast every day; Nho stayed on later at night and Chu went home early. That helped Carl's disposition! An ate the noon and evening meal with Truc, Carl and me. Her English lessons continued, but by now she spoke English with confidence.
Chu had seven children and her husband had deserted her. In addition to the children, Chu supported her father-in-law who was an invalid. Truc employed Chu to help her support her family more easily. Carl and I bought the materials for her to build a house in the family quarters area after Chu told us of the kidnapping of children that was taking place in Can Tho. Of course, there was only one motive for kidnapping children of the poor - V.C. terror. It was better for Chu to live in the family quarters area with our security. As a widow of a soldier killed by the V.C., our Ammunition Company would always provide for Nho as best they could. As a house keeper for the U.S. Army Advisor, Nho was well provided for.
On the night of August 19th, Carl's first night at Binh Thuy, we were brought up out of our beds sharply from the sounds of very heavy small arms fire about 3 km away. This went on for about an hour, and then there were four high order detonations about five seconds apart. The fire fight continued for about 20 minutes more, and then all was quiet. It was at the new airfield that R.M.K. was building. The V.C. had infiltrated through the defenses and placed four mines on the road to an outpost. Then the V.C. attacked the outpost with small arms fire. When the Reserve Force was required, and moved out toward the outpost, it passed over the mines. As usual, the Reserve Force was the real target - this was no surprise, but the Reserve Force was required and had to go. Four killed and eight wounded. We had search lights on each guard tower, but the guards could not locate the V.C..
On the night of the 20th, the V.C. attempted to infiltrate into our ammunition depot. For our security, we not only had perimeter guards, but also had several squads, located at different places every night, waiting to ambush anyone approaching our depot. The local people were told that if they ventured toward the depot after dark, they would be assumed to be V.C.. When the V.C. approached the depot on the night of the 20th, they ran directly into one of our ambush positions. They were permitted to continue to approach until they pulled a trip wire detonating a booby trap, then the ambush Civil Guard Squad placed all of the available small arms fire on the V.C. There were estimated to be 10 V.C. in all; they left four behind dead. In an hour it was all over. The security force from Binh Thuy Strong Point tried to chase the rest of the V.C., but were unsuccessful in locating them. None of our people were hurt. Our morale went sky high. Our ambush defense plan received praise from Sector Headquarters, which encouraged our men to achieve greater victories.
On the morning of August 22d, I got a telephone call from Norb - George Lahey, down at Soc Trang, had been caught in a V.C. ambush; he'd been hit. George had been evacuated by air to Saigon. All day we tried to get information; finally we learned he was going to be all right. George did an outstanding job in Vietnam. We needed more Advisors like him and we got them.
The story of George Lahey was summarized in The Observer on November 28, 1964:
WOUNDED U.S. ADVISOR DEFINES REAL MEANING
OF CIVIC ACTION
"Soc Trang (IV Corps IO) - It was a balmy, sunny Saturday as the two jeeps cruised toward Trung Khanh hamlet 10 km north of Soc Trang. Lt Kim Cuong, Commanding Officer, 21st ARVN Infantry Division Ordnance Company, and 2d Lt Bank, his Shop Officer, rode in the lead jeep. Captain George A. Lahey, Lieutenant Cuong's Advisor and friend, was riding in the trail jeep. Farmers worked their fields under the warming effect of the morning sun. Captain Lahey half turned to the right and gazed over the peaceful country side. He was deep in thought; 'The fields are so green and peaceful; if only---' 'V.C.!!, V.C.!!' Captain Lahey's driver yelled as he stamped hard on the accelerator. Lahey swung his carbine around to fire. One bullet struck him in the left leg. Instinctively he lurched forward as he triggered his carbine. One shot hit the back of his seat where a split-second before he had been sitting. Lahey pulled the trigger as fast as he could. Another slug nicked the upper part of his weapon.
"The squad of V.C. weren't over 10 feet from the road when they stood up in the waist-high weeds which had concealed them.
JEEPS SPEED - UP
"The two jeeps sped through the ambush and limped into the hamlet. Both of the vehicles were damaged by the intensive gun fire. Lieutenants Cuong and Bank also were wounded. A call was sent out for a medical helicopter and within 20 minutes all three were being rushed to Saigon.
"Was the ambush lying in wait especially for those three; or was it just a coincidence: Captain Lahey thinks it was just a happenstance. Regardless, the effect was the same. The V.C. had temporarily put out of action a driving force which was hampering their attempts to dominate the people.
MUST WIN THE PEOPLE
"We must win the people's support. We must show them that their government is truly theirs.
"Civic action is fine; but it must be what the people need and want, Lieutenant Cuong said.
"So for the next few days, the two visited the citizens of the nearby hamlets. The answer was always the same: schools, 'We need bigger schools; so all our children can learn.'
"With this, Lieutenant Cuong asked for and was granted permission by the Division to devote part of his time and the resources of his Company to help the people build schools.
"Then they approached Mr. Harry Jackson, United States Operations Mission (USOM), to ask for money to buy materials. The answer was yes.
SCHOOL COMPLETED
"Within a month, the first school was completed. The night after it was officially opened, Captain Lahey was saying of his counterpart!
"One word...just one word and off he went. He got permission, money, and put his men to work. A school in thirty days! If we had more men like him we'd have this problem licked in no time!
"That night the V.C. moved into the hamlet while the Popular Forces Platoon was on patrol. In typical communist logic, they told the people: This building is a capitalistic trick. It is not a school; it is part of their new post.
"Two of the women pleaded with the V.C.: 'No! It is a school for our children! They pleaded in vain. The building was wrecked by an explosion.
PEOPLE NOT FOOLED
"But the people were not fooled, and within 25 days the school was rebuilt. It stands today. Along with two additional schools which have been completed in surrounding hamlets. Two more are under construction, and two others are in the planning stage. All this, within three months.
"After the first school was destroyed, Lieutenant Cuong put his Shop Officer, Lieutenant Bank, in charge of training the local Popular Forces platoons. His men trained them in marksmanship, weapons maintenance, ambush and patrolling techniques. With this training, they are now better able to protect the hamlets, and the schools still stand. Every day they are filled with children who will some day be the leaders of their community.
RECEIVE TELEGRAM
"While in the hospital, Captain Lahey and Lieutenants Cuong and Bank received telegrams from the people wishing them a speedy recovery.
"The two Lieutenants are recovering from their wounds and will soon be back to duty carrying on their work with the people. Captain Lahey has been transferred to Clark Field (Manila, Philippine Islands) for more extensive surgery. With just two months left before rotation, it is doubtful that he will return.
"However, in the final analysis, the V.C. failed to stop the civic action work; Because the work Captain Lahey sparked will be carried on by those who remain and those yet to come.
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That was in 1964, and 'those yet to come,' come no more.
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On the night that George got hit, the V.C. came back to our depot. At about 9:00 PM, we received small arms fire. Then the V.C. detonated some explosives. I think it was just a face saving device for the losses they suffered the night before. They didn't come in close to the depot, they stayed out about 800 meters. A half hour later all was quiet. Our people were quite pleased with themselves over this. We had been unloading both an L.S.T. and an L.C.U. of ammunition that day, and both ships, particularly the L.S.T. still carried a lot of tonnage of ammunition. The L.S.T. was still tied up at the Binh Thuy boat dock. We were concerned about them, but Captain Huu, Commander of the Binh Thuy Strong Point, had taken adequate precautions.
On the 26th, our 2d Civil Guard Company reported for duty. We were mighty glad to have them. Now we placed one company plus one platoon on the perimeter of the depot, and three other platoons were under Captain Huu for ambushes and reserve forces. We were responsible for defense of the depot inside the perimeter fence. Huu was responsible for securing the area outside the fence.
By now, Carl, Truc An and I had become very close friends. We lived in the same building, ate our meals together and spent all of our free time together. During the day, Truc, Carl and I were together much of the time. My Vietnamese classes were paying off now. I could eat well with chop-sticks too! Our first meal was difficult. I commented that I did not know if I'd be able to eat with chip-sticks and Truc facetiously said that I'd starve if I didn't! Carl and I kept trying, and soon eating with chop-sticks was as routine as eating with a fork.
We learned why we had to move immediately to Binh Thuy Depot from the Can Tho Depot. On the 25th and 26th, the Security Police established road blocks everywhere. All young men age 21 to 30 were picked up and confined to our old depot at Can Tho. It was the draft, Vietnamese style! We were glad to see it. This could have two good effects on the efforts against the V.C.; 1) The ARVN units could be brought up to authorized strength. 2) Young men not in uniform were likely V.C. suspects and could receive more careful documentation checks by the Security Police. Those caught in the road blocks went into the training centers; those who stayed at home were not drafted. In a few days, the training centers were full and the draft was over.
Many Americans criticized this "draft" in that it was not uniformly fair. What they did not take into consideration was the lack of information and controls over the people in Vietnam that we have in the United States. In the U.S., we have birth registration, school records, drivers licenses, social security accounts - hundreds of ways to document an individual that the Vietnamese do not have. To require the people of Vietnam to register for the draft (which was required) was not very effective. All of these factors I have stressed before in this book (loyalty, V.C. population control measures) should be taken into consideration, but in addition was the lack of information concerning the people themselves. There were no social security records at that time to assist in locating the draft dodger, incomplete income tax returns, etc.. There was much work needed in this area in order to establish the order to life as we know it here in the United States. So the draft as we know it could not take place in Vietnam in 1964.
Speaking of income tax returns, another side issue was the tax system in Vietnam. To try to collect taxes from the individual as we do here in the United States was not practical in 1964 in Vietnam. So the government had to get the resources with which to perform its duties from bottle necks in the economic system. This was often misunderstood and called "graft" by those who did not understand that the rice mill was one of those bottle necks, and one of the places that the Province Chief could get control in the money flow and obtain the taxes necessary to run his provincial government as well as pass on to the national government the funds necessary to carry out the responsibilities and services at that level. Consequently, at many points in the economic system there was a tax collection procedure that was often misinterpreted as "kickbacks," "graft" and "corruption." No doubt there was graft and corruption, as there is anywhere in the world, but a lot of honest tax collection was suspect by Americans. Just as in the draft program, the procedure used in the tax program was necessary regardless of its fairness.
The Executive Officer of the old Civil Guard Company, who I shall here call Lieutenant Muy, had been conducting himself strangely the previous week. On the morning of August 29th, Carl and I explained these actions to Truc while we were eating breakfast. Lieutenant Muy had at times shown obvious hostility toward Carl and me. This hostility alternated with an extreme fondness for us that we thought was forced. He had continually tried to get Carl to go some place with him. He had come into our quarters without permission on several occasions. We asked Truc to tell Muy to stay away from us after duty hours, except when he needed professional advice. Truc said he would, but didn't get the opportunity to talk to Muy all that day. On the night of August 29th, a frightening thing happened. At about 8:30 PM, after dark, Carl walked out the front door of our barracks building and met Muy. Muy asked Carl where he was going and Carl replied to wash the glass he was holding. Muy asked, "Where?" And Carl replied, "In the Mess Hall." Carl left Muy standing on our steps and turned down the path toward the Mess Hall. As he did so, he saw Muy enter our building. Carl decided to return and see what Muy was up to. There is a drawing of the barracks area in this book to help you visualize what happened. Room #1 was mine. The dotted lines are partitions that had not yet been constructed. Carl was living in the completed Room #2. Truc, An and Lilas were living in Room #3.
Carl turned around, returned the way he had come and entered our barracks. Muy wasn't more than 15 or 20 seconds ahead of him. Carl went past the entrance to my room, down the hall, and turned to enter room #13. As he did so, he came face to face with Muy. Muy was leaning against the wall of my room and had a 45 caliber pistol pointing directly at Carl's stomach. Muy's face was hard and determined, but suddenly changed to a grin. He then put the pistol in his belt and left the building without a word.
Muy's actions were suspicious to say the least and that of an assassin at the worst. Carl and I sat down and tried to reason this all out. If Muy were a V.C. assassin, Carl was not the intended victim (he could have shot Carl out side the building while they were alone and in the dark). I had been lying on my bed reading, and through the cracks in the wall partition was fully in view from where Muy had been standing; I was an easy target. Truc could have been the target and when Muy heard the barracks door open he could have jumped behind the partition wall to catch Carl by surprise. Then we tried to think of some way that Muy could have been acting normally. He could have been joking - Carl didn't consider this likely. He could have been trying to steal something. All of this was conjecture, but we agreed on one thing: Muy's actions had to be reported toTruc right away.
We told Truc what had happened. Truc thought it was serious and took action immediately. He called a V.C. alert. Everyone went to their battle stations. Truc thought Muy's actions could have been a preliminary to an attack on the depot and he was taking no chances. Carl and I went to the generator building which we considered to be the number one target. If the V.C. were to attack our depot, the perimeter lights would most likely be knocked out first.
We observed one of the search lights on a guard tower toward the east end of the depot flashing on and off in a signal like fashion. Then a master switch for three perimeter flood lights was turned on and off three times. These lights were about fifty meters from Carl and me beyond the perimeter fence. Both of these guard positions were occupied by troops under Muy's command.
Truc placed a squad of Regular Army men from the Ammunition Company behind an ammunition magazine barricade such that they were covering the actions of the civil guard troops on the perimeter. Truc set up an ambush between the depot and the river in front of the perimeter fence (where the lights had flashed suspiciously) and off to an angle so that they had a clear field of fire on anyone approaching the generator building. We remained on alert all night - nothing happened. Carl and I never knew the answers to many of the questions that naturally arise.
Another difficulty of the situation in Vietnam comes to mind that many Americans in the United States did not appreciate. The V.C. had joined the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, the Civil Guard and the Self Defense Forces. Consequently you could never really trust or have absolute confidence in anyone. The danger of this infiltration could not be over estimated.
Cicero said, "A nation can survive its fools, and even the ambitious. But it can not survive treason from within. An enemy at the gates is less formidable, for he is known and he carries his banners openly. But the traitor moves among those within the gates freely, his sly whispers rustling through all the alleys, heard in the very halls of government itself. For the traitor appears no traitor; he speaks in the accents familiar to his victims, and he wears their face and their garments, and he appeals to the baseness that lies deep in the hearts of all men. He rots the soul of a nation; he works secretly and unknown in the night to undermine the pillars of a city; he infects the body politic so that it can no longer resist. A murderer is less to be feared."
And such was the state of affairs in Vietnam. Security can be increased by a multiplicity of counter measures, and it is the only way to counter the internal subversion by the Communists.
The threat which Muy represented, if he represented a threat at all, was neutralized immediately. On the morning of August 30th, Muy was assigned with the ambush reserve force under Captain Huu's supervision and his activities of the past week were related in detail to the ARVN Counterintelligence. We very seldom saw Muy after that. We heard that his explanation of the pistol incident was that he thought Carl was the Civil Guard Company Commander and Muy intended jokingly to surprise him. Both the Company Commander and Muy were quite young and immature; and his explanation could have been true.
The circumstances that were piled up against Muy remained too suspicious, however, and from then on all persons entering the depot were disarmed and escorted to their destinations. In order for there to be no mistake about this, Truc ordered that there would be no exceptions to the order.
At this time, the Vietnamese had no confidence whatever in the French people residing in Vietnam. There were French people in the Binh Thuy area and unless they spoke in French, the Vietnamese could not tell French from American.
The U.S. personnel were generally pretty good about the order and gave up their weapons when they entered the depot. Neither Carl nor I had ever carried weapons when we were inside the depot, so the order was not unreasonable. Only one American made it an issue. I asked Truc to give this American a written exception to the order. If Truc did not make the exception, I knew I would have to explain the Muy incident to Colonel Rickman. Colonel Rickman, I knew, still felt that we could do the job at the depot just as well while living in the American Compound. Carl and I were afraid that, for our own safety, Colonel Rickman might move us back to the American Compound. Truc agreed and the single exception was made.
I told my boss, Don Garvais, and my friend, Norb Kanzler all the details about the Muy pistol incident; just in case something did happen to us, U.S. follow-up action would not omit brother Muy. We considered the danger to our lives, while in the depot to be remote, and this satisfied Don.
I can relate with the Americans who in 1987 still remained in Beirut, Lebanon; when Americans were being kidnapped by terrorists. Somehow, when you live with the people, you rationalize away dangers. We enjoyed our work, thought it was very important, and somehow felt that the people knew and trusted us much more generally than was the actual case. Some how, we rationalized, the people would keep us out of harms way.
There were light and happy moments during this period; all was not serious and hard work. Truc, An, Carl and I often went shopping at the Can Tho market. They helped me buy gifts for Nancy, John and Chris. An wrote her mother in Saigon and asked her to purchase some beautiful silk for us. When it arrived, we went to a tailor in Can Tho and, from Nancy's measurements, had a Vietnamese long dress made for her. Often we went out to dinner at the Phong Dinh Lau in Can Tho, or to visit some of Truc's friends. Our good friend Captain Pham-Cong-Minh, the Battalion Executive Officer, often came out to spend Sunday afternoons in light conversation about every day happenings. His wife had a good job in Saigon, and the family lived there, where the children could be educated to considerable advantage. Often the family came down to visit Minh, and they all came out to the depot to visit with us too. He had a beautiful wife and a wonderful family. The Ordnance Companies and the Battalion Headquarters and IV CALC Headquarters often had dinner parties downtown. Truc and I made all of them.
About the 1st of September, Colonel Hien, IV CALC Commander, ordered that we open as soon as possible a temporary Ammunition Supply Point at Vi Thanh. Carl and a small detachment of ARVN soldiers from the depot flew down to Vi Thanh to set up shop and receive the first shipment of ammunition. The conditions were enough to drive an ammunition man insane. The ASP was about 50 meters directly in front of the aircraft landing strip. Every plane that came into, or took off from Vi Thanh flew directly over the Ammunition. A Civil Guard Battalion Headquarters was located about 150 meters in the other direction. There was a bottomless mud road going into the area. The area was so small that storage in accordance with customarily followed safety requirements was impossible. These are some of the things to which people trained only in conventional warfare must adjust. Vi Thanh was a village island in a sea of V.C. controlled territory. Therefore any supplies to be defended had to be within the small circle that could be defended by the troops available. At Vi Thanh, that perimeter was small. Consequently all of the required support activities were jammed in together. It was a way of life - no one liked it, but there was nothing that could be done about it. Ammunition people were not the only ones suffering for lack of real estate - those who had to be jammed against us didn't like it either! The Gasoline Dump was just down the street from Sector Headquarters. Captain Jesse Coleman, the Quartermaster Advisor, was just as concerned about his Gasoline Dump as I was about the ASP. Due to the conditions, the support provided by the ASP was only adequate. Our ASP was to operate for 90 days.
During the first week of September, our telephone went out of order. "Sandy" Sandstrom, Pfc.'s Back and Rohl checked the telephone line as far as the jungle, from the Airfield in Can Tho, and it was a good circuit. The line was broken some where in the jungle. We assumed that the predictions by the woman in the jungle, that the V.C. would cut the line, had finally come true. We gathered up our security force and once again went into the area. A tree had fallen over, and broken the line; it was not the V.C.. The insulation at several spots along the line had been worn bare from rubbing against trees, so the Signalmen replaced some of the line and all was well once again.
On the evening of September 5th, Don and Norb came out to the Depot for dinner. An prepared a wonderful dinner (all Vietnamese food of course) and we had ice cream for dessert. Ice cream in Vietnam was a real treat. During July and August, the mess hall at Eakin Compound had not been able to get much (if any) ice cream from Saigon. All of the Advisors had been complaining about the situation. It seems like a little thing now, but it was a big issue at the time. People coming back from Saigon told of the "Saigon Commandos" having all of the ice cream they wanted. I don't know that this was true - I doubt it. Many reasons were given for the failure to get ice cream. One was that there weren't enough thermos bags (in which the ice cream was air shipped to the Advisory Teams throughout Vietnam) to go around. Some people alleged that the Mess Association was not ordering ice cream because of budgeting of funds. All sorts of nonsense was expressed. Carl, Truc and I decided to exploit these feelings and tease Norb and Don - showing them how much better we lived in the Vietnamese Ammunition Depot at Binh Thuy than they did in the American Compound. We bought some chocolate ice cream on the local market in Can Tho. It was of very poor quality by U.S. standards and obviously (to Carl and me) not American made. We rehearsed an informal conversation to explain how we got the ice cream. Through planned deception we hoped to keep Don and Norb from realizing or considering that the ice cream might not be American.
After dinner, Don started to light up a cigar and Truc stopped him. Truc told him that we had dessert. When Chu and Nho brought in the ice cream, we were counting on Norb to blow his stack, and he did! "Where did you get the ice cream," he yelled. Very calmly in a matter of fact manner, I replied, "At the commissary in Saigon of course - well, naturally I didn't go up there and get it Norb. ( I rambled on), we mail in our orders, and the commissary ships our orders the next day. When it arrives at Can Tho, the Manifest Clerk at the airport calls us and we go pick up the shipment." I went on as though Norb was in reality asking the procedure for our getting food from Saigon. The planned chatter continued and Norb fumed. "We can't get ice cream at the Compound; they tell us that it is not available." Carl said, "We just place our order ---" We then let them in on our little joke and we all had another dish of ice cream. Don never entered the discussion, and I doubt that he was taken-in.
The medical officer would not let the Mess Hall at the American Compound purchase ice cream or French bread on the local market because they were prepared under substandard health conditions. At Binh Thuy, we ate only Vietnamese food; not eating ice cream or French bread didn't make much sense to us.
We had some sad news early in September, Paul Teeters, my friend with Raymond, Morrison and Knudson Contractors, had a heart attack and was flown back to the United States. Paul and I had coffee together several times a week, and spent a lot of free time together talking about the world situation. I was very concerned about him, and missed him in the days ahead. Mr. Larson, Paul's Assistant, took his place as the number one man for R.M.K. at Can Tho. Mr. Larson was a fine man and very pleasant, but we never had the cooperative working relationship that Paul and I had known.
By now we had about 1,000 people living across the road from the depot (the families of the 541st Ordnance Ammunition Company and the families of the two Civil Guard Companies). Health conditions were terrible. The people had little concept of the causes of disease. They had dug open slit trench latrines. They had made stagnant ponds in which they intended to warehouse fish, but had not yet done so. Garbage from the kitchens was cast aside every where. Mosquitoes, flies and horrible odors were every where. We pleaded and coaxed the people to clean the area, but to no avail. "The Americans and their crazy obsession with cleanliness!"
One day I really blew-up and complained bitterly to Truc. He knew better and I knew he knew better! He'd been formally educated. He'd been to the United States (twice) for schooling and to France also. His uncle was the Dean of the Medical School at Saigon University. When I finally stopped talking he replied, "Rome was not built in a day, do not expect our people to change over night." Of course he was right. We had made progress already - we just had a long way to go, that's all. I told Truc that unless things improved radically in certain areas, people would start dropping dead all over the area. Before it was over, the two beautiful little daughters of our Supply Clerk, Rho, died.
Both little girls were in our kindergarten. I believed their death was needless and the result of conditions that could have easily been corrected - but such was life in Vietnam. We set up priorities for tasks to be accomplished. Truc ordered latrines be built over the rivers edge where the rising and falling tide (as much as six feet difference in the water at high and low tides) would wash away the filth. Garbage pits were dug and a little dirt thrown over it every evening. The stagnant ponds remained. I threatened to pour oil into them if ditches were not dug to carry water in over the ponds at high tide. Progress was very slow. Many of the problems (if not most of them) remained when I left Binh Thuy to return to the United States. It was the work with the people that I enjoyed the most during my tour. We borrowed films on health and sanitation from the U.S. Information service and showed them for the people. Some were in English and some were in Vietnamese. Some of the people had never seen movies and they were always well attended. I felt that one project USOM could undertake would have been to build cheep wooden shacks (just big enough to shield the projector from the rain) and an outdoor screen in each little village, and then rotate through the villages a projector and such pictures as these. The people would love them as entertainment! They had no place to go or anything to do for entertainment, and would have been pleased to learn through movies.
On Sunday, September 6th, Carl and I went to the Compound for Mass. After Mass I tried without success to get help for the families of our Civil Guard Companies. They badly needed materials to build houses. No one ever helped them during my tour there. I tried, but it was all I could do to help the people for whom I was responsible; the Ammunition Company personnel and their families. It was like trying to fill a bottomless pit! Again, there were programs for civilians, but the military (particularly paramilitary) were neglected. After lunch at Binh Thuy, Truc, An and I visited the orphanage in Can Tho. An wanted to go along to see the children and I had some corn starch to deliver that TEPPAC had sent for the Sisters. The Sisters used the corn starch as a substitute for baby powder. That day there was a little nine month old girl there that stole my heart away. She was a beautiful little doll. I wanted to adopt her that very minute and take her with me.
Mother Glossiantte told me (through Truc as French interpreter) that the orphanage needed Polio Vaccine. Polio was a serious problem and Mother Glossiantte took us to the infirmary to see a crippled five year old. The government would not provide help to the orphanage because it was a Religious institution. Yet the only orphanage, was the orphanage operated by the Sisters of Providence! There was only one looser - the children. It was surprising to me how so called "liberal" minded people could be so very unliberal. TEPPAC tried to help, but we never got the Polio Vaccine. Truc and An (both Buddhists) were embarrassed. They did not realize that the United States had the same policies as the Republic of Vietnam. USOM would not help for the same reason.
Little Lilas was cutting her first teeth. After dinner that evening, we all had a look and felt the incoming tooth. Lilas was a beautiful child. Truc fed Lilas orange juice, and An was amazed to learn that children in the U.S. drank orange juice daily. We talked about vitamins for the children and I decided to write TEPPAC for vitamins for the orphanage. It wasn't long before Frances Traylor sent a shipment of vitamins from Las Cruces, NM. From these discussions, the health of Lilas became an influence over health conditions in the family quarters area. Health began to take priority even over security work. Sick people can not fight. An was an unexpected resource in this problem. She visited the wives in the family quarters area daily, and our discussions were passed to the families through her.
I believed we were missing a natural resource in the wives of the Counterparts of our Military Advisors. Not many, but some of the Advisors knew the wives of their counterparts well. How much in the area of health, sanitation and general raising of standards of living could have been accomplished if the wives had been brought to the USA to visit former Advisors, and lived here for a month! They could have then gone back to Vietnam and passed on the things they learned to other wives in the family quarters all over Vietnam.
In the afternoon of September 8th, civilians in Binh Thuy got word to us that a Battalion of V.C. were grouping about nine km from our depot. The V.C. were allegedly turning back sampans that attempted to enter their staging area. At 5:00 PM, we started building barricades around the generator building. We kept up the work until the men were about to drop. After dark, six ambushes on avenues of approach to the depot were set up - both to help identify the location of possible mortar firing positions and to give us early warning information, if the V.C. passed by them. Captain Sherbert called from the American Compound and said that I was to call him if I needed any air support, that he was ready and on call. I knew that already, but it was very encouraging for him to call, and I deeply appreciated knowing that others were concerned. We expected my telephone line to be cut right before the attack, so we would have to communicate with the U.S. Compound by radio. As it turned out, nothing happened that night. The next day, Sector Headquarters confirmed the information we had received from the people of Binh Thuy and Sector mounted an operation to seek out and destroy the V.C.. It was the first of many times after that, that the people in Binh Thuy slipped us information about the V.C. movements. It was a good sign, the people were with us.
On the morning of September 10th, Sector tried to pin down the V.C. force. The plan was to push the V.C. back against our Depot defenses. The V.C. saw through this plan and did not want any part of it. They broke contact with our Civil Guard Company just before lunch time. While the Civil Guard force was eating lunch, the V.C. launched a hand-grenade attack and wounded five Civil Guardsmen. In the action that followed, three Viet Cong and two Russian Carbines were captured. When the V.C. were interrogated, they said there were plans for a massive attack on our depot. First a heard of water buffalo would be stampeded to rupture our perimeter fence. They said the V.C. were assembling many sampans for the attack. We believed that their plan was to attack in two places: 1) with the water buffalo through the South fence. 2) through the family quarters from the Bossac River, using the families as a shield to force entry into the depot. Of course knocking out the generators would have a top priority.
On September 11th, Carl and his counterpart, Lieutenant Dien (the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squad Leader), Sergeant Rang (one of the EOD enlisted men), and Don Garvais took a helicopter to Cai Ke, located across the Bossac river in Vinh Binh Province. They had an EOD job to do there. A 500 pound bomb that had been dropped in a hamlet had to be defused. It could not be blown in place as it was right in the center of the hamlet. Carl defused the bomb with Dien looking on and learning from Carl's instructions. After it was defused, four men carried the bomb in a wheel barrow to the helicopter where it was loaded aboard and brought to our depot. They were real lucky as far as having easy access to the bomb. It entered the ground, resurfaced and came to rest on top of the ground.
On the 12th, Carl, Dien and I took a helicopter to Tra Vinh, where the Assistant Sector Chief made arrangements for a Company of troops to secure a landing area at an outpost called Thanh Binh. The outpost was located on an island in the upper branch of the Mekong River just off of Tra Vinh. When the area was secured we went in by chopper. This outpost had been over run shortly before and the Vietnamese Air Force dropped a dud 500 pound bomb on it while the V.C. were there. It was retaken and Carl's job was to deactivate the bomb. The bomb entered the ground through the tiled front porch of the outpost headquarters. The Self Defense troops had filled up the entrance hole. Without this hole, locating the bomb would be a long hard job. We defined the area for them that would be destroyed if the bomb detonated and recommended the area be evacuated, that only a few men be detailed to dig for the bomb at any one time, and that it should be found as soon as possible. When they located the bomb, they were to let us know and we would come and defuse it. At 3:00 PM, our scheduled helicopter returned for us and we departed. Our return to Thanh Binh later was to be an experience to remember.
On September 15th, Carl and I went to Vi Thanh to inspect the ASP there. We went down on the morning Otter aircraft. The Ammunition Supply Point was still a disappointment to us. It could not succeed without the support of the local Vietnamese troops. We had been committed to ship the ammunition to Vi Thanh from our depot at Binh Thuy by trucks furnished by Major Charles Holbrook's Counterpart, the Transportation Battalion Commander. Truc had agreed to furnish an officer and two enlisted men to be accountably responsible for the ammunition stored at Vi Thanh: to maintain record accountability and issue the ammunition to the using units. The Sector Chief was responsible for providing security, building a rock road to the depot, providing dunnage upon which to stack the ammunition, some sort of improvised shelter to protect the ammunition from the sun and rain. They were to have provided fire barrels filled with water, perimeter lighting and a telephone. None of these improvements had been accomplished. I talked with Lt. Colonel Carpenter, then the Sector Advisor at Vi Thanh, about the problem and told him that I thought we should recommend that the ASP be terminated. Colonel Carpenter had only one question - would the supply point at Vi Thanh provide a better capability for fighting the V.C. there, or can the same support be provided from Binh Thuy? I told him that the closer his support was to his people, the better it would be for them. If his units drew ammunition from Binh Thuy Depot, they would have to send their own assigned trucks and loading detail. If they drew ammunition from the ASP located at Vi Thanh, Charlie Holbrook's people would have to bring the replacement ammunition down to Vi Thanh to resupply the ASP; Vi Thanh would save a lot of transportation and labor. Colonel Carpenter asked for a list of things to be done and to give him a chance to persuade his counterpart to correct the situation, meanwhile to terminate shipments to Vi Thanh (if possible) and hold them back until Vi Thanh sector began to feel a shortage and have to plan a road trip to Binh Thuy. The Colonel did get support from Sector and the ASP ran its 90 days support mission and was still operating on borrowed time when I left Vietnam. The Otter for our return to Binh Thuy arrived at Vi Thanh 15 minutes early, and immediately departed before we could get to the airstrip. Major Donald Gluck got us out on a helicopter a little while later. When we got back to Binh Thuy, I explained to Truc the situation at Vi Thanh and what Colonel Carpenter had recommended we do. Truc said that he would do what he could to stall the shipments, but when he was ordered to ship the ammunition he would have to do so; the failure of Sector to Meet their responsibilities was not authorization for Truc to fail to comply with orders. He held off until the Sector Chief at Vi Thanh was getting all of the projects started and then at Colonel Carpenter's request started shipping again.
On September 17th, we headed back for the bomb at Thanh Binh. Carl, Dien and I went by helicopter first to Vung Liem District Headquarters. The District Chief was supposed to have already set up the security force for our helicopter to land at Thanh Binh outpost. When the District Chief told me that security had been set up, I felt a lack of confidence in his answer - he just didn't sound certain. I thought about asking him to come with us, but brushed this aside and we were off for Thanh Binh. We went up high, about 2,500 feet and passed over the outpost. After a long wait, we finally got our smoke signal to land. We came in low over the village of Thanh Binh. I commented into the intercommunication system to the others in the helicopter that I could not see any people; no children! That is a bad sign; but in that it was about 2:00 PM, the Siesta period was still in session, so we went on in toward the landing area. When we were about 100 feet off of the ground, and about the same distance away from the landing pad, the V.C. opened fire on us. I was in the center on the rear seat of our "HUEY" helicopter and could not return the fire. The V.C. were directly below us and I could do nothing. What a helpless feeling! Our two side gunners fired their machine guns directly below the helicopter and our pilot moved out fast. I was angry with the District Chief at Vung Liem, and I recalled that lack of confidence in his answer to my question as to the security provided at Thanh Binh. I was more angry with myself for not having reacted to my gut feeling about the District Chief's response. Next time, he would go with us or we would not go back. Our air priority was low. We could never have gotten an armed helicopter escort - and that was the only way we could have gotten in there. When we got back to Can Tho airfield we inspected the skin of the helicopter for hits. We were astonished not to find a single hit! I have no idea how many rounds were fired at us, but there were many. The V.C. no doubt knew we had come for the bomb on the 12th of September, and that we had not completed our mission. They knew we would be back and were waiting for us. I made a report of the incident to Don Garvais. Don said we were not to go back unless he had assurance that security was provided. What we were gambling was not worth the possible gain. We never did go back - the District Chief never asked for us to return. He probably suffered too much loss of face for him to make the request.
We had some excitement in Can Tho on September 13th, when there was another in a series of Presidential Coup attempts. General Duc, IV Corps Commander, was one of the leaders of the Coup attempt. When Duc left for Saigon, he left a Battalion of troops to defend his home and family from those forces that would remain loyal to General Khanh, who was then the President. After the coup attempt started on Sunday morning, a Battalion of troops loyal to General Khanh surrounded General Duc's house. Two ARVN Battalions faced each other. In Saigon, after the coup attempt failed, General Khanh ordered General Duc to return to his command at IV Corps. When General Duc landed at the Can Tho airfield, he was met by the 9th and 21st Division Commanders who told him they would attack General Duc and his forces if he did not go back to Saigon. They would no longer serve under Duc's command. Norb Kanzler was sorry to see General Duc go. For months Norb had been giving Duc's daughter English lessons and had grown very fond of the family. My friend Lieutenant The' (already mentioned as the Ordnance Battalion Ammunition Staff Officer) also was out of a job. He had become an aide -de-camp to General Duc and been promoted to Captain. Now, with the General out of favor, Captain The' was on his way to oblivion. Major Dang went to bat for The', and soon he was back at his old job at Battalion Headquarters.
On September 18th, Don and I went to Saigon. Don had two weeks leave and intended to meet his wife Kay in Hawaii. I planned to take care of some business at the Office of the Chief of Ordnance and return to Binh Thuy on Saturday or Sunday. We left on the 11:50 AM Caribou. Just before departing, I felt a pain in my left chest. While in route to Saigon, I had several sharp pains. When walking from the plane to the terminal building at Saigon, the pain became almost unbearable. We went directly to the hospital and I was admitted. At first they thought I was having a heart attack, but the Electro-Cardiograph came out clean and so did the x-ray. Don stayed with me until I was sent to bed. I was concerned that Don might not take his already approved leave and go to Hawaii. His wife was there waiting for him. There was a very close loyalty established between Carl, Don, Norb and me. Never before had I felt such total confidence in a group as I did in our little Ordnance Team. For this reason, I was very concerned that Don would not go to Hawaii. That evening, Don and Major Harry Foradori (a very close friend, supporter of my civic action projects, and Chief of the U.S. Army Ammunition Section at Saigon) came to visit me. Don had already passed up one seat that afternoon on a plane for Hawaii. He was now convinced, as was I, that whatever I had for an illness, it was not to be fatal, but it was too late for him to get on the plane leaving on September 19th. I was very uncomfortable on the night of the 18-19th. From about 1:00 AM to 5:00 AM, I had severe pains.
On the 19th, Don and Harry came again to visit. Don was now scheduled for departure on the morning of the 20th. This was the day of the U.S. Navy vs North Vietnamese Navy action that took place in Tonkin Bay. Now we were all afraid Don's leave might be canceled. We listened carefully to the news of Tonkin Bay and said a few prayers. On the night of 19-20th, I was given narcotics at 9:30 PM and 2:00 AM, because I just could not stand the pain. Though I spent most of the night in a sitting position, the pain was only bearable.
Sunday, the 20th, Don was on his way to Hawaii and Harry visited me in the hospital. That afternoon I assisted at Father Calter's Mass, celebrated at the hospital; so I was feeling much better. He had been transferred to Saigon from Can Tho. The people and doctors at the hospital were very pleasant and kind, but I didn't seem to be much help to them. I guess I wasn't giving them enough information.
On Monday, the 21st, the doctor agreed to let me go. When he came into the room, I greeted him with great exuberance and enthusiasm, and told him I might as well go on back to work. I didn't fool him though - those Navy doctors were really good. He listened to my breathing through his stethoscope, and commented that I had "improved." I told him I could do what I was doing in the hospital in my room at Binh Thuy. He discharged me. His discharge comment was "greatly improved."
The rest of the 21st and the day of the 22d, I spent at the office of the Chief of Ordnance and with Harry Foradori trying to coordinate some shipments of Artillery ammunition.
Van met me at the airport at Can Tho on the morning of the 23d. It was indeed good to be home. When we got back to Binh Thuy, there was considerable excitement as the Vietnamese welcomed me home. Truc, An, Chu and Nho met me as I came in the door. I related all the details of my five days of absence. You'd think I had been on an extended expedition to a foreign land! The Vietnamese had not lost a sincere interest in other people. Many evenings we spent talking about little family things few friends in the USA ever talk about. So it was not surprising that they should insist upon a full and complete report of my trip to Saigon. An presented me with a beautiful red Au Dai (Vietnamese long dress) for my wife, Nancy. Nho had picked up a Vietnamese printed form containing Nancy's measurements that was on my desk, and given it to An. Truc and An had selected the material and had the dress made in Can Tho.
On the 24th, Carl and the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squad went to Soc Trang to destroy a bomb. It turned out to be a U.S. 260 pound fragmentation bomb dropped during world War II.
Back in August, we had been notified that the paper money issued under the Diem Administration was to be replaced with a new currency before September 2d. Shortly after my arrival in Vietnam, I had put away 2,000 Piasters (at that time about $15.00 US) which we called "Ps", for any emergency that should arise. The exchange date came and went, but I had forgotten about the 2,000 Ps. On the 25th of September, I needed some money and remembered the reserve I had put away. It was worthless. I wrote a letter to the American Embassy in Saigon asking assistance in exchanging the four 500 P bills. On the 28th, the Embassy sent me a letter advising me that my problem had been forwarded to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The machinery of bureaucracy was in motion!
On the 1st of October, Colonel Rickman called for me to come into Can Tho, he wanted to see me. The fact that I was establishing a list of donors to finance the little Blessed Sacrament Chapel at Binh Thuy had come to his attention. The Colonel was very sympathetic with my desire to build the Chapel, as mentioned earlier, he was himself a Daily Communicant. But the Command was afraid the V.C. might start a propaganda campaign to the effect that the U.S. troops were forcing Catholicism on the people. I was very disappointed, to say the least, when the Colonel told me that I would have to get permission to build the Chapel. The military is very slow to act on anything "controversial" and the answer would undoubtedly be "no," if we ever got an answer before my tour was up.
I had decided to name the Church Nha Tho Duc Me Fatima (Our lady of Fatima Church), because of Our Lady's direct relation (through Fatima) to the Vietnamese War. So I prayed to her and left the removal of all barriers to the Chapel construction in her hands. Then I talked to Father (Captain) Joseph C. Nosser, our new Catholic Chaplain. Father Nosser said that there was no problem. I could give him the money and he would give it to the Bishop of the Can Tho Diocese. The Bishop could build the Chapel. The barrier was removed, though I was not thrilled with turning over control to another slow moving organization. In addition, Father Nosser was using the term "we" which meant that he was going to help!
That night, the V.C. attacked the outpost 1 1/4 km south of our depot. An attempt was made to push the V.C. into our perimeter defenses, but again it failed - they did not cooperate! The V.C. crossed from Lemon Canal to Orange Canal, through an open area directly south of the depot, but out of range of our weapons. Our people fired a .30 caliber machine gun at about 45o elevation pointed in their direction as they crossed. The machine gun played the rounds up and down in elevation so the tracer bullets would point out the location of the V.C. to the Security force from Binh Thuy Strong Point. We didn't hear any more from them that night.
On the morning of October 3d, as he often did on Saturdays, Colonel Hien (IV CALC Commander), came out to visit us at the depot. Though the administrative area of the depot was usually a bee hive of activity, the other areas were peaceful, quiet and restful. Hien, Truc and I would go for walks and carry on a light conversation about little things of no consequence.
The night before, I had told Truc, An and Carl that I could not build the Church, and that Father Nosser was going to talk with the Bishop about taking on the project. As I mentioned earlier, Truc and An were both Buddhists, but they were very interested in the needs of their people and were strongly in favor of the Chapel project. Truc favored the project for the additional reason that it would eliminate another reason for any of our people to go to Can Tho. For Security reasons we wanted our troops at the depot all of the time.
After a walk around the depot area, Hien, Truc and I went to our dining area for a beer, tea and coffee, respectively. Truc and Hien began to talk with each other at a rapid rate (their way of conversing without my understanding their conversation) and finally Hien addressed me through Truc, and in substance said as follows:
"It is true that the V.C. may well make propaganda over your Chapel project. They can make propaganda over many things that the Vietnamese and Americans cooperate to accomplish. Does that mean we must stop cooperation toward realization of all these things? As the battle against the Viet Cong must go on, so must life itself."
"Often we feel that the American thinks our approach to the defeat of the V.C. is half-hearted - that we are not placing our every effort in the direction of victory. Of course this is a misunderstanding. Many of us have been fighting the Communists most of our lives (Colonel Hien had over 30 years service and fought the Viet Minh with the French). Our younger officers and men have known no other condition of life. And so we try to retain some semblance of a normal life; the family, our community life, schools and our religions."
"Rightly, you and Truc have concluded that there should be a Catholic Chapel here at Binh Thuy. You are motivated to build a Chapel, and the Vietnamese are pleased to benefit from your motivation. If the Chapel is not built because of fear the V.C. will make propaganda against us, we may as well give up the fight, because the V.C. will already control us. For this reason, I have ordered Truc to build the Chapel and I will issue an official order to that effect Monday."
"The Catholic priests and sisters have done many fine things for the people of Vietnam. The sisters never refuse to care for those most rejected by society; the old man without a family, the infant abandoned at the convent gate. I have great respect for the good heart of these sisters. For this reason I will donate the metal sheets and wood for the roof of the Chapel."
"I not only recognize the need for the Catholic Chapel, but further, the need of a Pagoda for the Buddhist families. Therefore my order to Truc will include the requirement to build a Pagoda too. The order will authorize the establishment of two funds, one for the Chapel and one for the Pagoda. A committee of soldiers will be established for each fund to make the decisions for expenditures. We welcome donations from anyone for either fund. Both buildings will be constructed on government property in the family quarters area (the government had bought the land we had leased) and therefore are to be official military Chapels."
Needless to say, I was impressed with the efficiency of Our lady to dispose of the barriers to the construction of the Church. Colonel Hien expanded my little Blessed Sacrament Chapel idea into a full scale (33 X 100 foot) Church - I figured she had a part in that action too!
Hien went on to tell about a Pagoda in North Vietnam that the Communists had destroyed when they took over, as a symbol of the destruction of all religions there. Hien would have his artist draw a picture of that Pagoda as he recalled it, and it would be the design for the one we would construct. Hien said that this would be a V.C. propaganda in reverse. Hien was the most outstanding Buddhist leader in Can Tho. He played a large part in building the large Pagoda near the Can Tho airport. Once when I went to tour that Pagoda, I met Colonel Hien there, and he took me on a special guided tour. We met the Buddhist priest and had tea and bananas with him. Truc later went with me on three occasions to act as an interpreter when the priest gave me a general orientation course on the Buddhist religion.
On October 2d, I received a note from the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Headquarters acknowledging receipt of my letter to the U.S. Embassy requesting assistance in the exchange of my 2,000 Ps. They were sending it to the National Bank of Vietnam.
On October 5th, our Kindergarten opened and the children came for registration. We were to run a morning and afternoon session to accommodate the demand. We had a large 120 man mess hall which we turned into a class room. Our 18 single men had abandoned the Company Mess and were eating at a place across the road that was owned by Captain Huu, the Binh Thuy Strong Point Commander. I took pictures of the Kindergarten in operation several times, but none of the pictures were very good.
It had been a week since we had any V.C. activity at Binh Thuy. The wives, while shopping at the Binh Thuy market, picked up news that the V.C. had held an elaborate funeral for a V.C. Captain, the V.C. District Chief - one of the Communist Cadre. He had died as a result of wounds, I assumed he received during the fighting on October 2d. A Civil Guard Battalion swept through the area again between the 5th and 6th of October, and except for one sniper, found it clear of V.C.. He had a new Russian Carbine and 10 pounds of documents (must have been a courier).
I saw Mr. Larson at R.M.K., and he had good news - Paul Teeters, who had been recuperating from his heart attack at his home in Oregon, was on his way back to Vietnam. A day or so later, R.M.K. called and told me that Paul was coming down from Saigon, and I went out to meet him at the new airfield when the Contractor's aircraft brought him back to Binh Thuy. Paul was very weak, and visibly suffered as he climbed down from the little Beachcraft airplane. He did not look at all well. We had a good reunion and Paul promised to make his regular coffee calls at our depot as before - and he did. It was so good to have him back.
On October 15th, we had a U.S. Navy team of Captains and a two star Admiral visit the depot. We toured them through the ammunition storage area, and then they wanted to take a walk through the barracks and mess hall building. A couple of the Captains made some derogatory comments about Vietnamese family life - the usual type remark that indicated a lack of understanding of the people. It was then that I realized how much a part of the Vietnamese community I had become. The Vietnamese people had become my very close friends and I was deeply tied to them. Truc and An, Van, Chu, Nho, Dang, Minh, Lieutenant and Madam Duc, No (the Company Carpenter), the little group of Catholics; I was a part of them and they were a part of me. Truc was walking beside me at the time, and I knew he heard the remarks. I deeply resented the comments of the two Navy Captains; I felt real anger.
This was my wedding anniversary, October 15th, and that night the loneliness of being without my family was acute. I thought of Nancy, John and Chris, and what they must be doing. At 9:00 PM in Vietnam it was 7:00 AM in El Paso. They were probably eating breakfast----
On October 17th, Phong Dinh Sector conducted an operation behind our depot again. Just before lunch there was a brief contact with the V.C., but nothing further developed. It was Saturday, and Father Nosser came out to the depot as usual to give Carl instructions in the Faith. Carl had hoped to be Baptized because Norb, Carl and I were planning to go to Dalat on October 22d for a religious retreat, but Father Nosser said he would prefer that the retreat come before his Baptism.
At 2:00 PM on the 22d, Norb, Carl and I joined the other Catholic Advisors, who were to make the retreat, at the Can Tho airfield, and we flew directly to Dalat by Caribou aircraft. What a surprise Dalat was for us! It was like a paradise hidden away in the mountains. No wonder the French loved it so much! It was very high in the mountains and the temperature varied between 52o and 70o. Super pleasant weather. It was much like Highlands, NC; we enjoyed a fire in the hotel fireplace in the evening and very comfortable weather during the day.
In Dalat, Pine trees stood tall every where. The terrain was much like West Virginia - rugged and untamed. The wild life abound and in the lobby of the Dalat Palace Hotel, where we stayed, there were many specimens of these animals mounted on the walls and in display cases.
On the afternoon of the 23d, we went on a self directed tour. We went to the market which was typical for Vietnam. They had tourist type merchandise on sale. The only thing unusual about the market was the building, a two story concrete structure. The vegetable and meat market was downstairs and the merchandise upstairs. I bought a pink cashmere sweater for Nancy. Then we went to Prenn Falls and Zoo. The falls were beautiful, but the zoo was disappointing. They had a large handsome tiger and a pet elephant. Some of the retreatants climbed up on the elephant to pose for pictures. The Vietnamese attendant was very kind and friendly and delighted to assist the Americans mounting the elephant. Madam Nhu, wife of Ngo-Dinh-Nhu (brother of former President Ngo-Dinh- Diem), had held some official receptions at the picnic area below the falls; it was a beautiful spot. It was a relatively new recreation area, inaugurated in 1959, during the visit of the Queen of Thailand.
I had been directing our taxi driver in Vietnamese. We wanted to go to the University of Dalat, but I didn't know the Vietnamese word for University. I told him we wanted to go to the school of the 20 year old boys and girls. We ended up at a French College (an American high school equivalent), Lycee Yersin, where Truc had gone to school. Dalat, as you may recall was Truc's home town. While touring the high school, we found a young man about 18 years of age, reading an American western novel. He told me to tell the driver "di dai hoc." Di means go, dai means middle and hoc means school. If the University was middle school, I wondered what was the top school! In response to the prescribed formula, our driver grinned widely and replied that he understood and we were off again. The University was new and clean. It was the only private (Catholic) University in Vietnam. The other two Universities were at Saigon and Hue. It was a small school of a half dozen buildings. The Chapel was beautiful. We were impressed with the decorative iron work and wood paneling. From the University we could see our Dalat Palace Hotel, the Great Lake, the Military Academy, the Atomic Center, and the Vatican College for South East Asian Seminarians (St. Pius X).
Sunday morning, we walked to St. Pius X for Mass. Father Robert Crawford, C.M., our Retreat Master, had celebrated Mass at St. Nicholas's cathedral on Saturday morning, so on Sunday a Vietnamese Priest celebrated Mass for us. It was exactly the same, and again the language barrier of the two people was eliminated by the Latin Mass; we held something in common that was very dear to us both. The Seminary was beautiful and there were many young men there studying for the Priesthood. That afternoon, we said goodby to Father Crawford. He was one of the supporters of my Church project. We boarded a bus for the airport. Once again we carried our Carbines; we were on our way back into the Delta.
On October 29th, I got a form letter from the National Bank of Vietnam saying it was not in the National interest of the Republic of Vietnam to exchange my 2,000 Ps since the deadline had passed for the exchange, and therefore no exception could be justified. That was an honest and frank answer!
0n October 31st, Father Nosser Baptised Carl at the depot after his instruction class was completed. Carl took the name of St. Dominic; that made me pretty happy.
Early in November, we were informed that the V.C. had prepared mortar positions across the Bossac river to the north of our depot and also to the south behind our depot. We asked our Artillery support people at Binh Thuy to fire their prepositioned fire plan around our depot, and we were satisfied with the results. We established a code word to signal for Artillery to fire on each of the V.C. prepared mortar positions and other code words for the various fire plans in defense of the depot perimeter. Captain Huu had placed some of our Civil Guard in ambush positions on the Island in the Bossac river with the additional mission of detecting sources or locations of mortar positions should any fire on our depot. One night that ambush caught 10 V.C. in their cross fire, four of whom were killed. When they were fired upon, the six not hurt immediately jumped into the water and submerged themselves breathing through reeds. A hand grenade thrown into the water brought them up fast. They told Captain Huu that the V.C. planned to attack the depot on the 1st of December.
On the night of November 9th, the V.C. put a six by nine foot V.C. flag on some banana trees between our depot and the new airfield. I shaved in the men's room of the Administrative Office, as it was the only American latrine facility in the Depot. When I looked out the window that morning, I saw the V.C. flag and it looked as big as a house! The intent, we believed, was to demonstrate to the people V.C. ability to pass between our depot and the new airfield defenses and weaken our morale as well as the confidence of the Binh Thuy people. It's effect was not noticeable. That same night they put another flag on some trees behind the depot. Captain Huu presented the flags to me as souvenirs.
On the night of the 10th, the V.C. massed a Battalion of troops at a point about five km south of the Can Tho airport and about eight or nine km from us. They were scattered by Artillery and Helicopters flying flare runs to expose them.
The Eakin Compound "newspaper" published an article titled Weather Outlook, that gave a synopsis of Can Tho weather conditions:
"October proved to be a near normal month as we received 9.1 inches of rain compared to the expected rainfall of 9.8 inches. November is the last month of the transition period between the wet and dry seasons. During November the average maximum temperature will be 86oF, average minimum temperature 76oF, average rainfall 6.7 inches, and average relative humidity 86%. The total rainfall in Can Tho from 1st of January to 31 October 1964 was 52.9 inches. The normal for this period is 54.6 inches."
On the 15th of November, Carl and I went to Soc Trang to inspect some very old dynamite that had been found. It turned out to be new Composition-B plastic explosives. Dynamite becomes very sensitive when stored for long periods, and must be turned regularly. Composition-B is very stable in storage.
On the 22d, I went to Saigon for An Ordnance conference. That evening, Sergeant James Hale (he had spent the last seven years serving in Vietnam), the Sergeant Major of the Ammunition Branch, and I went shopping for something that would make a suitable Tabernacle for the Church. We finally settled for a safe we found, and purchased it for a reasonable price. Sergeant Hale said that he would have a brass front put on the safe to make it decorative. He took it to Captain Lai-Nhu- Xuyen, who worked in the Ammunition Branch at the ARVN Office of the Chief of Ordnance. Xuyen designed a beautiful frontice and the safe soon became a Tabernacle. Xuyen is an old friend. He visited me several times at Binh Thuy and then after my return to the United States, visited me at Fort Sheridan, IL. He had just completed the Ordnance Career Course at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD and was enroute back to Vietnam.
On November 24th, Major Bennett was shot in the leg while he was driving a jeep to the new airfield. He had just passed our depot at Binh Thuy and was in front of the banana trees where the V.C. had placed the 6 X 9 foot flag, when he heard a short but loud swish noise and felt a sharp pain in his left leg. He drove on out to the new airfield and reported to Captain Huu what had happened. Captain Huu moved in a security force fast and rounded up all the people in that area. He found one young man with a zip gun (match heads used as a propellant) who had been hunting birds. Captain Huu gave the gun to me and I passed it on to Major Bennett for a souvenir. We did not know for certain that this was the weapon used to fire the three cornered piece of metal that was taken out of Major Bennett's leg, but if not, it was a weapon like it.
At the end of November, I was informed that Captain Bobby L. Sharp was to be my replacement. He would arrive in early February for a few days when our tours would overlap and I would pass on to him the status of my duties. My tour in Vietnam was growing short and there was so much to be done.
November had been a quiet month - noise wise, but the most active month action wise. A brief recap of events for November: V.C. prepared mortar positions, 6 V.C. captured on the island tell of a planned December 1st attack, 4 killed on the island, 2 V.C. flags posted outside our depot, 4 V.C. killed in an ambush, 6 more V.C. killed when they attempted to escape in Sampans after an operation, Major Bennett was shot.
1 December passed - the V.C. attack never came. On December 3d, we were issued a new red Fire Engine for our Depot. It arrived at our Depot with red lights burning and the siren wide open! It drew a cheering crowd to say the least. Before Truc or I could get to it, the fire engine was off for Can Tho again (with considerably more than a normal crew), red light, siren and all! They "had to go to Can Tho to fill the tank with city water," we were told. After a short while it came back in the same manner as it had left, greeted by all of the villagers lined along the highway cheering and waving to the joyous riders. This time Truc was waiting for them and the fire engine was put away in the motor pool. They were like children with a new toy.
On December 4th, one of the children from our family quarters was run over in the road that separates the depot from the family quarters. The Vietnamese drove far too fast under all conditions and through our area was no exception. At about 5:30 PM, a Lambretta (French compact vehicle used for short run bus service) hit and killed a seven year old child. The boy was about the size of my youngest son. I had tried unsuccessfully, since the day we moved to Binh Thuy, to have the traffic slowed down. It was only a matter of time before someone was hit. The child was from one of the Civil Guard Companies. Immediately after the incident, the Civil Guardsmen swarmed out of the family quarters yelling for the driver to be killed. Truc dashed into the mob and, with the support of our Ammunition Company Regular Army troops, pulled the driver into the depot and closed the depot gates. Then the Civil Guard attacked our Ammunition Company personnel for helping the driver. I do not know who was to blame, the children were in the road all day, every day, and the parents new the danger was there. Finally, the Gendarmarie (local police) arrived and conducted an investigation. Then after more scuffling and yelling, the police evacuated the driver and his now mauled Lambretta to Can Tho.
On December 7th, Don and Carl went on an Explosive Ordnance Disposal mission with the EOD Squad in the vicinity of Chau Doc on the Cambodian border. They went to Chau Doc by helicopter and then by river assault boat for about two hours up the canal. They were under fire once in route. Their mission was to clear some dud 81 mm Mortar rounds fired by the V.C. a day or so earlier. When the job was over, they radioed for their helicopter to come pick them up for the return to Can Tho.
On December 8th, Don and I went by helicopter to Ca Mau to make a reconnaissance for a possible ASP location. There was no acceptable location in our opinion. I saw Captain James Bramlet down there. The Battalion to which he was assigned as the Advisor had earlier been assigned to defend the new airfield at Binh Thuy. He had been with the Battalion on an operation they had just completed at Ca Mau. We had viewed the tactical employment pattern as revealed by the ruts made by the M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers in the rice paddies as we flew over the area in route to Ca Mau. The V.C. had controlled most of this area for years. All of the roads had been cut with wide ditches across them (as many as eight to ten about 50 meters apart). The Battalion was very effective when it was at Binh Thuy, and it demonstrated its effectiveness again in this very successful operation at Ca Mau.
On December 9th, we had our first flag raising ceremony at the Binh Thuy Depot. It had been necessary for us to defer the flag raising ceremony at our depot until, according to the Chinese calendar and horoscope there was a "good day." Custom had it that unless the flag was raised on a "good day," the Commander of the activity was certain to be immediately transferred. The 9th was a "good day," and with considerable to-do, we had our first flag raising ceremony. Letters of commendation and awards were passed out.
I was promoted on December 11th, and Colonel Rickman pinned on my gold leaf rank of Major.
Our good friend Lt. Colonel Hien, IV CALC Commander, was transferred to the Pacification Center at Saigon. On Saturday, December 12th, Hien and his replacement, Colonel Le-Huy-Luyen, came for a tour and visit of our depot. About half way through the tour, Hien motioned me aside and we went to our dining area to talk. He drank a beer and I drank my coffee. The conversation was light and of no consequence as usual - it was our farewell. Colonel Luyen and the others joined us and we continued our conversation for about an hour. It was a most ideal situation - perhaps Hien planned it that way, I don't know. But the informality and friendly atmosphere was transmitted to Luyen and the rigid formality and reluctance (or feeling of insecurity ) of the Vietnamese with a new Commander was broken on the first meeting. Luyen didn't spend his free time with us as did Hien, but he made many more frequent duty hour visits to our depot. Soon we were quite good friends.
On December 12th, at 2:00 AM, our Artillery Battery at Binh Thuy opened up and pounded away for a half-hour. By 11:00 AM, the Artillery Batteries in the distance had taken over, and were still pounding away. The details of this like so many of these incidents were never known to Carl and me. By now our curiosity had died out and we just didn't inquire as to what happened anymore. On December 14th, I introduced An's father, Pham-Gia-Khang, to Paul Teeters as an applicant for a job with R.M.K.. Khang had been the operator of his own paper mill and print shop in Hanoi before the communist take-over of the North. He and his family moved as refugees to Saigon, where Khang joined the Army of the Republic. He had just retired from the Army (forced retirement due to age) and needed a job to support and educate his family. He had a wife and eight children to support (two in the University of Saigon). His wife and children stayed in Saigon, near the University, and Khang moved in with us. Paul was interested in Khang because of his experience in Security work. Paul needed a Chief of Security and Khang proved to be a very satisfactory one. Madam Khang often came to Binh Thuy to visit her husband and of course Truc, An, and her grand daughter, Lilas. Khang and I spent many hours in the evenings talking about America and Vietnam. He was very intelligent and with practice speaking English was becoming very fluent. Khang had learned by himself to read, write and understand spoken English from a text book and listening to the Voice of America. He was an exceptional individual.
An and Truc announced to us at dinner one night in mid December that Lilas was to have competition for the attention of the household. An had been experiencing morning sickness for some time now, so we really were not surprised by the news. But now it was official, and we all joked about how we had spoiled Lilas and her approaching dethronement! An had a little boy named Trong in July, 1965, five months after I had returned to the United States.
On December 15th, Carl, three ARVN EOD men and I departed Can Tho at 1:30 PM, by helicopter on an EOD mission. Either Don or I went along on these missions to assist in getting adequate Security forces from the local Vietnamese. Frankly, The Vietnamese were somewhat more rank conscious than Americans and we took advantage of the rank to get the best security we could for our small group transported in a single unarmed helicopter (the UH1B had only two side mounted machine guns for self-defense). We flew to Tan Chau (located about 15 km north of Chau Doc, on the Cambodian border). At Tan Chau, we were met by the Assistant District Chief, who told us that the V.C. bomb for which we were looking was located at Phu An, about 15 km northeast of Tam Chau. We asked if the area was secure for our "chopper" to land and when he said yes, I asked for him to come along with us (remembering our experience at Thanh Binh). After waiting about a half hour for him to get permission from the District Chief, we took off. We could not find Phu An. We located An Long Special Forces camp and landed for instructions. We were met by Captain Smith, who told us that Phu An was the village across the river and he believed it was secure. As soon as we landed at Phu An, our escort said that this was the place, hopped out and was met joyfully by the people. He'd flown for the first time in a helicopter and they were interested in his experiences. An honor guard of the self-defense troops was quickly formed for us and our little Ordnance group moved through the crowd to the "V.C. Bomb." It was in fact a U.S. Photoflash bomb, used as a mighty flashbulb for night aircraft photo reconnaissance missions. We did as best we could (not very well) to evacuate the area so that Carl and the EOD Team could defuse the bomb. After the bomb was safe, we loaded it into the helicopter and took it back to Binh Thuy, dropping off our escort at Tan Chau on the way back.
That evening after dinner, we opened a package from my wife, Nancy - gifts for An and Lilas. Nancy sent An a very nice blouse and Lilas some American pajamas with feet and some rubber pants. The Vietnamese passed them all around and talked about them at length.
On December 16th, there was another operation behind our depot. During this action, a force from our Civil Guard was sent by truck to outflank the V.C.. They went down the road from Binh Thuy toward Long Xuyen and a short way past the new airfield, turned south down a side road. The V.C. anticipated this move and had mined the road. They detonated an electrical mine under the truck killing four and wounding 12 men. As the bed of the truck buckled under the stress of the explosion, the rivets popped out of the floor and became flying missiles. It was a terrible mess. All of the victims lived across the road from the depot in our family quarters area. The wives and families (as they do in any war) suffered a great loss.
On December 17th, Norb and I went to Rach Gia on the morning Otter. We transacted our business quickly and went into town to eat at the market. We had planned to eat at a restaurant described to us by Major Dang and Don Garvais, but we could not find it. Rach Gia was noted for its seafood, and shrimp was my favorite. We finally ate at a little place in the market - it was not a good place to eat! We went back to the airport after our work was done, and took the afternoon Otter to Can Tho making stops at Vi Thanh, Ca Mau, Bac Lieu and finally Can Tho.
On December 22d, Carl and four of the EOD men went on a mission to destroy two 1,000 pound bombs located in the Tam Binh area. Carl had previously coordinated the security with the U.S. Army Advisor. But when they got to Tam Binh they found that a V.C. Battalion had since moved into the area where the bombs were located so they could not fulfill the mission. That night we were informed that a V.C. force of 300 men was moving down through Vinh Long Province toward Can Tho. A reconnaissance aircraft photographed the V.C. Mortar positions in the vicinity of our depot, but there was no indication of any change in them from the previous photographs.
On Christmas Eve, I worked with the Vietnamese Catholic men at the Church, building steps and the platform to be in front of the Altar. We poured the reinforced concrete late in the afternoon and finished at about 6:00 PM. Carl and I went to the Compound in Can Tho for dinner and then visited with our friends until time for midnight Mass. We stayed over night for Christmas dinner and then went back to Binh Thuy.
On Christmas Day, we built the Altar for the Church. It was made of brick and veneered with cement. We later mixed white pebbles with a blue cement mix and again veneered the Altar sides and corners. Then with water and a brush rubbed off some of the cement until the white pebbles protruded just a little. Blue and white are the colors of Our Lady of Fatima and this made a beautiful frame for the three dimensional reproduction of Salvador Dali's "Last Supper" placed on the front-center of the Altar. The tile floor and Altar steps were also in the blue of Our Lady of Fatima. We made a white tiled platform on the top rear of the Alter upon which we would place the candles. The safe, now made into a Tabernacle by Captain Xuyen, was placed on top of the Altar between the candle platforms. The top surface of the Altar was of white tile. The color theme throughout was blue and white. I had contracted painting the outside of the Church an adobe yellow (like many Churches in South America) as a practical matter. After I left Vietnam, the Vietnamese repainted the Church white carrying out the blue and white theme.
On December 29th, my friend Major Pham-Van-Tai, from the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, came down from Saigon, and we went to Sadec by helicopter for a visit to the 9th Division Ordnance Company (the 842d Ordnance Company) and the new ASP that was now in operation. Captain Walter F. Mellor, the Ordnance Advisor of the 842d, was in Saigon, so I slept in his bed that night. The next morning, Tai and I completed our inspection of the Supply Point, and concluded that the Lieutenant in Command was far too inexperienced for the job and that we would recommend to Dang that he assign Lieutenant Duc (541st Ordnance Company Executive Officer) as the ASP Commander. Truc, I knew, would not like the recommendation, Duc was an outstanding officer and Truc needed him badly at the Binh Thuy Depot - but not as badly as he was needed at the Sadec ASP. Duc was the most promising young Lieutenant we had, and an outstanding individual. Duc was strongly motivated by his Buddhist philosophy, which built in him strong moral character and good leadership qualities. After he took over the supply point, miraculous improvements were achieved. He had learned a lot from Truc and me in "making things happen," which was Truc's most outstanding characteristic. Duc had the qualities of leadership that would have taken him up the ladder of Command quickly if the government had not fallen in 1975.
On the afternoon of December 30th, Tai and I went by helicopter down to Ca Mau. Tai wanted to see for himself the conditions and possibilities of establishing an ASP there. The Office of the Chief of Ordnance was anxious to get direct logistical support as close as possible to our using units. After a visit with the Province Chief, we drove and walked all areas under consideration. Then we went back to the airstrip where our helicopter was waiting to take us to Bac Lieu, to confer with the 21st Division personnel, in whose tactical zone was Ca Mau. The 21st Division G-4 (Logistical Officer) said they would like an ASP at Ca Mau if one could be established. We got back to Can Tho about 4:00 PM.
On January 10th, Vince wrote to me from Vung Tau. He summed up our tour in a few words that said a great deal:
"Next month is February (and the end of our tours in Vietnam). Was it a quick year or a slow one? For me it was both. The front office recommended me for the Bronze Star with "V" (for Valor) and the Vietnamese put me in for their Gallantry Medal. But tell me Norm, who will ever believe our tales of this tour? Sometimes it doesn't even seem real to me as I look back. I am afraid that once back in the United States, in time it'll seem even less real. And I don't ever want to feel that way, because now I have a personal stake in this war. As Always, 'Sat Cong', Vince." Sat Cong means Kill Communists.
Sat Cong was the motto of the Junkmen, and they tattooed their motto on their chests, making certain death their end if the V.C. ever captured them. Fortunately most of them escaped in their junks when the country fell in April 1975.
Vince enclosed a newspaper clipping from the Asbury Park Sunday Press, dated December 20, 1964. This article expressed the personal satisfaction Vince received from becoming "personally involved" by becoming part of the Vietnamese effort, and part of the Vietnamese community - one of them. Those of us who did achieve this status all left part of us there in Vietnam, and brought a part of Vietnam back to the United States with us. The article, written by Peter Hoffman, follows:
"VUNG TAU, South Vietnam - Navy Lieutenant James Vincent is a 'Junkman' and proud of it.
"Officially, the 35 year old son of Mr. and Mrs. Benjamin Becker, 18 George Street, River Plaza, Middletown Township, New Jersey, is a Military Advisor to the Vietnamese 'Junk Fleet.'
"The fleet patrols thousands of miles of coast line and inland waterways trying to keep Viet Cong infiltrators out and stem the flow of weapons to the enemy.
"Lieutenant Vincent says of his duty, 'My fondest memories of this tour will be of myself living in the Junk Divisions with the junkmen, eating, singing, joking, fighting, and going out on patrol with them. They're like a tonic to me when I'm feeling blue and sorry for myself.
"In February, he'll be in a position to have memories of the junkmen. He is being transferred to the Lakehurst Naval Air Station for two years.
"Lieutenant Vincent, a 1948 Middletown Township High School graduate, is going beyond the assignment as a Military Advisor to the Vietnamese. Mr. and Mrs. Becker regularly send him candy and clothing which he distributes to the junkmen and their families. He has learned the native language and is now teaching English to 40 junkmen and one Catholic Priest. Shortly after arriving here in April, he wrote his parents, 'I'm trying real hard to learn this language because hardly any of the junkmen speak English. Well, the other night my chief (Chief Petty Officer) told me I was talking in my sleep - in Vietnamese!'
"In September while on a visit to one junk fleet base in Linh Hanh, he took along beer for the junkmen, candy for the children, and two towels each for the wives of the junkmen.
"Patrolling the seas and waterways aboard a Junk is risky business. The boats are the same design that plied the South China Sea hundreds of years ago. For one thing, there is no armor to stop enemy bullets. A .30 caliber machine gun bullet will pierce both sides of the junk's cabin.
"The fleet's mission is to stop all junks and search them for infiltrators, arms, and medical supplies. There are an estimated 50,000 junks in Vietnam.
"Cruising the Mekong River delta at night, the crew dresses in a black pajama-type uniform, and all men carry weapons. The slow moving junk presents an all too easy target for Communist snipers hidden in the dense jungle growth along the river banks.
"One reporter, who took a night cruise sent back this thumb nail sketch of Lieutenant Vincent, 'There, too is Jim Vincent, a Navy Lieutenant who resembles Smoky the Bear and likes nothing better than to shoot Viet Cong. He is never without an automatic rifle, a revolver, grenades in his pant's pockets, and candy in his shirt pockets for the children of the junkmen.' He called Lieutenant Vincent, and another Advisor Lieutenant Norman Mosher, Media, Pennsylvania, "Examples of the best kind of Advisors. They do not command; they advise. But they also speak the language, eat the Vietnamese food (including the congealed blood of chickens and ducks that the Vietnamese consider a delicacy), make patrols wearing the black outfit worn by the junkmen, share the common dangers and hardships.
"When they speak it is with authority. When the junkmen listen, they listen with respect. There is a great bond between the Advisors and the junkmen, and you see it at once.
"Recently, Vincent rigged a series of booby traps using hand grenades. It involved setting the grenades, then going back and gently pulling the pins."
"A false move could set off the grenade. When he went back to pull the pins, a small shy junkman came forward and said, 'Dai Uy (Navy Lieutenant) - I will pull the pins.' Vincent argued, but the junkman persisted. Finally Vincent yielded, and the junkman pulled all the pins without harm.
"Lieutenant Vincent has high praise for the Vietnamese soldier. In a letter home he wrote, 'I know there are many people in the States who feel the Vietnamese are afraid to fight. Nuts, if that were the case there wouldn't be a live American Advisor in this country now. They are the ones protecting us, and many times they give their lives protecting ours.
"He is firmly committed to the fight in Vietnam.
"'I have been here long enough to know that this war must be won, and it will be won no matter how long it takes and regardless of the cost,' he says.
"On another occasion he wrote his parents: ''I know you would like me to give you the straight story on what's going on over here in Vietnam, but the truth is that there is no one story and no sure fire solution. There is no doubt in my mind that we will win, but we must be prepared to stay and help for five or ten years. The Viet Cong can never win as long as the U.S. remains committed.
"I figure I know about 1.5 percent of the problems and less than one percent of the answers. Our military leaders here and the State Department people that come over are doing every thing possible to bring this war to a successful victory. We, and that includes Americans all over, must be prepared to go all the way.
"Lieutenant Vincent's wife, Pat and two sons, Michael and Joseph, are living in Norfolk, Virginia, awaiting his return.
"He recently wrote that he learned to eat with chop sticks soon after arriving in Vietnam, and notes happily, 'I have yet to leave the table hungry.'
"He also recalls his first visit to the village barber shop. 'Not only a haircut and shave (without lather) but a massage that left my head tingling for hours. They also shave the ears and forehead unless you stop them. Then they twist your head first to the right and then to the left. You can hear bones crack and pop.'
"There is no real let up from the tension of the war in Vietnam. Division 34 of the Junk Fleet is stationed in the Mekong Delta, and the base is surrounded by Communist held territory.
"At least half of the men at the base must stand guard at all times. The mud and straw houses within the compound are home for the Vietnamese and their Navy Advisors. A high mud wall surrounds the huts, and a 300 yard perimeter outside the wall is covered with barbed wire and mines.
"The Viet Cong make nightly sniper attacks at the base, but have not tried to take it. The men of Division 34, including Lieutenant Vincent, have devised their own counter attacks by laying ambushes and booby traps along the trails commonly used by the Viet Cong.
"Lieutenant Vincent soon will be replaced by another U.S. Advisor. But, his new duty in the security of the United States will not change his conviction that 'to neutralize is to Communize and every American that died here will have died in vain.
On January 4th, Van and I crossed the Bossac river on the Can Tho Ferry, and pulled in behind a 2 1/2 ton truck of troops that passed by going toward Vinh Long. At Vinh Long, we pulled in behind a 9th Division truck heading toward Sadec. We were going to spend the week at Sadec working with Lieutenant Duc at the ASP. It was a good week; we accomplished many tasks and I brought back with me a solid background and a real "feel" for the problems that Duc would have to face at Sadec to make the ASP productive. The 9th Division was the customer - and they were anything but cooperative. Duc prepared a security plan and we proceeded to build bridges for the guards to use to get to the guard towers (the area was under water). We restacked the ammunition (on the various platforms) into storage categories as they are prescribed; defensive positions were prepared; stock record accountability was established. I slept at Walt Mellor's house and Van stayed with his mother who lived at Sadec. Duc lived with his troops at the ASP. His family was still residing at Binh Thuy Depot.
On Friday, January 8th, Van and I headed back to Vinh Long, where we waited a short while for an escort. Finally, two M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers came by headed toward Can Tho and we tagged in behind them.
We had the joint Vietnamese - U.S. Advisor farewell party for Don Garvais on January 11th. It was a dinner party at the Phong Dinh Lau. Our little Ordnance Team was beginning to break up. Major Paul Martin, Don's replacement, had already arrived and now took over. Don's farewell party was the beginning of the end for Norb and me. It was one of those joyous/sad affairs. The three of us had become one of those rare perfect teams. Each pulled his own weight and a bit more. Each anxious to help the other. All absolutely confident of the all out support of the others. Norb and I hated to see Don Go, but we were happy for him. All of us missed our families terribly. In another month Norb and I would be gone too.
On January 14th, I saw Don off at the Can Tho airport. Don was one of those few individuals in the military that you "know" is going to the top.
The next evening there was another farewell party. This one was for Major Nguyen-Van-Nho, IV CALC Executive Officer.
Carl and I spent a quiet weekend 16-17 January) at Binh Thuy. Norb came out to visit as he usually did on the weekends, and we all attended Mass at Binh Thuy on Sunday afternoon. Shortly after we moved to Binh Thuy, I asked the IV Corps ARVN Chaplain to come to Binh Thuy and celebrate Mass for our little community. Father Nguyen-Khac-Nghieu came faithfully every Sunday afternoon and we celebrated Mass in the entrance cubical of our Barracks building, right next to my room. Sometimes I went to Mass in the compound in Can Tho, but usually I stayed at Binh Thuy and went to Mass with the Vietnamese.
On Tuesday, January 19th, I went with Paul Martin to Sadec by helicopter to visit the Ordnance activities there. Paul was getting his orientation for work during the next year. The rainy season was over now; it was hot and dry.
On the evening of January 22d, Colonel Rickman, Major William Coleman (Deputy Senior CALC Advisor), Charlie Holbrook and I had dinner at the home of Colonel Luyen, with the Colonel and his wife. Before dinner we sat and talked about our families back in the States. Madam Luyen was very attractive and charming. I talked and played with their children and thought of my own. Oh how I missed them and longed to see them again. The dinner was total perfection in all respects. It was served in courses, and the food was cooked French style.
Paul Teeters was transferred by R.M.K. from his job at the Binh Thuy Airfield to a construction project in Nha Trang. My good friend was gone again. I promised him that when Norb and I came up to Nha Trang for our Rest and Rehabilitation leave (R & R), we would certainly look him up. I met John Keyes, his replacement, and confirmed some oral commitments that Paul had made when we accepted the Depot from R.M.K.. Five flood lights for our perimeter fence had not yet arrived from the States, and Paul and I had made an oral agreement for their installation after they arrived in Vietnam - of course the agreement was really with Truc. Surely hated to see Paul go, but we would all be gone soon.
Norb and I were supposed to go to Nha Trang from the 25th to the 31st of January, but we were both so busy trying to finish up the projects we had started that we were actually relieved when our R & R trip was canceled. The roof was on the Church now, and the last of the contracts were negotiated. The original plan of Colonel Hien was to have the Church completed by Christmas and the Pagoda finished by Tet, the Vietnamese New Year. Our plans slipped, and we were behind on both of the projects.
On January 27th, I went to Vung Tau for a few days with Vince. I had canceled my R & R to Nha Trang completely, because Bob Sharp, my replacement, was to arrive at Saigon on the 29th and we would not have any over lap time together if I took my trip to Nha Trang. It was too bad that I missed it - but it was my own fault. I just kept putting it off until it was too late to go. So I told Paul Martin that I would just go to see Vince and come back with Bob Sharp on February 4th. I hated not going with Norb to Nha Trang, especially because I would miss seeing my old friend Paul Teeters. Norb would have to say good by for me.
I spent Thursday, Friday and Saturday (28-30 January) lounging on Vung Tau's back beach and visiting with Vince. I didn't do anything - I didn't want to - I was very tired and just wanted to rest. Harry Foradori called from Saigon on the 30th and I talked with Bob for a few minutes.
On Sunday morning, I went to St. Dominic's Church for Mass and met Vince for breakfast in the Mess Hall. Suddenly I wanted very much to be back at Binh Thuy with Carl, Truc, An and all the others. I walked over to the phone and "Operations" told me that a Caribou was departing for Can Tho in 20 minutes and I could go if I could make departure time. There was no time to really explain to Vince, and I know he must have thought I was disappointed in his hospitality, but I wasn't, I just wanted to go "home." I threw my things into my suitcase while Vince got a friend to drive us to the airfield. When we got to the airfield, the Caribou was just turning around at the end of the runway preparing to take off. Vince jumped out and ran to the radio operator in the Operations Office, while we drove out on the runway to the plane. I jumped in the tail of the Caribou and we were moving down the runway. That was my "good-by" to Vince, I never saw him again; we did exchange letters for a year or so though.
At Can Tho, I telephoned the depot and before long, Van was there and we were heading back to Binh Thuy.
On February 2d, the Feast of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin Mary, we celebrated the first Mass in the new Church. I consider that Church to be one of Our Lady's miracles. The road blocks to it's construction, it's financing, the contract negotiation problems, and actual work problems had all been successfully surmounted and the Church completed in four months. Completing anything in four months was in itself a miracle in Vietnam! There was still work to be finished, little things, but the Church was in operation at last.
On the 4th, Bob Sharp arrived at the airport on the morning Caribou from Saigon. Carl and I met him and we went back to Binh Thuy for lunch. Carl and I were concerned that Bob might not want to live at the depot with the Vietnamese. Not everyone can separate themselves from the U.S. community in a graceful manner, but Bob seemed like he would fit in well. Carl was concerned, because if Bob didn't stay at the depot (it was still a voluntary action), Colonel Rickman probably would require Carl to move back to the compound. Bob seemed like a good replacement for me; he was different and would offer a change of pace. He was more gregarious, I did not drink or smoke, and was inclined to serious reading. Bob was the gay party type that was more like the Vietnamese personality.
On the evening of the 5th, I went to "Happy Hour" at Eakin Compound for the traditional farewell party. I was presented two cartoon paintings. One of me eating with chop sticks captioned, "You are going to miss this place, Rick!" The other cartoon was of a Church and a Pagoda with me holding a long list of unfinished projects. I was saying, "It won't be competed in my time - but let us begin."
On Saturday morning, February 6th, the 840th Ordnance Battalion was formed in great splendor at the Binh Thuy Depot. Flags and banners flew from many poles in the area. Colonel Luyen presented to Walt Mellor and to me the Vietnamese Honor Medal for our efforts in Vietnam. After the ceremony, we had a little party of soft drinks and snacks.
Sunday night, Norb and I went to the IV CALC Advisor farewell dinner at the compound. We had a wonderful American steak dinner with all of the Advisors together - the last time for Norb and me.
On the 8th, Norb, Bob and I went to Sadec by road. This completed Bob's orientation of his duties and he took over the Advisory effort.
On the evening of February 9th, Norb and I were the guests of honor at a farewell dinner given by the officers of the 840th Ordnance Battalion. It was customary for the departing American to make a farewell address and for his counterpart to translate his speech into Vietnamese for the junior officers who could not understand English. Truc and I had been rehearsing my speech - in Vietnamese - and that was the way we did it; in reverse! I spoke in Vietnamese and Truc translated it into English for the Americans. The Vietnamese loved it; and I quote the speech here:
"I go back to the United States with a heavy heart because I must leave behind many close friends. The people of Vietnam have been very kind to me and I have grown to love them very much. There is a saying in the United States that when you are with good friends, time passes by very quickly. It is very hard for me to believe that a complete year has passed since I arrived here in Can Tho. Do you know why? Because I have been with many good friends. I came here as an Advisor, but found that one was not really needed - ammunition supply was in the very capable hands of Lieutenant Truc. So instead of being an Advisor, I became a student to learn from the Vietnamese people their beautiful customs and traditions. Binh Thuy Depot - where I lived, ate, slept, and shared happiness and sadness with you; you have taught me your language and your wonderful way of life.
"When I left my last military assignment, I thought I was leaving the best assignment I would ever have. But I was mistaken. The 541st Ordnance Ammunition Company was a great and wonderful surprise to me.
"I shall miss Vietnam and all of you who have been so wonderful to me, even though I return to the joy of my family after a year away from them. The world is small. The paths of Army people have a habit of crossing again somewhere. If you hear a "Hello" with a terrible accent, look for me, I will be calling to you. Today, the times are very sad for Vietnam, but as each of you contribute your part in the struggle to keep Vietnam free from Communist terror, remember that my heart is entwined with yours. I will be praying for you every day. Now God love you, and you love God."
It was all over and I was sad that night when I went to bed that last time at Binh Thuy.
The next morning I made the same farewell speech to the troops at work formation and shook the hand of each soldier and male civilian in ranks. Men and women did not touch each other in public in Vietnam, and I "forgot" this custom deliberately when I got to the end where the secretaries and record clerks were standing. I did not want to slight them. But even after knowing "that crazy American" for a year, the first young lady would not shake hands. Everyone laughed, not at me, but at the humor of traditional shyness winning out over a year of friendship. Van and I drove to the airport for me to catch that last Caribou flight to Saigon. Those Vietnamese closest to me came out to the airport to say good-by: Truc, An, Lilas, Van, Nho, Chu, all of the Company Officers, the Catholics who did volunteer work on the Church, Dang and The' from Battalion, Norb, Carl, Colonel Rickman, and Bob Sharp. When the Caribou came we all shook hands and bid farewell - but there were too many farewells - I missed my flight! Now that is one flight people just do not usually miss. Missing the plane did not bother me a bit and I realized how much I really was going to miss Vietnam and those friends. As I walked toward the terminal building, I jokingly whipped to the Manifest Clerk that I had been bumped off so many aircraft for "priority" passengers during the past year, that it was only fitting that I not get on the last plane. Norb had found a USOM aircraft that was going to Saigon so I wasn't delayed more than half an hour. After saying good-byes again, we were off the ground. As I looked down from the aircraft, I saw An, in her golden Au Dai (long dress) waving good-by from Truc's jeep. That was to be my last remaining clear memory of Can Tho and Binh Thuy for six years - An's waving good-by from the jeep.
At Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Headquarters, in Saigon, I met Harry Foradori and Jack Whitehorn (the III CALC Ammunition Supply Advisor) and gave Harry a final briefing on the status of ammunition support in the IV Corps area. Thursday and Friday, I "cleared" (went to each facility having an interest in the departing individuals) during the day and toured Saigon with Harry and Jack in the evening and on Saturday. One evening we went to the Goethe Institute to see the Albrecht Roser, Ina Von Vacano puppet show. It was in French and I could not understand a word of it but they were quite good. We could get the jest of the little plots from the puppets movements and expressions.
Saturday evening, I was the dinner guest of my old friend Captain Tung (former class mate at the Ordnance Career Course at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland), and his wife and family. We talked about Vietnam, the USA, and the Viet Cong threat. Tung was concerned for his children's security. One of his former counterparts, who had since returned to the United States had offered to take one of his children into his home until the Viet Cong were defeated. Madam Tung was strongly against this, but Tung felt he should accept the offer. He wanted my advice. I told him I felt the family should stick together as long as possible. A child growing up in the United States probably would find it very difficult to return to Vietnam and Vietnamese customs. It was a very sad conversation to say the least. Tung felt that the war effort would be much stronger if the families of the military could be moved some place like the Philippine Islands, where the soldiers would not have to worry about their safety. Tung felt the experience of living in a safe country would provide strong voices for stability after the Viet Cong threat passed. It was difficult for Americans to understand these problems that weighed so heavily on the minds of all of the Vietnamese. Late that evening, Tung and I drove all over Saigon, seeing the sights and just continuing our discussions of the problems he and the people must face in the future. Finally, Tung dropped me off at the Five Oceans Hotel, where I was staying with Jack Whitehorn. We said good-by there on the corner.
At 1:00 PM, Sunday, February 14th 1965, St. Valentines Day, I took off from Tan Son Nhut Airport in that beautiful Continental 707 Jet, and was on my way home to Nancy, John and Chris. Before supper time, we landed at Clark Field outside of Manila. In that I had served in Manila in 1945 and 1946, I wanted very much to see how the city had been re-built. We were not permitted to leave the Air Force Base even though we were there over six hours. At about 11:30 PM, we finally departed Clark Field and headed for Hawaii. Our 707 had movies and stereophonic music to help pass the time. The rich American food gave me a little trouble for a couple of weeks, and I first noticed this on the way home. We landed at Hawaii at about 10:30 AM, and I was met by three old friends, Harry and Anne Eastwood and John M. Brown. Harry, Brownie and I had served together in Counterintelligence at El Paso, Texas. We had just enough time for a cup of coffee and to catch up on what we had been doing, where we had been, and where everyone else was, when it was time to board the 707 for the last leg of our flight to Travis Air Force Base. We landed at Travis just after dark, and the cold February night air cut through our summer uniforms and thin Southeast Asia blood. I passed through customs and grabbed a bus to San Francisco's International air-port. I got there just in time to catch a flight to Los Angeles, but at Los Angeles, I missed the flight to El Paso by five minutes. I had to wait from 12:05 AM until 8:00 AM for a flight to El Paso. I called Nancy on the telephone, John and Chris had been waiting up for my arrival, but had fallen asleep. Nancy had already promised that they could miss school the next day, and so they would all meet me at the El Paso Airport. When I landed at El Paso, they were all there. Chris had grown a few inches since I'd last seen him. John had gained a little weight. Nancy was just the same as the day we parted. My hair was much more gray and I had lost weight. The cycle was completed, and already, as Vince had predicted, it all seemed like a dream.
This is not intended to be a record of my military service, but rather to relate my experiences with the people of the Mekong Delta. To maintain continuity, some sketchy military background seems appropriate.
In March 1965, after reporting for duty as the Assistant G-2, 5th Region, Army Air Defense Command, Ft. Sheridan, Illinois, Major General Robert A. Hewitt, Commanding General, presented the Bronze Star Medal to me for my work as Ammunition Advisor in the Mekong Delta.
In May 1965, I was assigned as the Escort Officer for a French Army Colonel who was visiting Headquarters Third Army, Chicago, and 5th Region, ARADCOM. I wish I could recall the Colonel's name, but I can not. One morning at breakfast he mentioned Vietnam. It turned out that he had been an Artillery Battery Commander and lived in the building that was in 1964 the Binh Thuy Strong Point. Binh Thuy, a small village half way around the world, and he had resided not more than a mile from where I had lived. We shared our experiences in Vietnam, and realized that those experiences were so very much alike. The Colonel did not share with me my expectations of success for the Republic of Vietnam.
On July 13, 1965, upon the departure of the G-2 for a new assignment, I was appointed G-2 of 5th Region, ARADCOM.
On the 15th of October, Major Phan-Van-Tai and Captain Lai-Nhu- Xuyen, my old friends at Office of the Chief of Ordnance in Saigon, visited me at Ft. Sheridan. They had just completed the Ordnance Career Officer Course, and were on their way back to Vietnam. We had corresponded, and I was expecting them. We had a great time talking over old times. I really longed for my friends back in Binh Thuy, and the incredible personal rewards I had received from my civic action work.
On November 1st, I called LTC Jerry Weatherall, at Military Intelligence Branch in the Pentagon, about the possibilities of a transfer to IV Corps Headquarters at Can Tho. Jerry said he could probably get me back to Vietnam, but I would have to get in country concurrence for an assignment to a specific location. He recommended I write the Senior Advisor at IV Corps. I wrote to the Chief of the Ordnance Division at Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and asked his advice. Such a short time had passed, I believed that among the Ordnance Staff there would still be people assigned who knew me or at least my professional reputation, and would take the time to make the inquiries about the possibilities and procedures to follow to work out an assignment to Can Tho. Colonel J.T. Prendergast responded to my letter. Things had really changed in the short time since I had left Vietnam. The personal relationships among Advisors was gone with a massive personnel replacement system that was reorganizing almost monthly. Major Paul Martin, who had taken Don Garvais place at Can Tho, was now the Deputy Logistical Advisor. Bob Sharp's replacement at Binh Thuy had already been designated (Captain Steve P. Takacs). Things were moving so fast that there was no way I would be able to coordinate a reassignment to Intelligence at IV Corps.
I read that U.S. Operations Mission (USOM) was recruiting former Advisors to fill Province Chief Advisor positions. I wrote to USOM to determine if I could be programmed to fill a position at Phong Dinh Province. They really liked my experiences at Binh Thuy and wanted me to apply for a Provincial Advisor position but because of the rapid build up of personnel were not geared to program individuals to specific locations.
I received a letter from Truc in December 1965; Le Trong (named after Colonel Trong, Chief of Ordnance), Truc and An's first son, had just been born.
On February 24th 1966, I was the guest speaker at the American Legion Americanism Dinner at Waukegan, Illinois, and appeared on radio station WKRS's talk show Viewpoint, with Vice Commander C. E. Warnecke, Homer Dahringer Post #281. I gave a one hour talk and slide show. It probably was a little longer than the people were expecting, but I wanted to educate them while I had the chance.
On March 3rd, our Headquarters moved to Montgomery, Alabama. Though I was delighted to get out of the cold weather, I was no longer "on the way" for Vietnamese officers attending school at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, when they returned to Vietnam. It was in Alabama that I started writing this book. Nancy had kept all of my letters, and I wrote a couple of times a week when I was at Binh Thuy. The book ended with Chapter 18, but by the time I got it to publishers, the public was interested in American troops in Vietnam, not Advisors; And the anti-Vietnam war protesters were already having their sway. Publishers were not interested.
I had continued in depth reading the works of authorities on insurgency warfare. But this free time reading was not a matter of record that would enhance my chances of an Intelligence assignment back to IV Corps Vietnam. So I enrolled and completed all of the correspondence courses of the Army Special Warfare School, Ft. Bragg. I completed the Counterinsurgency Operations Course in 1966.
On July 26th, I wrote to the 525 Military Intelligence Group in Saigon inquiring about the possibilities of an assignment in the Mekong Delta; I could not get any assurances where I would be assigned if I applied for a transfer.
On December 30th, I requested 30 days leave to return to Vietnam to visit the community at Binh Thuy. If approved, I could travel space available from California to Vietnam, and on to Binh Thuy. My Commanding General, Carl Darnell, would not approve a 30 day leave for his G-2. I had been G-2 for two successive Generals at 5th Region, (Major General Francis McGoldrick preceded General Darnell), and really loved that assignment. Both Generals really appreciated the work I did for them, and so documented. I was really confused at this time, I so loved that assignment, but still wanted to be back in Vietnam.
I had become part of the Army speakers bureau by now and was giving talks in the community. On February 17, 1967 I gave a talk to the Wetumpka Fine Arts Club, Wetumpka, Alabama. It was another one hour talk and slide show. Mrs. Rupert Ingram was President of the Fine Arts Club and invited me to give the talk. Her husband, Colonel Ingram, had been the Senior Professor of Military Science and Tactics at Oklahoma University, when I completed ROTC.
Truc wrote that his second son, Le-Tri had been born in February 1967.
Throughout 1967, I spent all of my free time studying to better document my knowledge of Wars of Liberation organization and methodology. I completed two more of the three courses at the Special Warfare School and ten subcourses from Army Branch Schools.
In January 1968, Truc and An wrote that their third son, Le-Truong, had arrived.
On the 6th of February, I was transferred to Intelligence Production Division, U.S. Army Pacific, Ft. Shafter, Hawaii, and on the 14th was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. I again contacted Military Intelligence Branch about the possibility of reassignment to the Delta. This time I was told that I had completed a tour in Vietnam, and when every other MI Branch Lieutenant Colonel had served in Vietnam, I might get a second tour, until then to just forget it and enjoy Hawaii.
On August 25th 1968, I received a letter from Truc. He said the Church was now too small for the number of people attending Mass, and he wanted to expand out both sides of the Church to make more room. People were attending Mass looking in the windows and a big crowd collected in front of the Church looking through the open front doors. The Military Chaplain at the Binh Thuy Airfield was now assigned to the Church to provide for the needs of this growing parish. The Pagoda was completed, but it too was too small for the needs of the people. 400 children were attending the school, now with 10 rooms. There were six teachers employed teaching five grades. Truc appealed to me to come back to Binh Thuy on leave and help with the work on the Church. He might have added develop funds and materials.
Intelligence Division Chief Paul A. Baldy, by now my close friend and well informed about my civic action projects in Vietnam, helped me prepare a request for 30 days leave at Binh Thuy. He prepared a proposed message to MACV requesting in-country clearance for the visit, and prepared the proposed document to be signed by Brigadier General William E. Potts, to the Chief of Staff, recommending approval. I got the concurrances of the G-1 (Personnel), G-4 (Logistics), G-5 (Civil Affairs), and the Staff Judge Advocate (Legal). I felt certain this attempt would fly. General Potts went to Oklahoma Military Academy, and my sister ran around in the same crowd as did General Potts. Mrs. Potts had attended Monte Cassino High School in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Nancy and I were acquainted with her. The Potts were very nice to us in Hawaii, and invited us to attend social events. We were truly honored by their invitations. I thought my leave request would surely be approved. By now, Paul Baldy thought so too, and commented, "You are going to try and find a job over there - you don't plan to come back, do you?" I confided that if I got over there, I'd find a way to stay. The request went forward to General Potts on the 22d of October; on the 23d I got a call from Colonel Blewett, General Potts' Deputy; he simply stated that General Potts declined to forward my request and he was returning the documentation. After that, I gave up trying to return to Vietnam and settled back to enjoy racing my Columbia 22 sailboat, the "Nancy Lee", in beautiful Hawaii.
During 1970, Truc went to the Advanced Officer Course at Aberdeen Proving Grounds. On return he took 10 days leave in Hawaii and stayed with us. We had such a good time; so much to talk about. We toured Oahu and he so enjoyed the Polynesian Cultural Center. I took him on the Dillingham sailboat race to Kaneoe Bay, and we came in 1st place in our class. He really enjoyed that experience. The next weekend was the Columbia 22 State Championship race, and he planned to go in that race too, but took ill. I stayed home with him, and my crew went on the race without me and won.
On July 11th 1970, I requested an extension of four months in Hawaii, so that my children could stay in school until the end of the school year. Boom! By return mail, I got orders to Vietnam! I could not believe it! I called Military Intelligence Branch and summarized my attempts to get back to Vietnam; I quoted the word last given me, that when every other MI Lieutenant Colonel had a tour in Vietnam, I might get a second tour. I pointed out two MI Lieutenant Colonels in G-2 who had not had a first tour. I frequently emphasized that I was not complaining and did not want off the orders, but I sure gave them a hard time!
Nancy wanted to go back to Montgomery, Alabama, and be with the ARADCOM wives she liked so very much. I called Colonel Paul Wolfe, and he started looking for housing. He found a house, but we would have to immediately commit ourselves sight unseen. Nancy is very particular about housing, and wanted to wait until we got there. That was a big mistake. We arrived and could not find anything. She elected to settle at Huntsville, Alabama. I had been assigned to the Army Ordnance Missile Command there; a fascinating tour as Space Project Officer in the Control Office, on the staff of Major General John Bruce Medaris. Nancy still had civilian friends there.
CHAPTER 20 - 1970 - 1971 SECOND TOUR.
On September 27th 1970, I reported for the Southeast Asia Orientation Course at the Intelligence School, Ft. Holibird, Maryland. This course provided an up to date status of the situation in Vietnam.
My orders directed I report to Travis Air Force Base, California, on November 8th. 16 days leave before the orientation course and 25 days after completion of the course was just too much; besides, I was very anxious to get back to Vietnam. I reported in early, and on October 13th, arrived at Ton Son Nhut Airport in Saigon. The flight over was an uneventful jet flight; a great improvement over the propeller driven aircraft flight in 1964. The changes at Ton Son Nhut were significant. In 1964/65, it was predominantly a civilian airport with considerable military activity. Now it was an intensely active military airport with civilian participation.
Along with many other new arrivals, I inprocessed, completing administrative requirements for the next few days, and had a chance to get over jet lag. As soon as I had my feet on the ground, I contacted the officer section in the Adjutant General's Office, and made known my desire to return to duty in the Mekong Delta, specifically at G-2, Delta Regional Assistance Command (DRAC) at Can Tho.
I was informed that my name had been submitted to the Commanding General of I Corps (the northern most military area of S. Vietnam), and the AG would not withdraw that nomination. There were two vacancies at DRAC for Lieutenant Colonel, MI Branch, and I was the first (to this individual's knowledge) to have volunteered for DRAC Headquarters. I made it clear that I still wanted the assignment to DRAC, and the AG spokesman said to wait and see if I was accepted for the G-2 position by the Commanding General of I Corps; if I was not selected, there would not be any problem assigning me to DRAC.
In the evenings, I toured Saigon. It was strange being there, and none of my friends of the first tour being there. The changes in Saigon were significant; U.S. personnel flocked the streets, there was a proliferation of bars, the people were definitely not as friendly. They were not unfriendly, just not interested in Americans; I guessed they had gotten to know us well during the intervening six years.
During the day, I lounged about the officer barracks and talked with other new arrivals. I met Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Hutchins, MI Branch, and we spent time together at the PX, and where ever transients twile away time.
Finally the call came from the AG. I had been accepted by the CG of I Corps as his G-2, and was to leave immediately. I protested, and was rebuffed. Finally I asked the AG action officer to quote my words to the Commanding General, I Corps, "I do not want to be your G-2," and if he still wanted me to be his G-2, I was ready to go. As I expected the Commanding General, I Corps, released me for assignment to DRAC. The AG action officer said he would nominate me to the CG of DRAC, and call me back with the response.
On September 23d, I was accepted and assigned for duty with DRAC. I got transportation to the DRAC air traffic control office, and was told that I'd be on a helicopter to DRAC within an hour. Shortly, I boarded the helicopter for that last leg of my journey "back home."
We landed at the Soccer Field, next to the Eakin Compound, something new to me. In 1964 this had been a very active sports activity; now it was a helicopter pad. I signed in for duty, and was given a temporary civilian apartment accommodation downtown in Can Tho.
Curiosity was driving hard, and I decided to walk to downtown Can Tho. I planned to walk around the area and eat at the Phong Dinh Lau Restaurant; then go out to Binh Thuy and visit with Truc, An and family.
I had not walked more than a few blocks, when two small boys came along and talked with me in Vietnamese. One took my left and the other took my right hand and we walked along, as my memories flooded back to mind of days gone by. Suddenly the boy on my left grabbed my watch and the one on the right tried to restrain my hand momentarily. My watch was gone in an instant, but I was quick enough, and had a solid grip on the little thief, while the second boy disappeared. The boy dropped the watch at my feet and struggled to be free. I spoke to him in Vietnamese saying that he was a very bad boy, not a good boy, then released him. I had my watch back, and nothing more could be done except possibly give a false impression of Americans to Vietnamese civilians on the street. Another change was evident; in 1964 this would not have happened. I learned that these kids were orphans, who banded together as a family and support group. They lived on the streets, slept in a jeep or what ever they could find for the night. The only support was what they stole.
Lunch at the Phong Dinh Lau was a great disappointment. The meal was far substandard to what we had at our dinner parties in 1964.
I called Truc on the telephone at the Binh Thuy Depot. He was gone; he had just been transferred to Ban Me Thut in 2d Corps. I explained who I was, and asked for other Company officers; they were all gone. It was siesta time (the Vietnamese take a two hour siesta after lunch), and I decided to try again another day, when I could have the benefit of an interpreter.
The G-2, Lieutenant Colonel Ephriam E. Waller, returned from a day in a helicopter with Major General John Cushman, CG of DRAC; we had dinner together in the General's Mess that evening, and I met General Cushman. He was the Colonel Cushman I knew only by reputation in 1964. In 1964 he was the Senior Advisor to the 21st ARVN Division, with headquarters at Bac Lieu. In 1964, he was liked or disliked; no blend of either. Other than having met him at Bac Lieu on a visit once, and performing some administrative task for him while I was Duty Officer at Eakin Compound, I had never had any personal contact with him.
After dinner, Ephrim Waller and I had a private talk. I was to be his Deputy, and the AG was nominating other Lieutenant Colonels; one of which was to be selected for assignment. Ephrim wanted me to talk to the other officers of G-2 the next day while he was away with General Cushman, and to attend the evening briefing as a spectator. He took me to the rooms of some of the G-2 officers and introduced me.
The next morning, I met with the G-2 Intelligence Sergeant, who gave me the administrative policy files and an organization briefing.
About mid morning, I was told that a Vietnamese Priest was asking to see me. I met Father Nghiu. Father Nghiu was the Chaplain at the Binh Thuy Airfield. Because of my telephone call to try to find Truc, the people at Binh Thuy knew I was back, and a luncheon was prepared to honor me; I was to go immediately with him to Binh Thuy.
We left in his jeep, and the surprises for me were around every corner. I could not believe the growth of Can Tho during my six year absence. Businesses were proliferating and all the way past the Can Tho ferry road and on to the Can Tho Airfield. We did not stop there, but the commercial aircraft were in abundance. Rice paddies beyond Can Tho Airfield were now fully developed. We crossed the Bridge and were in Binh Thuy District. The Strong Point was still there, but much developed. I doubted that a Captain was in command!
As we approached the Ammunition Depot, a couple of hundred people were along the road on the family quarters side and cheered a welcome to me.
We entered the gate, and the Company officers were in a formal formation to greet me. Across the street in front of the Depot Office there was a little group of military and civilian people standing quietly. After introductions and welcome by the Company officers, we crossed the street to the little assembly of people who were with the Company, Civil Guard or civilian workers at the time I was at Binh Thuy in 1964. I recognized only one face, that of Madam Nho; either the faces of the others had changed, or they were of the hundreds who were there and knew me, but people with whom I did not have enough direct contact to recall their face. The welcome was very touching; if only for the fact that the leaders and people attending the luncheon only knew me by reputation, but went to the major effort of preparing the celebration.
The evening briefing did not go well for the G-2 Section. The Lieutenant Colonel being relieved by Ephrim Waller was actually still the G-2. General Cushman orally criticized him and the G-2 briefing more severely than I had ever heard a General criticize in the presence of others - it was really a bad scene. As time went by I came to know that if you did a good job, the way General Cushman wanted it done, he was a great person to work for, but if you did not do your home work, he would tear you apart on the spot without mercy.
No one worked as hard is General Cushman - no one. He was very intelligent and had a memory like an elephant. I heard him comment twice that information had been briefed before, adding "don't brief that again."
After the briefing, Ephrim asked me what we were going to do? The General insisted that he be with him on every trip and during every meeting; Ephrim had no time to run the shop or become aware of the changing enemy situation. I told him that we should reorganize to give the General what he wanted: I should run the shop, he should be with the General and answer all intelligence questions, and the new Lieutenant Colonel should run the Current Intelligence Section, become intensely knowledgeable of the changing situation, give the evening briefing and at every available moment pump Ephrim up with new developments in the enemy situation. Ephrim agreed.
The next morning, Ed Hutchins arrived for duty with G-2. He moved in with me in temporary quarters, and then we shared a room in the hotel in downtown Can Tho leased by the Army.
The Advisory Team worked 12 - 14 hours a day six and seven days a week. Soon we had the confidence of General Cushman and our G-2 Section were the fair haired boys. There was very little time for me to get involved in civic action as on my first tour. I managed to stay over night once a month with Father Nghiu at Binh Thuy, and go to Mass with the people, but that was about it. I supported the parish projects as best I could.
Colonel Lac, ARVN IV Corps Chief of Staff, asked me if I could help the Dominican Father building a college by obtaining enough sand to raise the ground level for the building two feet. Oh how I wished I had my good friend Paul Teeters! I was able to find a contractor willing to provide the sand if we could find trucks to pick it up. I figured it would take about one hundred 2 1/2 ton truck loads to meet the requirement. Colonel Lac and I tried to find the transportation or funds to hire transportation but couldn't. There just was no time to do the fund raising or coordination, and the American community was just too busy to give the time necessary to accomplish civic action. Time had changed all of that.
I represented the G-2 Section on a planning committee preparing a three phase drawdown organizational plan. "Vietnamization." That plan was implemented by G-2 in early July, when Ephriam Waller was transferred. Our time was drawing short now. General Cushman directed that I conduct a survey of classified documents and execute the destruction of all not required to be completed before my tour terminated.
I was presented an Oak Leaf Cluster for my Bronze Star Medal on May 5th, in recognition for some work I had done in G-2.
During my first tour in Vietnam, I was so involved I missed my Rest and Rehabilitation (R&R) Leave. This time, I made plans to return to Hawaii, and with my racing crew participate in the Around the Island Race between May 27th and June 2nd. It was a delightful break, and the "Nancy Lee", the Columbia 22 sailboat my boys and I had enjoyed so much while we were stationed there, came through with first place! We won! I thought of Truc, and the sailing we enjoyed together on the "Nancy Lee."
On July 6, 1971, the Vietnamese Army presented to me the Vietnamese Staff Officer Medal.
On July 12th, I received orders for assignment to Ft. Huachuca, AZ, the new location of the Intelligence School.
Upon completion of the classified document survey and destruction, General Cushman directed that I conduct an investigation into accidental deaths during an air support mission; upon completion of that investigation, the General would give me an early release for my next assignment. Most of the investigation travel was by helicopter, but I wanted to make one road trip back through territory I had driven so often six years earlier. On September 5th, SGT Be and I drove to Minh Duc to get signatures on statements. Telephone lines and poles were gone; even the land itself looked hostile. It was not as before; the situation had depreciated considerably since 1964.
Father Nghiu came to my office and informed me that Madam Nho had been struck by a 2 1/2 ton truck and killed. I went to her home to console her family as best I could. It was very sad.
On September 12th, I gave General Cushman my personal comments and final investigative report. He bid me well on my next assignment; my second tour was over.
On September 13, 1971, I once again left the Can Tho airport for Saigon. A far different and routine processing than the farewell at that airport six years earlier. Before, I was determined to return; this time I knew I would not be back. It was as sad an occasion as the consoling of Madam Nho's family. I did not meet with Truc and his family even one time. Father Nghiu was the only Vietnamese there to say good by.
I hope this book documents some of the really good things Americans did in Vietnam, and the sincere regard we had for the people of Southeast Asia. Those of us who served there need for America to recognize that effort. That was the reason and purpose of this book. The first tour shows what American service men did in civic action when time was available for them to spend in that effort; the second tour shows how little can be done, even by people who are highly motivated to do civic action work, when they are so very deeply committed to a war effort. If there was less involvement of American service men in civic action after 1965 it was because they did not have the time; they are the same servicemen.
Upon return to the United States after my second tour in the Mekong Delta, I was assigned as head of the Interrogation Committee (school) at the Army Intelligence School, Ft. Huachuca, AZ. Until March 30, 1974, when I retired, I was in continual contact with Southeast Asian Officers attending the Intelligence School. In 1972, MAJ Trinh-Quang-Chuc, one of the officers with whom I had served at G-2 in Can Tho, was a student at Ft. Huachuca, AZ. I spent a lot of time with him, and got an update on what was happening in the Delta. COL Tay and LTC Tu, the G-2 and Deputy, were still at IV Corps Hqs at that time. I don't believe any of them got out when the country fell.
In 1980, I quit my job with the State of Florida, and went back to College. I obtained a BA degree in Psychology and went to work for Catholic Social Services' Refugee Social Services Program RSSP. 95% of the refugees with whom we worked were from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. During the next five years, I worked at job development, career counseling, economic development of the refugee community and business counseling.
The first thing I did was to searched for information about my friends in Vietnam. Not one of them to my knowledge got out; certainly not Truc and his family. Suanne Brooks, Director, Office of Refugee Resettlement, Atlanta, GA, was especially helpful. I gave her the names and dates of birth of Truc's family, and she accessed the computer in an attempt to find them. The computer is not perfect, but we are pretty certain that they did not get out. When the Communists took over, all of the S. Vietnamese field grade officers were put into concentration (Re-education) camps. I have personal knowledge of only one being returned to the Vietnamese community, and none have gotten out of Vietnam. It is commonly accepted in the refugee community that many of the able bodied field grade officers were sent to Siberia to perform as slave labor, as a war reparation payment to the USSR. Truc could have been one of them.
I believe America is in for a big surprise 15 to 20 years from now. The children of these refugee families of the Valley of Tears will be adults. Their parents have made unbelievable sacrifices for them, and the children have taken full advantage of the opportunities in America. Years from now, this first generation of Southeast Asian native born Americans will be Congressmen, Senators, Doctors, Lawyers and Community Leaders. At the time of this writing, the daughter of one of our South East Asian Staff has obtained a PhD in Psychology.
The refugees were not a representative cross section of the Southeast Asian population. They were survivors. 100% of the adults were survivors; people determined not to submit to communist slavery. What a great genetic input to America's mixing bowl! They endured terrible experiences escaping to freedom. Estimates as high 50% of those attempting to escape died enroute. Those Vietnamese escaping by boat to Thailand had to run a blockade of pirates who committed terrible atrocities on them. The Cambodian people are almost extinct in Cambodia; perhaps more Cambodians are now in the free world than in their native land. 1,000,000 Cambodians were herded out of the Capitol by the Communists and killed. I have talked with some who escaped that horror. One is an artist in St Petersburg, Sokha Hien, who has painted pictures to record what happened. The Cambodian refugees are not organized or financially able to make known their "holocaust"; but they want you to know about it. Where are all those "caring people" who demonstrated against the war now? What are they doing to help the refugees they created?
I often felt that there were special interests, who, if they had their way, would have made welfare dependents of these very unique survivors. At RSSP we would not have it so. All of our staff had lived in Southeast Asia and had seen how these people work in their own environment; ours was the Nhan Vi philosophy of Ngo-Dinh-Diem; give them only the essentials necessary to get them started helping themselves, withdraw that help before they lose their dignity and independence. By 1982, when unemployment in America was very high, we in St Petersburg had 100% employment of our Southeast Asian refugees. We were given recognition as a model program by the Office of Refugee Resettlement, and a grant for me to travel seven states to teach our job development methodology.
Our Staff started Hallmark Services, Inc., a very high quality commercial janitorial service. Phuc Van Nguyen was President, and the Corporations five Board Members were refugees. Most of Hallmark's employees were from my part of the Mekong Delta; Bac Lieu, Vinh Long, Sadec, Soc Trang, Rach Gia. I am very proud to have been a part of that effort. Though my part was initially its first Chairman of the Board, and subsequent advisor, Phuc knew how to make things happen and made it all happen. When our economic development grant ended, so did my salary; but I continued full time for six more months performing administrative work for Hallmark. A very happy/sad day came when Phuc told me that he was ready to go it alone; he felt he did not need help any more. RSSP had achieved its goal.
One of the saddest periods of my life was the Spring of 1975, when the news was full of the fall of Vietnam, terminating on fateful April 30, 1975. On TV I saw An at the gate of the American Embassy, asking a guard in English, "Can you help me?" The embassy was being evacuated by helicopter. She was alone. I assume Truc was up north when everything collapsed. Forewarned, she and the children probably got to Saigon where her parents lived.
As a military man, I felt abandoned by the American people and our government. All those fine men who gave their lives to keep Vietnam free, and ten times that number that were wounded and scarred physically and psychologically for life; 100 times that number of Vietnamese suffered the same fate! Was all this for nothing? Are Americans so much like leaves blowing in the wind that they will commit American lives and then simply throw in the towel? Does America have the staying power to win when engaged in a protracted War of Liberation? If not, we are in for big troubles in South and Central America. Vietnam was not lost by the military in Vietnam, it was lost on the streets and in the elected governmental bodies of America. If America is not ready to take the next step, where ever it leads, it must not take the first step in war. My son John was in the Army during the Vietnam war period (1972- 74); though he was assigned to Korea and did not get to Vietnam. My other son, Chris, would have been of age to go into the service in 1977. I expected them to go, and was confident in my feelings that America should help countries fend off "Communist Wars of Liberation."
Now, many years after the fall of Saigon, my bitterness remains for those Americans who raised the Viet Cong flag of the enemy in our streets; who called us murderers and pigs. Our government must recognize by law actions the President can take to fight Wars of Liberation. A condition has developed from the War Powers Act that narrows and removes our flexibility to act. We must have alternatives other than doing nothing and declaration of war. Advisors are not covert operators; they are openly assigned and "non actor" individuals giving advice; they are not troops. They may be in a hostile environment; that is the job for which they are paid. They are not "boys" they are professional men in their prime of life performing duties which they accepted voluntarily. Special Forces personnel also are highly experienced professional volunteers who do not need to be coddled. The mission of these two professional careers should be free to provide alternatives between doing nothing and declaration of war. If America again gets into a military action beyond the commitment of Advisors and Special Forces, it should first declare war or the War Powers Act should prevail. Had we been in a declared war, those people who carried the flag of the enemy in our streets would legally have been guilty of treason.
My Supervisor at Catholic Social Services, Michael Cook, opined that my work with the refugee community and particularly with Phuc Van Nguyen was a psychological substitution for Truc and his family and the guilt I felt for America's abandonment of them. I suspect he was right. I think I've worked my way through that now, being satisfied to monitor refugee achievements in the newspaper and TV media.
Communist insurgency is organized to be implemented in phases; generally accepted to fall into three (Phase I, II and III).
During the first phase, the Communists concentrate on organizing from the bottom. Real or imagined grievances are exploited among the people and exploitation is gradually increased commensurate with the local situation, organizational and resources development. One small area may be in phase one, and an adjacent small area may be in phase two. An area may transition from phase one to two, and upon receipt of reversals transition from two back to one. Phase one becomes phase two with increased terrorism. Effectively stopping the Communist insurgency effort should commence as soon as there is evidence phase one insurgency is in operation. Usually a government identifies the movement very late in phase one; often too late.
In phase two, the Communist insurgency effort manifests the first indications of an organized guerrilla warfare. The major effort is still toward mobilizing the general population toward their cause and in consolidating their gains. The government will be fully aware that an organized insurgency is underway and that it has lost control of some areas of their country; though they may not publicly acknowledge the loss. Neither side during this phase has the power to defeat the other. The Communist effort has the objective of wearing down the government over time.
In a revolution directed at the top of government, the effort is toward the overthrow of the leader and gaining control by coup d'etat. The Communist War of Liberation directs its effort toward the people themselves at the bottom of the social system. Their aim is not to take over the existing government, but to destroy that government and replace it completely. Their efforts from the beginning toward this objective are to neutralize the military and police establishment through subversion and civil disobedience. Unless the insurgency is stopped during this first phase, I personally doubt it will be stopped. Efforts have been successful in stopping a Communist insurgency during phase one, but the government effort to keep the insurgency suppressed usually fails. I say this because the Communists have and will continue to develop the phase one insurgency, only dropping back in intensity. They are not going to quit, and democratic institutions are hard put to maintain the suppression within the limits we apply to minimum levels of freedoms.
We in the United States are very impatient with our third world friends who violate or restrict freedom (as we see it) of their people. I personally do not believe a Communist insurgency can be stopped by a third world country limited to the restrictions we place on them. I do not advocate another position than the one we hold; I do not know the answer to this problem. But I am convinced that if we hold a third world friend to our standards of democratic institutions it will not be able to suppress a Communist insurgency.
During phase one, the Communist insurgency must in each area:
1. Define the problem through intelligence collection and analysis. This effort will be continuous, and be the basis for evolving the infrastructure; scale it up or down to meet the ever changing situation. Real and imagined grievances must be defined. Personnel must be identified for recruitment of infrastructure cadre; they must be carefully trained.
2. Propagandize to exploit real and imagined grievances of the people. The objective of this effort will be to establish a political constituency. If the government identifies what is going on and takes action to suppress the insurgency, propaganda will be focused on harsh repressive governmental reactions to insurgent initiated demonstrations. If the action of the government is not repressive enough to exploit, the demonstrations will be escalated into riots until the government does react in a manner that will support the propaganda that it is repressive. Once you grasp the significance of this concept, you can begin to see that the government is in a no win situation when restricted to our standards. This warfare concept takes advantage of our freedoms and our standards for third world friendly governments. The situation is very difficult for us in the same way because we would have to prove by evidence acceptable in a court of law that the insurgency was a Communist insurgency dedicated to the overthrow of the established government before effective action could be taken to stop the insurgency. You are not likely to get enough of that type proof to stop the insurgent; particularly when our rules are applied toward the way evidence is obtained.
3. All of the intelligence gathering and propagandizing real and imagined grievances is worthless without organization. This task takes advantage of the discontent created and the individuals identified as angry enough to take action. These individuals will be recruited to further the insurgency propaganda in the organization to which the individual belongs and at his work site. The individual will continue his propaganda gaining sympathizers until the organization actually becomes a front for the insurgency. Some of the people identified will be recruited into the Liberation Front organization. As these agents demonstrate loyalty and acceptable revolutionary behavior, the best will be recruited into the political infrastructure or shadow government.
4. As the organization develops and is filled with recruits, personnel will be trained for the Liberation Army. Safe areas will be established where the insurgency controls the area, or in areas where governmental leaders have been recruited and can provide security with governmental forces, or order the governmental forces to stay away from the safe area. Political and front cadre also must be trained and politically indoctrinated.
5. Part time and then full time guerrilla forces having been fully trained carry out very limited engagements where success is absolutely assured: Kidnapping for ransom money to fuel the insurgency, small raids on police stations to get arms and ammunition. These activities are often directed by training cadre when a group "graduates" from training. Full time Liberation Army forces are not organized until the Political Infrastructure is strong enough to support it logistically, provide replacements recruited from the Liberation Front activities and obtain the intelligence necessary to assure successful paramilitary activity.
Phase two begins when all three organizational elements are established and functioning, and the Liberation Army is engaging in activities that seriously challenge police and military units. It continues to be called phase two until the full time Liberation Army is of sufficient strength to begin to wear down the governmental military forces. The infrastructure provides the Liberation Army with food, money, intelligence and personnel. Most of the food is obtained locally with funds obtained through kidnapping, extortion from businesses and taxation. Income tax computation eventually over time becomes very sophisticated to preclude individuals claiming they pay more tax than others; they start out simply requiring a percentage of production. Local Infrastructure Cadre will compute and work continually to sophisticate the tax collection. Funds converted into foreign currency will provide logistics not available within the country. Within each village Propaganda and Training Cadre of the Infrastructure give lectures and engage in the entrapment techniques described by Major Dang in this book. Recruits are developed and assigned Liberation Front tasks until proven reliable; then are assigned to the Liberation Army, Liberation Front or Shadow Government Infrastructure organizations. After the military actions justify, recruitment will be very direct, with Liberation Army elements taking a village over night for recruitment (through motivation, fear and intimidation). Young men leave the next morning with that military element. Intelligence through agents developed or inserted into government forces, political apparatus and police forces, entertainment locations (where these personnel spend their free time), must assure the insurgency knows instantly what the government is doing. Government and military personnel are recruited to remain in place and act as agents or to defect. The Civilian Proselytizing Section, Military Proselytizing Section and the Security Section of the Infrastructure Organization actually make the recruitment contact, though the names may be provided by the Liberation Front Organization.
The Infrastructure organization establishes police and court systems to resolve civil disputes. The Security Section will conduct the investigation to develop the facts upon which the police and court will act. Having been provided the facts and names of witnesses, the "Peoples Court" will try the case and carry out the decision of the court. During the day when governmental forces control the area, the government police prevail; during the night, when the insurgency controls the area, the insurgency polices and operates courts. Swift and acceptable justice is the primary objective of the "Peoples Court". Propaganda and Training Cadre exploit the contrast between the fast effective insurgency justice and the slow and inefficient justice of the freedom protected governmental system. At a time when fear for physical security is very strong, the continual inference that under the insurgency the people will be protected is effective. One might critically examine our own justice system and conclude how effective a communist propaganda supported by a "Peoples Court" might be. Infrastructure medical teams work in the villages training local people to provide medical care and mid-wife services, and operate the dispensary. Wounded Liberation Army personnel will be treated by these medical teams, who are protected from exposure particularly because their primary overt purpose is to provide medical services for the local civilians.
By now, seven or eight sections of the Shadow Government Infrastructure are in place in every village and hamlet:
1. Organization Section - Provides the infrastructure record keeping functions; issues orders, publishes procedures and policies of the Committee.
2. Commo-Liaison Section - Provides communication through runners using dead drops and coordinated meeting points for Commo-Liaison personnel of adjacent areas. They act as guides for Liberation Army elements and Infrastructure leaders passing through that assigned area.
3. Finance and Economy Section - already discussed; collects money and develops tax systems.
4. Civilian Proselytizing Section - Recruits personnel from the established governmental organizations and general population.
5. Military Proselytizing Section - Recruits personnel from governmental military and police forces, and their dependents.
6. Propaganda and Training Section - Already discussed.
7. Security Section - Conducts counterintelligence and intelligence collection functions, maintains law and order. Conducts assassinations on direction of the Committee Chief at Province or higher level.
8. A military affairs coordinator, or a Military Affairs Section (Province and higher levels), assures coordination between the Liberation Army, the Infrastructure and the Liberation Front.
When the organization is complete it functions laterally by Committee with respective Sections of neighboring villages working together, neighboring Provinces working together; and functions vertically as a chain of command through Committee Chiefs and technical command through respective Sections working with higher and lower Sections. In each activity organization there is a Political Officer (Communist Party Member). The political officers are a chain of command and intelligence net within the chain of command that assures policies and directives from the top prevail.
Without the Infrastructure, the Liberation Army is a guerrilla force without logistical and communication support and without defined objectives to meet political goals. Without the Infrastructure, the Liberation Front is a political action committee only, with most of its activities potentially legal. With the Infrastructure, the three elements are a powerful political force with which we have yet learned a way to defeat (within the limits of our standards of democratic institutions).
To defeat the Communist Liberation Warfare concept, we must target the Infrastructure; it must be destroyed and attacked with intensity over time to preclude its reorganization. Without the Infrastructure, the guerrilla forces can not endure the organized governmental military forces; the political action fronts will separate to focus on specific grievance to be satisfied by the government.
The defeat of the Infrastructure is a major counterintelligence mission, that must have laws to assure its success. Presently, an attack on the Infrastructure brings major demonstrations by the Liberation Front charging effectively that the government is attacking its political opposition. This is particularly frustrating for the USA when working with third world governments where there is generally corruption and claims that all of its opposition is communist. The free world must come to grips with this dilemma or be frustrated to the end - Communist domination.
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